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The thesis is composed of three chapters on topics related to banking.  The first 
chapter studies the impact of emotions on real-world decisions made by loan officers 
by analyzing the loan conditions of loans granted immediately after a bank branch 
robbery. We find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a 
robbery (compared to changes in loan conditions that occur contemporaneously at 
unaffected branches) suggesting that loan officers do change their decisions following 
this event. In general loan officers seem to adopt so-called avoidance behavior: they 
decrease at once the likelihood of having contact with the client by lengthening the 
maturity of the loan contract and by demanding more collateral thereby reducing the 
probability of loan non-performance (and dealings with the client) prior to maturity. 
Loan officers also end up granting loans with somewhat softer loan conditions. 
Further in accordance with the literature on posttraumatic stress we find that the 
avoidance behavior that manifests itself in loan conditions is halved within two weeks 
after the robbery and that the effect further varies depending on the presence of a 
firearm during the robbery. 
 
The second chapter analyses the repayment decisions of firms with multiple loans 
that, for liquidity constraints or strategic reasons, stop making payments in some but 
not all their loans. Using a sample of commercial loans from Colombia over the 
period 2002:03 – 2012:06, I find that firms are less likely to delinquent on loans 
granted by banks with which they have long relationships and by banks with which 
they have a clean repayment history. These results suggest that firms are concerned 
with losing the benefits gained through the relationship and that they anticipate that 
banks will punish more the delinquencies made to their own loan portfolio than to the 
one of their peers. I also find that firms are more likely to delinquent on loans granted 
by foreign and by public banks and on loans that are more likely to end up in a 
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renegotiation process. This suggests that the ability and willingness of the bank to 
punish the firm for misbehaving play an important role on firm’s decision. Overall, 
the results suggest that firms assess the influence of their delinquency choices on their 
ability to obtain new loans in the future. 
 
The third chapter analyses the causal link between the length of the credit bureaus 
retention time and the subsequent behavior by lenders and borrowers. It exploits a 
quasi-experimental variation in retention times, provided by the introduction of the 
Habeas Data law in Colombia. The law was ratified in 2009 and prohibited 
institutions in Colombia to access the entire credit history of borrowers. Since then, 
the negative credit information is observable only for a period that depends on the 
length of the delinquency period. Our results, suggest that after the introduction of the 
Habeas Data law: i) the duration of loan delinquency periods are longer, ii) firms 
seem to strategically wait long enough, until their negative records disappear from the 
credit bureaus, before switching banks, iii) banks grant loans with higher interest rates 
and lower collateral requirements. 
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Fear, Anger and Credit. 
On Bank Robberies and Loan Conditions 
Abstract 
We study the impact of emotions on real-world decisions made by loan officers by 
analyzing the loan conditions of loans granted immediately after a bank branch 
robbery. We find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a 
robbery compared to changes in loan conditions that occur contemporaneously at 
unaffected branches. In general loan officers seem to adopt so-called avoidance 
behaviour. In accordance with the literature on posttraumatic stress their avoidance 
behavior is halved within two weeks after the robbery and the effect further varies 
depending on the presence of a firearm during the robbery. 
JEL Codes: G02, G2. 




During the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in understanding the 
role emotions play in judgment and choice. Research in the cognitive sciences have 
found that both immediate emotions (experienced at the time of the decision that 
might arise from factors unrelated to it) and expected emotions (predictions about the 
emotional responses to decision outcomes) may play an important role in the decision 
making process (Loewenstein (2000), Lerner and Keltner (2001), Lowenstein and 
Lerner (2003)). Recent research in financial economics has naturally focused on the 
central role emotions play in traders’ decision making (Lo and Repin (2002), Lo, 
Repin and Steenbarger (2005), Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane, Nicholson and Willman 
(2011)). The main emotions experienced by traders are greed and fear, and they 
appear as a result of previous successes or failures in the market. Learning strategies 
for emotion regulation seem indeed to have important consequences for trader 
behavior and performance. According to Fenton-O'Creevy, Soane, Nicholson and 
Willman (2011) for example high performance traders are more inclined to regulate 
emotions and to cope with negative feelings. By contrast, low performance traders 
engage in avoidant behaviors or invest substantial cognitive effort in modulating their 
emotional responses.1 
Besides traders, there is an important class of individuals that take important 
financial decisions on a daily basis, yet that have hardly been analyzed, i.e., the loan 
1 See also Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2014) on the emotional response by Italian investors triggered 
by the financial crisis, Pool, Stoffman, Yonker and Zhang (2014) on the effects of shocks (due to a 
decline in house prices) to mutual fund managers' personal wealth on their professional risk taking, and 
Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr and Maréchal (2015) on experiments in which financial professionals primed 
with a financial bust were found to be substantially more fearful and risk averse than those primed with 
a boom. 
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officers at bank branches. These are individuals that around the world are in charge of 
key decisions related to the process of granting loans. They evaluate, authorize, 
recommend approval and/or define the loan terms of the new loans. They base their 
decisions on a set of rules imposed by the bank, as well as on their own perception of 
the loan applicant. This perception, however, is influenced by loan officers’ 
experience, education, ethnicity, social background and to a large extent the emotions 
experienced at the time they analyze the loan application. 
Although there has been a lot of research on the determinants of lenders’ judgment, 
discretion, and choices, including tastes, going back to at least Becker (1957), the role 
of loan officers’ emotions have been largely ignored. This may be attributed to a lack 
of data and, in particular, the difficulty of finding the right setting that allows isolating 
the effect of emotions on credit outcomes in particular loan terms. 
In this paper, we study the impact of emotions on real-world decisions made by loan 
officers. We do so by analyzing the conditions of loans granted immediately after an 
exogenous event that directly affected the emotions of the loan officers.2 The 
exogenous events we focus on are bank branch robberies. Such robberies provide for 
“reasonable quasi-natural experiments”. Robberies are notoriously difficult to predict, 
with respect to the exact branch and time where the action will take place, and bank 
robberies are likely emotionally charged because these events are almost always 
characterized by the threat and/or the actual use of violence. As a consequence loan 
officers often experience several posttraumatic stress symptoms after a robbery: 
Increased awareness of surroundings, sleep disturbance, nightmares, difficulty 
2 Other work analyzes loan approvals and outcomes around emotional events that are aggregate and/or 
anticipated. Agarwal, Duchin, Evanoff and Sosyura (2013) for example analyze the impact on loan 
approval of nation-wide events such as the Super Bowl and the American Idol contest, and days around 
major holidays. Similarly, Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2014) analyze loan performance during 
Ramadan in Pakistan. 
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concentrating, avoidance, anxiety, irritability and outbursts of anger are among the 
symptoms encountered (Leymann (1988), Kamphuis and Emmelkamp (1998), Miller-
Burke, Attridge and Fass (1999)). The symptoms are commonly experienced 
immediately after the robbery, however they are found to diminish rapidly within the 
first week after the incident and only few if any of the symptoms remain six months 
later (Leymann (1988)).3 Consequently, the impact of bank robberies on loan terms 
should be reduced over time. 
Moreover, the severity of the consequences experienced by loan officers is 
influenced by the intensity of the bank robbery. Miller-Burke, Attridge and Fass 
(1999) for example found that the use of weapons by the assailants is associated with 
the loan officers experiencing more symptoms of posttraumatic stress, i.e., higher 
perceived stress, worse physical health, and worse work productivity after the 
robbery. We therefore expect to find a stronger effect on the loan conditions granted 
by branches that experience a more violent robbery. In sum, robberies yield almost 
perfectly exogenous but temporary shocks of varying strength to the emotional state 
of mind of the loan officers affected by the robbery which allows us to identify how 
emotions determine loan conditions. 
To accomplish this analysis we therefore combine two unique datasets. We first 
access unique data collected by the Policía Nacional de Colombia, the Colombian 
National Police, which contains detailed information on 389 bank robberies that took 
place in Colombia between 1998 and 2011. In particular we will employ the address 
of the robbed branch, the exact date of the robbery, the amount robbed, the weapon 
3 Interestingly, robbery witnesses remember long and accurately many details about the robbery (e.g., 
action, weapon, clothing), but in contrast to other stressful events there may not be a significant 
relationship between the degree of emotion involved and the number of details remembered 
(Christianson and Hübinette (1993)). 
7
used and the type of robbery. Matched with the robbery data, we use information on 
commercial loans reported by financial institutions to the Superintendencia 
Financiera de Colombia, the regulator of Colombia`s financial system. Detailed 
information on the loan conditions, i.e., maturity, collateral, interest rate, and loan 
amount, the loan rating and the date of origination of the loan is provided for all the 
commercial loans granted between 1998 and 2010. 
We employ a difference in difference approach to measure what effect a bank 
robbery has on loan conditions. The treatment group for each event corresponds to the 
loans granted locally by the bank whose branch was robbed, and the control group 
corresponds to the loans that were granted by all banks in the rest of the country. In 
order to rule out structural changes in the process of granting loans (due to for 
example monetary policy changes or internal organizational changes), we define an 
event window for each bank robbery that retains only those loans granted 90 days 
before and 90 days after the bank robbery. In addition, we include a set of branch-
event fixed effects in order to account for any observable and unobservable branch 
specific heterogeneity across time. 
We find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a robbery 
suggesting that loan officers do change their decisions following this event. In general 
loan officers seem to adopt so-called avoidance behavior: They decrease at once the 
likelihood of having contact with the client by lengthening the maturity of the loan 
contract and by demanding more collateral thereby reducing the probability of loan 
non-performance (and dealings with the client) prior to maturity. These effects are 
also economically meaningful. Maturity increases by 3.3 months, for an average 
maturity of 8.7 months, while the likelihood collateral is pledged increases by 3.4 
percentage points (pp), for a mean likelihood that equals 18.4 percent, and 
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collateralization (i.e., collateral over loan amount) increases by 3.9 pp, for an average 
collateralization of 15.4 percent. However, as the symptoms experienced by the loan 
officer likely wear off quickly (or so the literature on posttraumatic stress suggest), 
the effect on these loan conditions should commensurately dissipate. And indeed we 
find that the avoidance behavior that manifests itself in maturity, collateral and 
collateralization is halved within two weeks after the robbery. 
Further consistent with avoidance behavior is our finding that loan officers end up 
granting loans with ceteris paribus slightly softer loan conditions, possibly reflecting 
a reduced willingness to spend face-to-face bargaining time with applicants (Mosk 
(2013)). Loans at once carry a somewhat lower interest rate and a higher loan amount: 
The interest rate drops by 30 basis points (bps), for a mean interest rate of 17.2 
percent, and the loan amount increases by 34 Million COP, for a mean loan amount of 
928 million COP. Finally, we find that loans granted after a robbery are more likely to 
be non-performing, indicating the relevance of our findings concerning loan officers` 
emotions for optimal credit allocation by banks in the economy. 
But the effect further varies depending on the presence of a firearm during the 
robbery. In robberies where the perpetrator carries a firearm, loan officers 
subsequently adopt stricter avoidance behavior, with longer maturity and higher 
collateral requirements, and the correspondent lower loan rates and higher loan 
amounts. But in those robberies where there was no firearm involved, collateral 
requirements and loan amount initially drop while loan rates increase. 
That the results differ according to the presence of a firearm during the robbery is 
interesting and fully consistent with the idea that different emotions may be triggered 
depending on the severity of the robbery. When the robber has a firearm loan officers 
are likely to feel overpowered and threatened, so fear and afterwards depressed 
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resignation will most likely be the emotions that prevail. On the other hand, loan 
officers that are present in robberies without any firearms involved are possibly less 
terrified during the ordeal and angry afterwards. They could feel anger because their 
space and security has been violated, yet they were not able or courageous enough to 
prevent the incident. In line with this reasoning Lerner and Keltner (2001) find that 
fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception for example. Whereas fearful 
individuals made pessimistic risk-avoidance choices, angry individuals made tough 
risk-seeking choices. 
We enrich the interpretation of our findings further by studying robbers` re-
visitations of branches and the differentiated impact by branch size, bank type, firm 
and loan size, and bank-firm relationship length.4 Finally, we investigate potential 
alternative explanations, including the accumulation of work, changes in bank 
policies and customer reactions, but find these to be rather inconsistent with our 
estimates. 
Given this unique setting our paper helps distinguish between competing theories 
about the effect of life-threatening events on human behavior. Bernile, Bhagwat and 
Rau (2016) for example document a non-monotonic relation between the intensity of 
CEOs’ early-life exposure to fatal disasters and corporate risk-taking (see also e.g., 
Malmendier and Nagel (2011), Oswald, Proto and Sgroi (2012), Kim and Lee (2014), 
Cameron and Shah (2015), Dessaint and Matray (2015)). In contrast to these papers 
that study the potential long run effects of life-threatening events for general 
4 Based on one of the authors` own experiences working in the financial sector in Colombia, and not 
unlike is the case in many other countries, we know that loan officers in branches can and will exert 
discretion in setting loan terms, especially when located in smaller branches (in the province) in 
domestic banks and for smaller loans to smaller firms that are relationship customers. 
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managerial actions, we can assuredly identify the immediate impact on specific terms 
of loans granted by loan officers following bank branch robberies. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the related 
empirical literature. Section III describes our identification strategy. Section IV 
introduces the econometric methodology used in our analysis. Section V describes the 
data and provides descriptive statistics. Section VI contains the empirical results, 
including tests for robustness and an assessment of potential alternative explanations. 
Conclusions follow in Section VII. 
II. LITERATURE
A large literature discusses the role played by emotions in labor and organizations 
(Mumby and Putnam (1992), Martin, Knopoff and Beckman (1998)), and also in 
expert decision-making (Lowenstein and Lerner (2003)). Most of the evidence on the 
role played by emotions is collected in experimental settings or from surveys. One 
recent notable exception is Danziger, Lev and Avnaim-Pesso (2011). They show that 
taking their food break, and consequently recuperating from possible mental 
depletion, led eight Israeli judges that were followed in 1,112 parole cases over a ten-
month period to rule more favorably; favorable rulings dropped from 65 to almost 
zero percent in the run up towards one of their two daily food breaks, to jump back up 
to 65 percent immediately thereafter. 
At the same time a recent empirical literature has commenced to study more closely 
the decision-making of another important group of expert professionals, i.e., loan 
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officers.5 These are individuals that work for a bank and that handle applications for 
credit made by firms and households to the bank. Loan officers typically have 
decision power, either as individuals or in a committee (for large loans for example), 
and even when assisted by expert software (that generates an internal credit score on a 
borrower for example) loan officers often can ‒ within certain limits ‒ overrule its 
outcomes. 
Recent empirical work has documented the determinants of the discretion loan 
officers wield in their credit decisions (Cerqueiro, Degryse and Ongena (2011), 
Degryse, Liberti, Mosk and Ongena (2011), Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011)), the 
impact on their decisions of delegation (Liberti (2004)) and pay (Agarwal and Ben-
David (2012), Brown, Westerfeld, Schaller and Heusler (2012)), their willingness to 
game the expert software (Berg, Puri and Rocholl (2013)), and their apparent use of 
discretion to discriminate (taste-based à la Becker (1957)) on the basis of the gender 
or race of the potential borrowers (Ravina (2009), Hertz (2011), Ongena and Popov 
(2015)), Bellucci, Borisov and Zazzaro (2010); also Beck, Behr and Guettler (2012)). 
Yet, as far as we are aware, there is little or no evidence on the role played by 
emotions in the decision-making by loan officers, and the range over which emotions 
determine actual real-world credit outcomes. Yet, at the same time anecdotal evidence 
and interviews with loan officers indicate that emotions ‒ emotionally laden 
intuitions, i.e., “gut feelings”, in particular ‒ may play a crucial role in credit 
decisions (see also for example the structured interviews with fourteen loan officers at 
one bank in Israel in Lipshitz and Shulimovitz (2007)). 
5 A normative literature which can be found in any banking textbook has discussed the inputs into the 
decision-making process (the five Cs for example, i.e., Character, Capacity, Capital, Collateral, and 
Conditions), the decision process, and the required characteristics of the loan officer him or herself. 
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While emotions themselves can be negative or positive, all types of emotions 
traditionally were considered to have a negative effect on the decision quality (or 
rationality), and were therefore typically described as “disruptive,” “illogical,” 
“biased,” and “weak” (Putnam and Mumby (1993), p. 36). This is no longer the 
perspective the current literature has, however, and the impact of each particular 
emotion has to be studied in detail to assess its outcome on the decision that is being 
taken. 
Important for our study in this regard is a recent set of experiments by Raghunathan 
and Tuan Pham (1999). They start from the observation that many important 
decisions are made under emotionally-taxing conditions. They therefore focus on the 
influence of negative emotions at the time of decision-making. They predict, and 
experimentally confirm, that in trade-offs between risk and return the negative 
emotion of anxiety in particular will bias the preferences of the decision-maker 
towards low-risk low-return outcomes, even if the decision-to-be-taken is partly or 
completely unrelated to the anxiety-producing event. Why is that? 
First, Raghunathan and Tuan Pham (1999) posit that negative emotions may shape 
people’s decisions by skewing the content of their thoughts. “It is well established 
that under negative mood people’s perceptions, thoughts, and judgments are often 
distorted toward greater negativity ‒ an effect known as mood congruency.” Relevant 
in this regard is also a study by White, McManus and Ehlers (2008) who show that 
prior to treatment of a posttraumatic stress disorder, patients overestimated the 
probability and the cost of all types of traumatic events occurring relative to non-
patients, and they overestimated the probability and cost of the specific type of 
traumatic event that they had been traumatized by. These judgment biases were 
specific to traumatic events and did not generalize to all negative events. 
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Second, Raghunathan and Tuan Pham (1999) argue that negative emotions may 
shape decision makers’ motives and in that way determine decisions. A pervasive 
motivational shift observed under negative emotions is an intensified concern “for 
elevating or ‘repairing’ one’s mood”. The meaning structure underlying anxiety, they 
argue, is defined by high uncertainty over an outcome and low control over a 
situation, which results in an implicit goal of uncertainty reduction by the decision-
maker. Finally, Raghunathan and Tuan Pham (1999) argue that negative emotions 
may alter the process through which people make decisions. Anxiety may interfere 
with the decision-maker’s ability to process information. As a result, anxious 
individuals are posited to process information less systematically. 
To study the impact of anxiety on real-world decisions made by loan officers we 
investigate the loan conditions of granted loans in the period immediately following 
the robbery of a bank branch when branch employees may suffer from PTSD. 
III. IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
1. Robberies of a Bank Branch
Robberies of bank branches provide for “acceptable” quasi-natural experiments. 
Even though the robbery itself may be the outcome of an economic decision-making 
process followed by the robber(s) (Ozenne (1974)), robberies are actually quite rare in 
many countries. Many bank branches will not experience a robbery for a long time 
period, if ever. During our eight-year sample period, i.e., 2003:01 - 2011:12, for 
which we obtain data from the National Police of Colombia, 835 bank robberies took 
place in. During this time period they were around 4,250 bank branches in Colombia 
resulting in an average yearly hazard rate at the branch level of 2.2 percent. Compared 
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to other crimes, bank robberies are fairly uncommon (Lamm Weisel (2007)) and 
always create a bit of a local “event”.6 If anything, robberies have become even rarer 
over time (O’Flaherty (2009)) in many countries, also in Colombia. The hazard rate at 
the branch level in our sample drops from 4.2 percent in 2003 to 1.7 percent in 2011. 
Robberies are notoriously difficult to predict, with respect to precisely where 
(branch) and especially exactly when (day and time) they will take place. Surprise is 
an essential ingredient in any robbery otherwise the police could just sit, wait and 
arrest the potential perpetrator(s).7 
a. Location
While the exact branch and time where a robbery will take place is difficult to 
predict, higher unemployment or fewer policemen per capita not surprisingly spur 
more robbing across U.S. States (Samavati (2006)), and so does branch location in or 
close to a low-income area (Hannan (1982)),8 i.e., proximity to potential offenders is a 
key factor in helping to predict branch robberies (Baumer and Carrington (1986)). 
Easy access to a highway or an arterial route (to get away) and distance from a police 
station (Baumer and Carrington (1986)) may also play a role. 
At the branch level there are also certain characteristics that seem to attract robbers. 
Robbers seem to like multiple entrances to a building, a higher number of tellers, a 
longer distance between any two tellers, and reduced visibility from within or outside 
of the bank (Baumer and Carrington (1986)), seem to dislike security doormen 
6 In 2011 on average only 0.3 bank robberies took place per day, coincident with 1 kidnapping, 18 sex 
crimes, 35 store robberies, 40 homicides, 60 car or motorcycle thefts, 103 cases of domestic violence 
and 166 larceny events for example. Source: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Republica de Colombia. 
7 Only in Dick (1956), adapted in the movie Minority Report (2002), is the police able to actually 
prevent crime from occurring by apprehending criminals based on foreknowledge (in this story 
provided by three psychics called “precogs”). 
8 Bank mergers if and when constraining access to credit may result in more crime in a local 
community, a seminal study by Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005) shows. 
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(Hannan (1982)), but do not seem to care much about other commonly used security 
equipment. To account for these observable and other unobservable branch 
characteristics, that may attract or repel also robbers with certain motives (Johnston 
(1978)), we include branch-event fixed effects. 
While in general robberies are difficult to predict in space and time, there is one 
exception. Branches do get robbed multiple times, often within a short period of time 
(e.g., Lamm Weisel (2007) for the US), either because robbers thought they had left 
unfinished business (and there was still money on the table), or it was easy to pull off 
(so why not visit again for a second serving), or competing robbers copycatted. While 
we have branch-event fixed effects and compare only 90 days before and after (this 
also removes the possibility any recurrent robbery takes place), we also remove those 
branches that are robbed multiple times in robustness. 
b. Time
Yet even despite this observed multiplicity, robberies remain rare, i.e., even the re-
visitations are not that common and in time still almost random. In our total sample of 
robberies for example, there are 63 re-visitations, with an average time between them 
of 1.3 years. 
Most of the robberies are holdups,9 either by lone bandits or teams. Lone bandits 
that are armed or unarmed often act ill-prepared and on a whim. Not to be recognized 
afterwards lone robbers rarely case the branch they rob. Teams are always armed and 
are typically more prepared, in terms of location, but even then the exact branch they 
hit and the exact timing of their actions are not that well predictable. 
9 Of the 835 robberies in the dataset 474 are bank holdups and 260 teller holdups. There are 38 cases of 
tunneling, 11 entries during closing hours, and 7 cases of staff impersonation. 35 cases are classified as 
“other” or were left unclassified. 
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In some countries a lot more robberies take place on a Friday as branches sit on 
payday money (and the opportunist robber may need money for weekend partying) or 
those other days of extended opening hours (Lamm Weisel (2007)), but that does not 
seem to be so overwhelmingly the case in Colombia.10 There are also more robberies 
during winter time in countries where collars and hats are then commonly worn then, 
but again this not the case in Colombia as there are no real seasons. The 
aforementioned set of branch-event fixed effects also account for observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity in the calendar timing of the robbery. 
2. The Impact of Robberies
Robberies are potentially traumatic events. Bank employees (and also customers) 
may be threatened, injured, taken hostage, or even killed. Miller-Burke, Attridge and 
Fass (1999) and also Leymann (1988) for example document that for many 
employees, experiencing a robbery in the branch they worked, suffered negative 
consequences in a variety of areas affecting both their individual life and their 
company. “To varying degrees, this impact included experiencing numerous clinical 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress, greater perceived stress, worse physical health, 
impaired productivity at work, less desire to continue working for the current 
employer, and problems in both work and personal relationships.” 
 The negative impact of the workplace trauma was worse when the robbery was 
more intense, i.e., a weapon was used by the robber, there was close proximity to the 
robber, and the perceived personal threat was high. These effects were not moderated, 
10 Of the 835 robberies in the dataset, 105 take place on Monday, 172 on Tuesday, 150 on Wednesday, 
163 on Thursday, 192 on Friday, 41 on Saturday and only 12 take place on Sunday (likely because 
most if not all bank branches are closed then). 
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Miller-Burke, Attridge and Fass (1999) find, by the potentially confounding factors of 
employee age, sex, job position, though ex ante employee training can help assuage 
the emotional effects of victimization (Lamm Weisel (2007)). So these findings 
suggest reaction to robbery are not or only weakly related to (for us unobservable) 
employee characteristics.11 
Similarly Kamphuis and Emmelkamp (1998) document that employees who had 
experienced a robbery evidenced significantly higher psychological distress than their 
non-victimized colleagues. Within the group of robbed employees, a correspondence 
was found between the time elapsed since the robbery and their current level of 
psychological distress. These findings suggest significant psychological distress 
reactions following bank robberies, which decrease over time. We will therefore 
investigate how the impact of bank robberies on loan terms dissipates over time.  
And Kleim, Ehlers and Glucksman (2007) show that after experiencing a violent 
traumatic event, such as a robbery or terrorist attack, most people show some 
symptoms of acute stress disorder, but that only a minority develop persistent 
symptoms of sufficient severity to warrant a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), which can be predicted to occur after six months from as early as two weeks 
after the attack (see also Kleim and Ehlers (2009)). Hence we will also study the time 
trend in the effects after the robbery. 
11 We did not find any evidence in the literature that ex post media coverage (see e.g., Aronson (2012) 
on media contagion) or capture of the robbers mitigates trauma (there is no immediate robbery-specific 
information on media coverage or robbers` arrests available for Colombia in any case). We surmise 
that coverage or capture may not be moderating factors per se and/or that few robbers are caught 
immediately. For example for Italy Mastrobuoni (2014) reports that the perpetrators were arrested in 
only 7 percent of the 4,972 bank robberies recorded between 2005 and 2009; Italy actually witnessed 
almost 60 percent (sic) of all bank robberies in Europe during that time period. For the US the 2011 
FBI Bank Crime Statistics show that only in 20 percent of the 4,534 bank robberies in which loot was 
taken there was eventually full or partial recovery. 
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3. Testable Hypotheses
Recall that Raghunathan and Tuan Pham (1999) posits that anxiety is generally 
experienced in response to situations where the person is uncertain about an 
impending outcome of a personally relevant event, especially when the outcome is 
potentially harmful (e.g., “is the individual sitting in my office potentially a robber 
and dangerous”), and feels unable to alter the course of events (e.g., “I am a loan 
officer and I have to talk to all loan applicants), and that anxiety influences decision 
makers in the content of their “dark” thoughts (“a robbery can easily be repeated here 
at this branch now”), motives (“I want to avoid contact with potential robbers”), and 
process of decision-making (“It is all futile, I don’t care anymore”). 
Following a robbery we therefore expect loan officers that suffer from anxiety to 
make loans that require less contact with the applicant, now and in the future. Less 
willingness to roll-over a loan soon may lead to longer loan maturity; less willingness 
to monitor and deal with a client in case of non-performance may lead to more 
collateralization (à la Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001)); less contact with an 
applicant during negotiations should result in a lower interest rate (and a higher loan 
amount) that the loan officer offers to the client. 
IV. METHODOLOGY
 We employ a difference in difference approach to measure what effect a bank 
robbery has on loan conditions. The treatment group for each event corresponds to the 
loans granted locally by the bank which was robbed, and the control group 
corresponds to the loans that were granted by all banks in the rest of the country. For 
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each bank robbery we define an event window that comprises loans granted 90 days 
before and 90 days after the bank robbery. 
The econometric model takes the following form: 
	 	 	 											 1  
where , ,  and  index firm, branch, time (in days) and event respectively.  
 In equation 1 ,  represents one of the loan conditions. For each loan condition 
we estimate a different regression: Maturity is the maturity of the loan in months and 
Collateral is an indicator variable equals 1 if the loan is collateralized and equals 0 
otherwise. Collateralization is the ratio of the collateral and loan amount. Interest 
Rate is the interest rate of the loan in percent and Loan Amount is the amount of the 
loan in millions of Colombian pesos (COP). 
The variable	 	 	 	  is equivalent to the interaction term in a 
regular difference in difference analysis. It is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the 
loans that were granted by the robbed branch after a robbery took place. Thus,  is 
our coefficient of main interest.  and  correspond to 	 	  and 
	 	  fixed effects, respectively. These two sets of fixed effects account for 
temporal differences in loan conditions within the event window. Finally,  
corresponds to branch-event fixed effects. They capture any systematic differences 
across branches (included in treated or control group) for each event.12 
12 Given these short time windows that are part of our identification strategy to uncover the temporary 
changes in behavior of the loan officers and the many small firms observed to borrow infrequently 
from only one bank, it is not practical to include firm (or firm-day) fixed effects to control for (the 
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 Findings in the psychology literature suggest that loan officers experience several 
stress symptoms during the first weeks after the robbery that gradually disappear for 
most of the loan officers. In view of this fact, we should expect to find a greater effect 
on the loan conditions for the first few weeks after the robbery, and less so for the 
following weeks. We test if this is the case by interacting the variable 
	 	 	 with the variable 	 	 	 , which 
indicates how many days after the robbery the loan was granted. 
V. DATA 
We focus on robberies in Colombia, where previous research has also investigated 
the cultivation of coca and conflict (Angrist and Kugler (2008)) and kidnappings 
(Pshisva and Suarez (2010)) for example. 
[Table 1 around here] 
For our analysis we use the two datasets we already briefly introduced. The first one 
comprises information of the bank robberies that took place in Colombia from 2003:1 
to 2011:12 and was collected by Policía Nacional de Colombia, the Colombian 
National Police, and as already indicated it includes information on the address of the 
robbed branch, the date of the robbery, the amount robbed,13 the weapon used and the 
robbery-induced changes in) demand. Given that most if not all loan officers will experience the 
robbery but only few customers will, we surmise that the estimated changes are caused by changes in 
the behavior of loan officers. We will return to assessing the changes in customer behavior in 
robustness. 
13 While this information comes directly from the Police and not from Press reports we cannot entirely 
discount the possibility of underreporting of the amounts robbed to dissuade aspirant robbers. If this 
21
type of robbery.14 The dataset contains 835 bank robberies that took place in 170 
municipalities and 652 different branches of 28 different banks. The average amount 
robbed was equivalent to 37,000 US dollars, which represents less than 1 percent of 
the total deposits of a bank at the municipality level! About 3 percent of the bank 
robberies were done without arms, in 89 percent firearms were observed, and the rest 
was done with the use of so-called “white” weapons, i.e., knifes and sharp 
instruments. 
 The second dataset is a credit register that contains information about individual 
commercial loans reported by financial institutions to the Superintendencia 
Financiera de Colombia, the regulator of Colombian’s financial system.15 This dataset 
provides a detailed look at all the loans granted by the financial system to firms on a 
daily basis. Characteristics such as loan maturity, collateral, interest rate and amount, 
and (crucial for our purposes) the exact date of origination are included from 1998:12 
to 2010:12. The dataset contains 2.5 million loan observations made to 32,965 
different firms by 120 different financial institutions. Given that we are interested in 
understanding the role of emotions on the process of granting loans, we focus only on 
new loans at origination. This corresponds to 316,138 loan observations. 
 While we do not know the specific branch where a loan was granted, we do have 
information on the physical location of the firm at a municipality level. Therefore, 
under the assumption that firms go to the nearest branch, we can determine in which 
municipality the loan was granted. However, if there is more than one branch of the 
underreporting is systematically proportional, however, our variable capturing the robbed amount will 
still incorporate the same variation. 
14 As far as we can tell information on injuries and casualties associated with each robbery is not 
systematically recorded and centrally collected and is not publicly available. 
15 The dataset was provided to us due to a direct link of one of the authors of this paper with the Central 
Bank of Colombia. 
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same bank in a given municipality, we are not able to identify in which of them the 
loan was granted and consequently our exercises will be based on the entity-
municipality level, and not on the exact address of the branch. 
Clearly this approach may affect our results. The effect of a bank robbery for 
example might be intensified in densely populated municipalities, where there may be 
several branches of the same bank located within very short distances, sometimes 
even within one or two blocks. Given this proximity of the branches in a densely 
populated municipality, news may spread quickly from one branch to the other. Thus, 
the effect of a bank robbery might be propagated across branches in the same 
municipality. Employees of other branches will feel terrified of having to go through 
a similar experience and given this “emotional contagion” (e.g., Hatfield, Cacioppo 
and Rapson (1993)) they might react accordingly. Therefore in (unreported) 
robustness we include interactions with measures for the density of branches of the 
robbed bank at a municipality level (i.e., the number of branches per square 
kilometer) and find indeed such effect. 
Finally, in terms of the data we employ, we note that the auxiliary information on 
firm characteristics, such as their physical location, industry and financial statements, 
is provided on a yearly basis by the Superintendencia de Sociedades, the government 
institution that regulates non-financial firms. 
 As previously mentioned, we focus on the loans that were granted 90 days before 
and 90 days after a robbery. Restricting our sample to this event window helps us to 
rule out structural changes in the process of granting loans, i.e., monetary policy 
changes, internal organizational changes or even changes of loan officers. In addition, 
and in order to limit the probability that our results will be driven by differences in the 
loan applicants, we include only the firms that get loans both before and after the 
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robbery, in the treatment group or in the control group.16 After including these 
adjustments to our sample, we end up with 389 bank robberies. 224 of them are bank 
holdups, 151 teller holdups, 6 tunneling and 2 impersonating staff. 
 Our final dataset consist of 3.17 million loan observations, which comprises 35,487 
that were granted by the robbed branches, and 3.13 million that were granted by other 
branches in the rest of the country. These loans where provided by 1,649 branches of 




Table 2 shows detailed summary statistics of the variables used in this study. Our 
dependent variables correspond to the loan characteristics: Maturity, Collateral, 
Collateralization, Interest Rate, and Loan Amount. The mean maturity is 8.7 months, 
around 18.4 percent of the loans are required to pledge collateral and the average 
collateralization is 15.4 percent. The mean interest rate is 17.5 percent and firms are 
granted loans of 927 million COP (about 515 thousand U.S. dollars) on average. 
However, as evidenced by the standard deviations, there is a substantial variation in 
the loan conditions. 
[Table 2 around here] 
16 Not imposing this restriction leaves our findings virtually unaffected confirming that the composition 
of firms does not play a major role in determining our findings. 
24
As part of our independent variables we include relationship and firm characteristics 
to control for the creditworthiness of the borrower. Among relationship characteristics 
we include the Length of Relationship that measure the stock of private information 
about the borrower that the bank has acquired (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and 
Udell (1995)). The average Length of Relationship in our sample is 14.2 quarters. We 
also include Main Bank that indicates whether the loan is granted by the firm’s 
primary source of financial services, and capture the scope of the relationship. In our 
sample, about 20 percent of the loans are granted by the firm’s main bank. 
Among the firm’s characteristics we include a Small Firm dummy, as an indicator 
variable for the size of the firm. Small firms are generally considered to be less 
transparent and have less bargaining power than their larger counterparts. In our 
sample, about 30 percent of the loans are granted to small firms. We also include Age 
as Borrower as a measure of the amount of public information available about the 
firm (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995)). In our sample, the 
average Age as Borrower is 26.8 quarters. Additionally we include Number of 
Relationships that is measure as the number of banks with which the firm has an 
outstanding loan prior to the origination of the new loan. The average Number of 
Relationships in our sample is 6.0. Finally, we include Arrear (t-1) and Firm Rating 
as measures of the quality of the borrower. Arrear (t-1) indicates whether a firm had 
an arrear, in at least one of its loans, one year prior to the origination of the new loan. 
About 10 percent of the loans in our sample were granted to firms that had an arrear 
the year before the origination of the new loan. Firm Rating is the average quality 
rating of the outstanding loans of the firm. The quality rates are observable by banks 
and range from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates poor quality and 5 good quality. The average 
Firm Rating in our sample is 4.9. 
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Considerable insight can be obtained simply by comparing loan and firm 
characteristics of the robbed and the branches in the rest of the country (in robustness 
we will report in the rest of the region). Table 3, shows the differences in means 
between these two groups of branches for each of the aforementioned variables, both 
before and after the bank robbery. The last column presents a test of the differences in 
differences. For the loans granted before the bank robberies we do not find significant 
differences for Collateral. However, we do find significant differences for Maturity, 
Collateralization, Interest Rate, and ln(Loan Amount). These differences might be 
explained by differences in the characteristics of the borrowers. And consistently, we 
find significant differences in all the relationship and firm characteristics. Moving to 
the loans granted after the bank robberies, we find significant differences for all the 
loan conditions, except for Interest Rate. The differences in the relationships and firm 
characteristics are similar to the ones found for the loans granted before the robbery. 
That is, the differences between the clients of the two groups remain the same. The 
test of the differences in differences suggests that there are significant changes in the 
conditions of the loans granted by the robbed branch after the bank robbery. 
Moreover, the test suggests that the characteristics of the corporate clients of the 
robbed branches versus the control branches remain the same before and after the 
robbery. 
[Table 3 around here] 
To better illustrate where identification of the impact of interest comes from, Figure 
1 presents the time path of a fifteen days moving average for each of the loan 
characteristics, by robbed branches and control branches. The vertical line represents 
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the dates of the robberies. Inspection of the graph for Maturity suggests the presence 
of similar trends for the robbed and the control branches. The gap between the two 
lines, however, is reduced after the bank robbery (Panel A). For Collateral, similar 
trends are observed for both groups, although the gap between them seems to increase 
after the bank robbery (Panel B). For the Interest Rate similar trends are also 
observed. However the interest rate seems to reach lower levels for the robbed 
branches after the robbery (Panel C). For the Loan Amount the trends of the two 
groups are not easily comparable due to high volatility. The gaps between the two 
groups, however, seem to increase after the robbery (Panel D). 
[Figure 1 around here] 
As discussed before, we use a difference in difference approach to measure what 
effect a bank robbery has on loan conditions compared to branches in the rest of the 
country. Our main results are in Table 4 and comprise for each dependent variable 5 
different models (in Appendix Table A.1 we report the mostly unchanged estimates 
when comparing to branches in the rest of the region). Model I corresponds to the 
model presented in equation (1). Model II, includes an interaction term with the 
variable ln(Days After the Robbery). This term allows us to test if the effects on the 
loan conditions gradually disappear as the number of days after the robbery increase. 
In Models III, IV and V we include interactions with characteristics of the bank 
robberies. In particular, we include Firearm, a dummy for the robberies that were 
made with the use of firearms; and Robbed Amount, a variable that measures the 
robbed amount as a percentage of the total deposits of the robbed branch. With these 
variables we aim to test if the degree of violence employed in the bank robbery has a 
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differential effect on the loan conditions. Moreover, we aim to rule out the possibility 
that our results are being driving by monetary considerations rather than by the 
psychology effects experienced by the employees. 
[Table 4 around here] 
The results strongly suggest that there is an overall increase in the length of Maturity 
after a bank robbery, by 0.7 months in Model I. According to Model II maturity 
increases by more than 3.3 months right after the robbery but gradually decreases as 
the number of days after the robbery increase. The effect halves within 10 days and 
vanishes entirely around 110 days after the robbery. We do find a differential 
economically relevant effect for the robberies that were made with the use of firearm, 
but the effect is estimated imprecisely. The robbed amount does not have an effect on 
Maturity. 
We do not find evidence of a persistent effect on collateral as shown by Model I. 
However, when we include the interaction with ln(Days after the Robbery), we find 
that the likelihood that a firm is required to pledge collateral increases by 3.4 percent 
right after a bank robbery. And this probability decreases as the number of days after 
the robbery increase (Model II). The effect is halved in less than 8 days and is 
overturned 64 days after the robbery. Nonetheless, the results presented on Model III 
suggest that the increase on the likelihood of collateral is present only when the use of 
firearms is involved in the bank robbery. The branches whose robberies where made 
without arms or other types of arms experienced the opposite effect. Moreover, 
Models IV and V show that the effects of a bank robbery over Collateral are also not 
affected by the robbed amount. 
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Similarly, the results suggest that there is an effect on Collateralization (Model I). 
However, the immediate increase of 3.9 percent in the level of collateralization also 
dissipates over time (Model II). The effect is halved 5 days after the robbery and is 
overturned 28 days after the robbery. As with Collateral, this pattern is present in 
Collateralization only when the use of firearms is involved in the bank robbery. 
When less violent or no arms are used the effect is the opposite. Models IV and V 
show again as before that the effects of a robbery on Collateralization are not affected 
by the robbed amount. 
For the Interest Rate we find that there is an effect that persists 90 days after the 
robbery. The effect corresponds to a decrease on the interest rate by 0.34 percent 
(Model I).17 And according to Model II, this effect does not disappear as the number 
of days after the robbery increase. However, as Model III shows, the decrease on the 
interest rate is only present in the branches in which firearms were used in the 
robbery. For the rest of the branches there is an increase of the interest rate. It 
increases by 2.6 percentage points right after the bank robbery and decreases as the 
number of days after the robbery increase. Models IV and V again show that the 
effects of a bank robbery over Interest Rate are not influenced by the robbed amount. 
Finally, we also find that there is an increase in the Loan Amount after a bank 
robbery. The increase corresponds to 3.7 percent of the mean loan amount (Model I). 
The effect, however, do not seem to decrease over time or be affected by the use of 
firearms in the robbery. Finally, the robbed amount does not have an effect on the 
17 The semi-elasticity (i.e., as a percentage of the mean dependent variable) equals -2.0 percent which 
in absolute value is the smallest of all studied loan terms. This is consistent with the possibility that 
credit spreads, but not other loan terms, are “anchored”, i.e., that the path of credit spreads since the 
last loan influences the level at which a firm can currently borrow (Dougal, Engelberg, Parsons and 
Van Wesep (2015)). 
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Loan Amount. This further shows that our results are not being driving by monetary 
considerations.18 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that, due to a combination of emotions 
experienced after a bank robbery, loan officers deviate from their traditional approach 
of processing the loan applications. However, as the number of days after the robbery 
increase, most of the emotions disappear and loan officers return to their usual 
approach of dealing with clients. Moreover, the effect on the loan conditions seems to 
depend on the degree of violence of the robbery. 
In firearm robberies, loan officers seem to adopt strict avoidance behavior: They 
decrease the likelihood of having contact with the clients in the near future by 
lengthening maturity and by increasing the collateral requirements on loan contracts. 
Loan officers also reduce the bargaining time with applicants by granting loans with 
lower interest rates. On the other hand, loan officers that are present in less violent 
robberies decrease the collateral requirements and charge a higher interest rate. 
The fact that the results differ according to the intensity of the robbery might 
suggests that different emotions are triggered depending on the levels of potential 
violence experienced. In firearm robberies, loan officers face a potentially severe life-
threatening experience, thus fear could be the most likely emotion to prevail. On the 
other hand, loan officers that are present in less violent robberies will be less terrified. 
Instead of fear, the emotion that could be more predominant is anger. They could feel 
anger because their space and security has been violated and they were not able to 
prevent the incident. In line with this reasoning Lerner and Keltner (2001) find that 
18 In unreported results we estimate an additional specification, one for each of the loan conditions, 
where we include interactions with an indicator variable that equals one when the robbed amount is 
very high (we use various percentile cutoffs), and equals zero otherwise. The coefficients on these 
interactions are also not statistically significant. 
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fear and anger have opposite effects on risk perception. Whereas fearful individuals 
made pessimistic risk adverse choices (see also Christelis and Georgarakos (2013) 
and Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr and Maréchal (2014)), angry individuals made risk-
seeking choices. This difference in behavioral outcomes seems to be consistent with 
our results overall. 
We note that the relative size of each of the effects may be influenced by the 
intermediation margin that loan officers have on each of the loan conditions (the 
discretion that loan officers have for each variable). However, our results are robust to 
different specifications that include as control the “other” loan characteristics (see 
Appendix Table A.2).19 
We also study how individual loan ratings are affected (even though loan officers 
may not have full discretion for all loans to set a new credit rating) and find that better 
loan ratings are recorded after the robbery, but that this effect is not influenced by the 
time since or the intensity of the robbery. 
[Table 5 around here] 
Finally, we are curious about the non-performance of the loans that were granted 
after a robbery. If loan officers set loan terms optimally before the robbery, ceteris 
paribus we would expect loans granted after a robbery more likely to be eventually 
non-performing. This is exactly what we find and report in Table 5. The probability of 
arrears on loans increases by 0.8 percentage points after a robbery (its mean equals 
2.7 percent), while the time in arrears increases by 0.019 quarters or 2 days (its mean 
19 Self-evidently these are “bad” controls (Angrist and Pischke (2008)) to the extent that they are also 
affected by the robbery. 
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equals 5 days). The half-life of these effects equals 12 and 7 days, respectively, in line 




As mentioned before, some branches do get robbed multiple times, and as noted 
before this is an often observed phenomenon in robbery statistics. In our selected 
sample there are in total 40 “re-visitations”.20 
Re-visitations can affect our results in several ways: First, if they occur within a 
short period of time, their effects on the loan officers and consequently on the loan 
conditions might overlap, making it difficult to disentangle the effects of a particular 
event. Second, if re-visitations are more spread over time, security at the robbed 
branch could have been improved and in addition loan officers could be better 
prepared to cope with the traumatic event in case a robbery occurs. 
In order to make sure that the effects of re-visitations are not affecting our results, 
we exclude the bank robberies made to branches that were robbed more than once 
within our sample period by relying on our information on the exact address of the 
robbed branch. The estimates are presented in Appendix Table A.3 and are very 
similar to those already reported. The magnitude of the coefficients decreases, but 
their signs remain the same and also the level of statistical significance overall 
20 We also assess the impact of placebo pre-visitations of a branch, one year (or half a year) prior to the 
first actual robbery. We find that the main results of interest (i.e., reversal and fire-arm) are no longer 
statistically significant and/or economically relevant in most specifications. 
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remains almost unchanged. This suggests that our results are not being driven by the 
effects of re-visitations. 
In addition, we analyze separately what is the effect of re-visitations. If loan officers 
of branches that were previously robbed receive training to cope with this type of 
violent event or get otherwise inured to crime, the effect of re-visitations over the loan 
conditions should be less pronounced. On the other hand, if no psychological 
treatment is received after a robbery, loan officers might get a stronger trauma after a 
new incident. We re-estimate our model for the sample of robberies that correspond to 
re-visitations. The results, presented in Table 6, show that re-visitations have bigger 
economic effects over the loan conditions than first time robberies. This suggests that 
previously robbed branches are not better prepared to deal with a new robbery.21 
[Table 6 around here] 
b. Branch Size and Bank Type
Loan officers at small branches are more likely to have witnessed the robbery first-
hand and it may be more difficult for them to stay at home afterwards (although it 
also increases the probability the branch will be closed). At the same time, loan 
officers at small branches may ceteris paribus be more familiar with their customers. 
Interacting the variables After and Days After with a dummy for branch size which 
equals one if the branch is smaller than 25 (or 50) percent of all bank branches with 
21 We also interact the after and days after variables with the number of robberies a branch experienced 
during the last three years or alternatively a dummy that equals one if at least one robbery took already 
place at the branch, and equals zero otherwise, but we find similar results. 
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respect to the volume of loans in its portfolio, and equals zero otherwise, we find little 
statistical significance on the estimated interaction coefficients. 
Next we also consider bank type. Given stricter regulations in their country of origin 
branches of foreign banks may provide better protection and training for their 
employees, such that in case of a robbery these loan officers are less traumatized. 
Similarly given their status within the governmental administration, employees at 
state banks may also receive better protection and training. Interacting the variables 
After and Days After with a dummy for branches of either foreign or state banks (in 
unreported regressions), we indeed observe a statistically significant reduction in the 
effect of a robbery across loan terms. 
c. Large Firms, Small Loans, Long Relationships
We then analyze if there is a differential effect on the loan conditions of loans 
granted to large firms. As these firms typically receive more transactional loans, they 
might be less affected by the emotions experienced by the loan officers. We therefore, 
expect to find a less pronounced effect of a bank robbery over loans granted to big 
firms. In addition, we analyze if there is a differential effect over relatively small 
loans. Given that these loans are more likely to be approved directly by loan officers, 
a not by higher hierarchy levels, they are more exposed to the emotions of the loans 
officers. In line with this, we expect to find a more pronounced effect of a bank 
robbery over small loans. Finally, we look at loans granted to firms that have had 
already a long relationship with the bank. On the one hand, these loans may be more 
relationship-based and require more personal attention; on the other hand, the loan 
officer may feel more comfortable with the firm manager given their long-standing 
personal ties. In line with the latter argument, we expect to find a less pronounced 
effect of a bank robbery on loans granted to a firm with a long relationship. 
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We estimate three additional specifications, for each of the loan conditions, which 
include interaction terms with indicator variables for large firms (upper 25th percentile 
based on the total assets of the firms) and for small loans (lower 25th percentile based 
on the loan amount), and the length of the relationship. Our (unreported) results 
suggest that the effect of a bank robbery is less pronounced over loans granted to 
large firms. These results, however, are not statistically significant. We also find that 
the effects of a bank robbery are stronger for small loans. This is consistent with the 
fact that emotions are more prone to be transmitted over loans approved directly by 
the loan officers, who are the employees that have a direct exposure of the violence of 
a bank robbery. Finally, we find that if anything the length of the relationship 
somewhat mitigates the effect of a robbery (see Appendix Table A.4).22 
3. Potential Alternative Explanations
a. Accumulation of Work
There is no regulation or standard practice in Colombia that prescribes how many 
days to close a branch following a bank robbery. Instead, each branch arbitrarily 
chooses the number of closure days, if any. This could partly affect our results, as the 
closure of a branch might generate an accumulation of applications to be dealt with 
once the branch is re-opened. If the number of closure days is large, the excessive 
amount of work might alter the loan officer’s response to a particular loan application. 
22 While few firms maintain only one bank relationship in Colombia (see also Qian and Strahan 
(2007)), we re-estimate the effect of robberies on lending terms for these firms because these borrowers 
are less likely to have an immediate choice of another lender right after the robbery. The estimated 
coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude but the much lower number of observations robs most 
estimates of their statistical significance. 
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If this is the case, we should be able to find a differential effect for branches with 
large closure periods. 
As we do not have separate information on branch closures, we use the number of 
days in which a robbed branch did not grant any commercial loans as a reasonable 
proxy. Based on this measure, we find that in 119 bank robberies (out of the 389 bank 
robberies included in our selected sample) the branch is not closed the day after the 
bank robbery. In the rest of the bank robberies there are closures (or periods of not 
granting commercial loans) that vary between 1 and more than 15 days. We interact 
our main specification with the number of closure days. The results (unreported), 
however, are not statistically significant and small in magnitude. This suggests that 
the potential effects of branch closures are not driving our results. If anything the sign 
of the coefficients suggest that the effect of a bank robbery over the loan conditions 
decreases with the number of closure days. This is likely to be associated with a 
decrease of the symptoms experienced by the loan officers. 
Hence our findings are not consistent with the possibility that branches close and 
work accumulates. But work could also accumulate with individual loan officers, 
because other loan officers call in sick, spend time in counseling to mitigate distress 
symptoms (Leeman-Conley (1990)), or seek to quit their job altogether (Miller-Burke, 
Attridge and Fass (1999)). 
Yet, none of these actions are very likely in Colombia. Due to low sick payments,23 
sick leaves are expected to be less common there than in many other countries around 
23 Sickness absences are typically found to be more common in countries where full pay periods for 
temporary incapacity are predominant than in countries where this is not the case (e.g., Gimeno, 
Benavides, Benach and Amick (2004)). In Colombia sick employees receive only 66.7% of their salary 
during the first three days of absence paid by their employer. Afterwards payments are made by the 
General Health Social Security System but obtaining such payments may take time and effort. Not 
surprising then maybe that in a report published by the International Trade Union Confederation 
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the world; counseling is typically not provided; and, quitting and/or switching jobs is 
very difficult in the short run as the unemployment rate ranges between 10 and 15 
percent during the sample period (which is always almost 5 percentage points higher 
than in the rest of South-America), the labor market is rigid and unemployment 
benefits before 2013 were close to zero. All of this makes it unlikely work would 
accumulate with a few resilient loan officers, while the aforementioned branch 
closure evidence suggests work accumulation cannot explain the direction of the 
change in loan terms immediately after the robbery in any case. 
To deal with the workflow more easily, loan officers could in general cherry-pick 
applications.24 They could choose to review the most easy-to-approve and important 
loans immediately after the robbery, while deferring other more difficult applications 
for later. Granting easier (collateralized and safer, i.e., with longer maturity and lower 
interest rate) and more important (i.e., larger sized) loans first would be 
observationally equivalent with our findings so far on loan terms, but it would not be 
consistent with the worse performance on these loans we observed in Table 5. 
[Table 7 around here] 
Table 7 further demonstrates the number of loans drops significantly after a robbery 
(its mean equals 2) with a half-life of 7 days to recover fully after 44 days, especially 
when a fire-arm is used; hence, loan officers may temporarily seek to avoid customers 
(ITUC) in May 2014, Colombia was listed as one of the “worst countries in the world to work in”, and 
is compared to Cambodia and Zimbabwe. 
24 Alternatively, interim employees could be hired leading to a temporary loss of private and/or soft 
information, leading to more lending based on publicly-available hard information. But we did find that 
if anything the length of extant bank-firm relationships somewhat mitigates the effect of a robbery (see 
also Appendix Table A.4) which would not be the case if the loss of information drives our findings. 
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and that even when they would be granting the “easy” loans first they fail to correctly 
set conditions (as evidenced in Table 5) potentially due to their lack of concentration 
as a consequence of the robbery. 
b. Changes in Bank Policies
After a robbery occurs, the bank may revise its risk policy and shifts its credit 
origination from riskier loans to safer loans. While not impossible we think that the 
immediate reaction and short half-life of the observed changes are not consistent with 
bank-wide policy changes. For example in Dessaint and Matray (2015) it takes more 
than 180 days to observe the maximum corporate response which comes with a half-
life of one year or more.25 
But to investigate this possibility further we check if loan terms change across the 
affected bank branches in a region (Appendix Table A.5). So now the treatment group 
contains the loans granted within the region but not the municipality where the 
robbery took place, while the control group comprises all loans granted by other 
banks in other municipalities. Interestingly, we find that there is some impact on loan 
terms in the region, but that it is three or more times smaller and once again 
immediate and reversed quickly. This is not consistent with changes in regional bank 
policy which likely would be applied homogenously and would take some time to 
implement and reverse, but rather is consistent with “emotional contagion” between 
loan officers across the regional bank branches of the affected bank (e.g., Hatfield, 
Cacioppo and Rapson (1993)). We then check if loan terms change across the entire 
affected bank after a local robbery, and in unreported regressions we find they do 
25 They study how managers respond to the occurrence of a hurricane event when their firms are 
located in the neighborhood of the disaster area. They find that managers increase the amount of 
corporate cash holdings (and to express more concerns about hurricane risk in 10-Ks/10-Qs) even 
though the real risk remains unchanged. 
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somewhat but that this potential contagion effect is now even smaller (and close to 
economically meaningless). Recall that we find a similar contagion when we assess 
how the affected bank branch density at the municipal level reinforces the changes in 
loan terms. 
c. Effect on Customers
While most if not all employees at the robbed branches will experience the robbery, 
only few customers present in the branch at the time of the robbery will.26 However in 
principle not only bank employees but also customers might feel threatened and 
experience stress. Their reaction may have an impact on their demand for credit at the 
robbed bank and also on the level of deposits they keep in that bank. 
Ideally, we would like to analyze what is the effect of a bank robbery on the number 
of applications and especially the loan terms that are requested by the applicants. In 
the absence of this information,27 we use the total number of loans granted by each 
branch as well as the total amount lent before and after the robbery to determine if 
customers stop going to the robbed branch. We replicate Table 7 but now eliminate 
the restriction that a firm has to be granted loans in the period before and after the 
robbery, so that we can take into account the possibility that customers stay home 
longer after the robbery. However, in further unreported regressions we find that 
overall the drop in the number of loans obtained is substantially smaller for all firms 
than for those firms that borrow before and after a robbery. This suggests that 
customers do not stop applying for new credit at the robbed branch. 
26 Notice that loan officers (present during the robbery or closely connected to those present) may be 
responsible for granting hundreds of loans within our estimation period, the few customers present will 
be tied to at most a handful of loans. 
27 No credit register in the world records comprehensive application information. Jiménez, Ongena, 
Peydró and Saurina (2012) for example use the information requests lodged by banks as a proxy for the 
number of applications. Only single-bank datasets contain detailed application information (e.g., 
Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), Brown, Kirschenmann and Ongena (2014)). 
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Moreover, the results for the total amount lent (its mean equals 222,144 Million 
COP), presented in Table 8 suggest that there is a slight increase on the total amount 
lent by the robbed branches. The increase corresponds to 2.8 percent of the average 
amount lent by a branch. The results are robust to different specifications that include 
event fixed effects and branch fixed effects.28 
[Table 8 around here] 
On the other hand, if depositors are afraid of losing their money after a robbery, they 
might run on the robbed branch (or other branches of the same bank) to withdraw all 
their money. Anticipating this, banks may actually transfer some extra liquidity to the 
affected branch(es). If on the contrary customers are afraid to go to the branch, they 
might decide to keep their money in the bank for a longer period than usual (even if 
they could withdraw from another bank, there are fees that might stop them from 
doing so). 
To assess these possibilities we perform an exercise similar to the one performed for 
the loan conditions, but we now use the amount of deposits as a dependent variable. 
The information on the amount of deposits is gathered from the website of the 
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia. It is dis-aggregated at the bank-
municipality level but it comes (unfortunately only) at a quarterly frequency. 
Our (unreported) estimates suggest that there is only a modest increase in the level 
of deposits in the quarter after a bank robbery (that equals one fifth the standard 
28 As to changes in other loan terms we note that if borrower preferences would change, this may 
especially affect relationship loan outcomes. Recall from earlier discussion that if anything the length 
of the relationship somewhat mitigates the effect of a robbery which could imply that borrower 
preferences after a robbery change in an opposite direction than loan officer ones. 
40
deviation in deposits). This is consistent with the idea that depositors are afraid to 
visit the bank and prefer to keep their deposits in the bank for a longer period, or that 
the bank provides some more liquidity to the affected branch(es). The small effect, 
however we find, is not sensitive to the time elapsed since the robbery, the degree of 
violence or the robbed amount, nor to the type of deposit (i.e., current account, fixed 
deposit, saving account) involved. Hence, changes in deposits do not seem to provide 
an alternative explanation to the changes in loan conditions we estimated earlier. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the impact of emotions on real-world decisions made by 
bank officers. We do so by analyzing the loan conditions of loans granted 
immediately after an exogenous violent event that is expected to have an effect on 
loan officers’ emotions. The exogenous event we focused on is bank robberies. Our 
study is the first one that attempts to understand the link between loan officers’ 
emotions and loan officers’ decisions over loan conditions. 
We employ a difference in difference approach where the treatment group for each 
event corresponds to the loans granted locally by the bank whose branch was robbed, 
and the control group corresponds to the loans that were granted in the rest of the 
country (or region). In order to rule out structural changes in the process of granting 
loans we define an event window for each bank robbery that retains only those loans 
granted 90 days before and 90 days after the bank robbery. In addition, we include a 
set of branch-event fixed effects in order to account for any observable and 
unobservable branch specific heterogeneity across time. 
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We find significant differences in conditions of the loans granted after a robbery 
suggesting that loan officers do change their decisions following this event. In general 
loan officers seem to adopt so-called avoidance behavior: They decrease at once the 
likelihood of having contact with the client by lengthening the maturity of the loan 
contract and by demanding more collateral thereby reducing the probability of loan 
non-performance (and dealings with the client) prior to maturity. However, these 
effects dissipate as the symptoms experienced by the loan officer wear off. In 
addition, loan officers grant loans with ceteris paribus slightly softer loan conditions: 
Lower interest rate and a higher loan amount, possibly reflecting a reduced 
willingness to spend face-to-face bargaining time with applicants.  
These effects, however, vary depending on the severity of the robbery. In robberies 
where the perpetrator carries a firearm, loan officers subsequently adopt stricter 
avoidance behavior, with longer maturity and higher collateral requirements, and the 
correspondent lower loan rates and higher loan amounts. But in those robberies where 
there was no firearm involved, collateral requirements and loan amount initially drop 
while loan rates increase. 
Finally, although in this study we analyze a single type of event (bank robberies), 
loan officers (as any individual) might experience several different events that could 
have an effect on their emotions and subsequently on the loan conditions. Strategies 
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The Figure presents the time path of a fifteen days moving average for each of the loan characteristics, by robbed branches and control branches. The

























































Variable Mean Median SD
Register of Robberies (National Police of Colombia )
   
   
Amount Robbed, in US Dollars 37,000      6,300        97,600        
Amount Robbed / Robbed Branch Deposits, in percent 0.97 0.01 4.61
Credit Registery (Financial Superintendence of Colombia )
   
                      
Loan Amount, in US Dollars 432,208    63,108      1,469,835   
Sample: Match of Registry of Robberies with Credit Registry
   
   
Amount Robbed, in US dollars 19,980      4,995        54,718        
Amount Robbed / Robbed Branch Deposits, in percent 0.02          0.00          0.12            
    
Loan Amount, in US Dollars 499,480 58,371 1,609,733
        
    
Loan Amount, in US Dollars 515,143 83,564 1,627,935
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Firms’ Strategic Choice of Loan Delinquencies 
Abstract 
I analyze the repayment decisions of firms with multiple loans that, for liquidity 
constraints or strategic reasons, stop making payments in some but not all their loans. 
Using a sample of commercial loans from Colombia over the period 2002:03 – 2012:06, 
I find that firms are less likely to stop making payments on loans granted by banks with 
which they have long relationships and by banks with which they have a clean repayment 
history. These results suggest that firms are concerned with losing the benefits gained 
through the relationship. I also find that firms are more likely to stop making payments 
on loans from foreign banks when compared to domestic banks, and equally on loans 
from state owned banks when compared to private banks. This suggests that the ability 
and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving play an important role in 
a firm’s decision. Overall, the results suggest that firms assess their delinquency choices 
based on their perceived ability to obtain new loans in the future. 
JEL Codes: G21, G32, G33 
Key words: Payment delinquencies, strategic choice, lending relationship, foreign 
ownership, state banks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate finance literature has often analyzed the main causes of debt defaults. A 
liquidity default occurs when a firm does not have the money to make debt payments. 
However, a strategic default occurs when the firm despite having the financial ability to 
cover its debt obligations decides to stop making payments1. The literature has mainly 
focused on finding the optimal debt structure of a firm, ex ante liquidity constraints, that 
deters strategic defaults and makes unavoidable liquidity defaults less expensive (Hart 
and Moore (1998), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996), Acharya, Huang, 
Subrahmanyam and Sundaram (2011)). However, the optimal decision of a firm ex post 
unavoidable liquidity constraints have been left unexplored. For instance, no research has 
attempted to analyze the trade-offs of a firm when deciding which type of debt to 
delinquent on.  
In this paper, I empirically analyze the delinquency decisions of firms with multiple 
loans that, due to liquidity constraints or strategic reasons, stop making payments in 
some but not all their loans. The decision on which type of loan to stop making payments 
is important as it might have asymmetric influences on the ability of the firm to obtain 
new credit in the future. Understanding this decision and its main drivers helps to shed 
light on the trade-offs faced by a firm when its cash flows are not enough to cover all of 
its debt payments. I focus my analysis on three aspects that can influence the delinquency 
choice of a firm: i) the strength of the relationship between the firm and the bank, ii) the 
ability and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving and iii) the 
likelihood that a loan will end up in a renegotiation process. A unique dataset with 
detailed information on all commercial loans granted in Colombia from 1998 to 2012 is 
used in this analysis. The set of observable characteristics includes: collateral, loan 
amount, maturity, interest rate, currency and loan rating. This loan data is merged with 
the firms' financial statements as well as with bank characteristics. This provides a rich 
1	Strategic defaults of big corporations are often associated with agency problems between managers and 
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data set ideal to analyze the choice of arrears of a firm. In addition, Colombia is a 
country in which rating agencies do not monitor firms and therefore there are large 
information asymmetries between firms and potential public investors. As a result, less 
than just 0.9 percent of total firms have public debt and the predominant source of 
financing is bank credit. Thus, relationship lending should be particularly important in 
Colombia.  
My empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, I isolate a group of firms with 
multiple loans that is forced to stop making payments on some of its bank debt 
obligations. I do so by selecting firms that have all their loan payments up to date in a 
given quarter !, but who start having payment delinquencies2 on some of their loans, but 
not in all of them, in the following quarter, ! + 1. Firms that are forced to stop all their 
loan payments are excluded, as they do not face the decision on which loan to stop 
making payments. Similarly, firms that manage to make all their loan payments are not 
included. The selected sample is comprised off firms that face heterogeneous liquidity 
shocks in terms of origin3, timing and magnitude. Nonetheless, the outcome of the 
shocks is homogeneous as they evaluate a common set of decisions. This helps me to 
assess what the primary factors impacting firm delinquency decision are, in isolation of 
other concerns.  
Next, the main drivers of the delinquency choice are obtained from a linear probability 
model in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable for loan delinquency. This 
variable takes the value of 1 for the loans that the firm chooses to stop making payments 
and 0 otherwise. There are several potential reasons why a firm would prefer to stop 
making payments on one loan instead of another one. I focus my analysis on a diverse set 
of variables that include type of relationship, type of bank and loan characteristics. In 
addition, and crucial for my identification strategy, I include a set of firm-time fixed 
effects in order to account for any observable and unobservable firm, time and firm-time 
heterogeneity. Thus, identification comes from a firm’s choice to stop making payments 
on one loan versus another. 
2	In this paper “payment delinquency” and "arrear" make reference to stop making payments on a loan.	
3	The origin might be linked to limited liquidity and/or strategic reasons.	
64
I find that firms are less likely to stop making payments on loans granted by banks with 
which they have long relationships, suggesting that firms are concerned with losing the 
benefits gained through the relationship. For the average relationship (9.6 quarters), the 
likelihood to start an arrear in a loan decreases by 2.2 percentage points. This effect as a 
percentage of the mean likelihood is equal to 9.6%. I further test if a variation on the 
value of bank-firms relationships (provided by a change in regulation that modified the 
memory of the credit bureaus4) has an effect on this result. I find that firms are even less 
likely to stop making payments on long relationships when the value of the relationship 
increases (i.e. when there is more asymmetric of information in the credit market). In 
addition, I find that firms that had arrears in the past are more likely to stop making 
payments on loans granted by banks victims of their previous arrears (the likelihood 
increases by 10.1 percentage points) and are less likely to choose to stop making 
payments on loans with banks that have not experienced any of their previous arrears (the 
likelihood decreases by 10.7 percentage points). This suggests that firms strategically 
keep clean records with some banks.  
I also find that firms are more likely to stop making payments on loans granted by 
foreign banks when compared to domestic banks (the likelihood increases by 1.4 
percentage points), and equally on loans granted by state owned banks when compared to 
private banks (the likelihood increases by 6.2 percentage points). In robustness, however, 
I show that firms are more likely to stop making on loans granted by foreign banks when 
the bank enter the market as a Greenfield Investment. These results suggest that the 
ability and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving play a role in the 
firm’s decision. This is in line with previous empirical findings that suggest that 
compared to domestic banks foreign banks generally face informational disadvantages 
that can affect their ability to succeed at recovering defaults (Mian (2006)). Furthermore, 
state owned banks are less active in monitoring and punishing their clients. This is due to 
the fact that they maximize social objectives instead of profits, and are considered to be 
inefficient compared to private banks (Gerschenkron (1962), Banerjee (1997), Hart, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). 
4	Refers to the Habeas data law.	
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Finally, I find that firms seem more likely to stop making payments on loans that are 
prone to end up in renegotiation process. Three main results stand out. Firms are more 
likely to stop making payments: i) on collateralized loans (that give the bank more 
certainty that the firm will repay), ii) on larger loans (that give the bank more motivation 
to start a renegotiation process) and iii) on loans that still have a relatively long time until 
maturity (that provide more time for renegotiation). 
In order to understand whether the selection of loan delinquencies is linked to the ex 
post availability and cost of credit, I analyze the benefits of bank-firm relationships and 
the cost of past loan delinquencies in terms of the loan conditions of new loans. I find 
that as the relationship lengthens firms get loans with lower interest rates, lower 
collateral requirements and higher loan amounts. This is consistent with previous theory 
and empirical findings according to which banks gain private information about the 
prospects of a firm during the relationship, and based on this they decide whether to 
extend more credit and/or change the loan terms (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot 
and Thakor (1994), Berger and Udell (1995)). On the contrary, it provides evidence 
against theories of ‘hold up’ problem according to which borrowers become locked in to 
their banks as the relationship matures and banks extract monopoly rents (e.g., Sharpe 
(1990), Rajan (1992)). Nonetheless, this result might be associated to the existence of 
multiple relationships in Colombia5. As according to Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) the 
competition from an additional informed bank eliminates the “hold-up” costs. In 
addition, this exercise provides evidence that firms with previous arrears get loans with 
higher interest rates, higher collateral requirements and lower loan amounts; in particular 
when the previous arrears where with the bank granting the new loan. This is consistent 
with previous empirical findings that suggest banks write tighter loan contracts than their 
peers after suffering payment defaults to their own loan portfolio (Murfin (2006)). 
5	 In the Colombia the average number of bank –firm relationships is 3 and the maximum 23. The 
distribution of the number of bank relationships per firm varies a lot across countries. With Italy and 
Norway in opposite extremes.  While in Italy on average firms have 15 relationships, in Norway no firm 
has more than 6 relationships. 
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To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the payment delinquency 
choice for firms. Other work has studied this question for households taking into account 
relevant aspects for them. Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010) analyze a sample of individuals 
that experience a liquidity shock and are forced to stop making payments in at least one 
of their loans6. They find that due to precautionary liquidity concerns, individuals prefer 
to default on mortgage loans than on credit cards. Trautmann and Vlahu (2012) find 
experimentally that expectations that the bank will become distressed reduce the 
repayment incentive for solvent borrowers, because the benefits of the relationship are 
lost if the bank fails. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2013) study the determinants of 
homeowners’ attitudes towards strategic default. They find that the cost of defaulting 
strategically increases with wealth and that it is driven by monetary and non-monetary 
factors like fairness and morality. They also find that people who know somebody who 
defaulted strategically are more willing to do so themselves, due to a decrease in the 
perceived probability that a bank would go after a borrower who defaults. 
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing how firms with multiple loans react 
when they are forced to stop making payments on one or more of their loans. An 
empirical analysis of this particular aspect of firms’ decision making in periods of 
financial distress is new to the literature. Importantly, in the strategic choice of 
delinquencies, the analysis takes into account certain aspects of the lender-borrower 
relationship, the type of bank and the loan characteristics, and it is able to identify the 
trade-offs faced by a firm when deciding which type of loans to delinquent on. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a review of the related 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section III presents the hypothesis and the 
methodology. Section IV describes the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section V 
contains the empirical results, including tests for robustness. Conclusions and a brief 
summary of future work follow in Section VI.
6	My empirical strategy follows closely the approach taken by Cohen-Cole and Morse.	
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The corporate finance literature has studied the optimal debt structure of a firm, ex ante 
liquidity constraints, that deters strategic defaults and makes unavoidable liquidity 
defaults less expensive. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), for instance, analyze what is the 
optimal debt structure of a firm, in terms of number of lenders, allocation of security 
interests and voting rules. The key to their analysis is the idea that these aspects of the 
debt structure affect the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. They, 
however, do not take into consideration that the characteristics of the lender and/or the 
relationship between the firm and the lender might also affect the outcome of debt 
renegotiation. According to their findings it is optimal for firms with low credit quality to 
borrow from just one creditor, making the liquidation cost cheap. And it is optimal for 
firms with high credit quality to have debt structures that make strategic default less 
attractive by borrowing from multiple creditors, by giving each equal security interests, 
and by adopting voting rules that allow some creditors to block asset sales. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, there are no theoretical studies that analyze the optimal 
decision of a firm, ex post unavoidable liquidity constraints, regarding which loans to pay 
and which loans to delinquent on. 
Recent empirical studies have analyzed several aspects of delinquency decisions, 
however, they have focused mostly on households.7 Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010) 
analyze the drivers of delinquency decisions using a sample of US consumer loans from 
2006 to 2007. Their analysis is focused on individuals that experience a liquidity shock 
which force them to stop making payments on at least one loan. These individuals face 
the decision to choose the type of debt they wish to keep and the type of debt on which 
they wish to enter delinquency. They find that individual liquidity considerations and 
local housing prices are significant predictors of the delinquency decision for individuals 
7	An exception is a recent paper by Baele, Farooq and Ongena (2014). Using a monthly dataset of 
business loans from Pakistan over the period 2006 to 2008, they analyze the effect of religion on 
the loan default rate. They find evidence that the default rate of Islamic loans is less than half the 
default rate of conventional loans. Islamic loans are less likely to default during Ramadan and in 
big cities if the share of votes to religious-political parties increases. Their findings suggest that 
individual religious belief and/or those of their fellow believers affect the decisions on loan 
defaults.
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under moderate stress. Moreover, they find that due to precautionary liquidity concerns, 
individuals prefer to default on mortgage loans than on credit cards. Trautmann and 
Vlahu (2012), experimentally study the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on 
loan repayment. They find that solvent borrowers are more likely to strategically delay or 
even default on their loans when the bank’s expected strength is low and when other 
borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low. The authors argue that the repayment 
incentives are reduced because the benefits of maintaining the relationship are lost if the 
bank fails. Another branch of the literature investigates non-monetary factors that affect
the default decision. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2013) use a survey made of US 
households during the period 2008 to 2010 to study the determinants of homeowners’ 
attitudes towards strategic default. They find that the cost of defaulting strategically 
increases with wealth and that it is driven by monetary and non-monetary factors like 
fairness and morality. People who are angrier about the economic situation and who 
distrust banks are more likely to default strategically. While people who consider it 
immoral to default are less willing to default. They also find that people who know 
somebody who defaulted strategically are more willing to do so themselves, due to a 
decrease in the perceived probability that the bank will go after a borrower who defaults. 
In this paper I study the decisions of firms that for liquidity constraints or strategic 
reasons are forced to stop making payments in some of their loans. The analysis focuses 
in understanding why a firm would prefer to delinquent on one loan instead of another 
one. It follows closely the approach taken by Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010), however, 
instead of focused on a period of global financial distress, I take advantage of the 
richness of my dataset by selecting all the periods in which a firm faced this type of 
decision. In addition, I focus on loan delinquencies rather than on permanent defaults. 
This is important, as the life of a firm is likely to continue after a loan delinquency such 
that the future availability of financial resources should play an important role in a firm’s 
decisions. Loan delinquencies typically have a cost for a firm in terms of future financial 
constraints and this cost can vary across lenders depending on the relationship and/or 
bank specific characteristics. Therefore, the firm’s decision in regards to which loan to 
delinquent on, should take this cost into account. However, as the firm approaches a 
69
permanent default, considerations around the cost of liquidation should start to play a 
more important role as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).   
This paper aims to contribute to the current literature by providing an empirical analysis 
of a firms’ decision-making process in periods of financial distress. It is the first paper 
that studies how firms react when they are forced to delinquent on some of their loans. 
Importantly, the analysis takes into account aspects of the relationship, the bank and the 
loan characteristics that were not taken into account before in the literature of strategic 
choice of defaults.  
III. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
This paper, as discussed, aims to understand the decision making of firms that due to 
liquidity constraints or strategic reasons are forced to stop making payments in some of 
their loans. The analysis is focused on firms that have made all its loan payments up to 
date on quarter !, but delinquent on some of their loans, but not in all of them, in quarter 
! + 1. Firms that are forced to stop all their loan payments, are excluded, as they do not 
face a decision as to which loan to stop making payments on. Similarly, firms that 
manage to make all its loan payments are also not included. 
Although each firm included in the analysis is likely to experience a liquidity shock8 
with a different intensity, the decision faced by each of them is the same: Which loan do 
I delinquent on? The decision might be driven by several reasons that aim to favor the 
current and/or future financial conditions of a firm. Among those reasons are: the 
strength of the relationship with the bank, the ability and willingness of the bank to 
punish the firm for misbehaving, and the likelihood that a loan could be driven into a 
renegotiation process. 
In order to identify what the main drivers of the delinquency choice are, I estimate the 
following linear probability model:   
8	The liquidity shock is experience as a result of liquidity constraints or strategic decisions of the 
firm.		
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1 !"#$%&'"%()!"#$ = ! !!"#$%&'(ℎ!"!"# + ! !"#$!" + ! !!"#!"#$ + !!" + !!"#$
(1) 
where !, !, ! and ! index firm, bank, loan and time (in quarters) respectively. !!" 
corresponds to firm-time fixed effects. They capture any systematic differences across 
firms for each quarter. The specifications saturated with firm-time fixed effects rule out 
the possibility that observed and/or unobserved firm, time and/or firm-time heterogeneity 
explain the decision as to which loan to stop making payments on. Thus, identification 
comes from a firm’s choice to stop making payments on one loan versus another. The 
standard errors are clustered at firm level to account for correlations in the residuals 
across observations of the same firm.  
!"#$%&'"%()!"#$ is equal to 1 if the loan is delinquent and is equal to 0 otherwise.  
Among the relationship characteristics I include: !"#$%ℎ !" !"#$%&'()ℎ!"!"#, which is 
the length in quarters of the relationship between firm ! and bank ! at time !. 
!"#$%&'( !"#$%&'"%($") !"#$ !"#$!"#, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
firm ! has been delinquent only on loans granted by bank ! before time ! and equals 0 
otherwise. !"#$%&'( !"#$%&'"%($") !"ℎ!" !"#$!"# which is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if firm ! has been delinquent only on loans granted by banks different to ! before 
time ! and equals 0 otherwise. !!"#$% !" !"#$%!"# which is the number of loans that 
firm ! has with bank ! and !ℎ!"# !" !"##$%!"# which is the proportion of bank debt that 
firm ! has with the bank ! at time !. Within the bank characteristics I include !"#$%&'!", 
which indicates whether the bank ! that granted loan ! is foreign (equals one) or 
domestic (equals zero). !"#$%&!", which indicates whether the bank ! that granted loan ! 
is state owned (equals one) or private (equals zero) and !"#$ !"#$!"  which is measured 
as the natural logarithm of bank assets. Between the loan characteristics I include 
!"##$%&'$#!"#$, which is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the loan is collateralized 
and equals 0 otherwise, !"#$ !"#$%&!"#$, that is the amount of the loan in millions of 
Colombian pesos (COP), !"#$%$&# !"#$!"#$, that is the interest rate of the loan in percent 
and !"#$ !" !"#$%&#'!"#$, which is the number of months remaining until the end of the 
contract.  
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According to the literature on relationship lending, banks gather private information 
about the prospects of a firm through the relationship, and based on this information 
determine whether to extend more credit or change the loan terms. Thus, an important 
dimension of a relationship is its duration (Diamond (1991)). Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
and Boot and Thakor (1994) have formally modeled the association between the duration 
of a relationship and the loan interest rate. Their models predict that loan interest rates 
decline as the relationship lengthens. Boot and Thakor (1994) also found that collateral 
requirements decrease with the duration of the relationship. In this scenario, a firm might 
be concerned with losing the benefits generated through the relationship and therefore 
would avoid a situation where it has to delinquent on loans granted by banks with which 
they had long relationships. Nonetheless, if by means of having a long relationship, 
banks are also more willing to subsidize the firm in times of distress, at the expense of 
having a recovery of profits during good times, then firms should be more likely to 
delinquent on loans granted by banks with which they have long relationships (Bolton, 
Freixas, Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2013)). 
The value of lending relationship, however, depends on the level of competition in the 
credit market, as is shown by Petersen and Rajan (1995). When credit markets are 
concentrated, lenders are more likely to finance young or distressed firms because it is 
easier for them to extract rents later. In addition, the flexibility of a firm to switch banks 
is limited in a concentrated market. These aspects make a lending relationship more 
valuable to a firm in concentrated markets.  
Another dimension of a lending relationship is the previous loan delinquency of a firm.  
Based on how the bank has reacted to previous loan delinquencies made to its own 
portfolio and/or to portfolios of other banks, the firm will decide whether to delinquent 
on loans granted by the same bank or on loans granted by a bank with which the firm has 
a clean repayment history. If banks punishes the delinquencies made to their own 
portfolio more than the ones made to other banks (learned through the credit bureau), 
firms may choose to strategically keep clean records with some banks. Although there is 
not theoretical literature that supports this hypothesis, Murfin (2006) shows empirically 
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that banks write tighter loan contracts than their peers after suffering payment defaults to 
their own loan portfolio. 
In addition, the scope of the relationship and its importance on the portfolio of the firm 
is another indicator of the quality of the relationship between the firm and the bank. A 
higher number of loans or a higher proportion of debt with a bank could indicate not only 
that the firm has built a good reputation with the bank, but also that the firm holds its 
main bank account with the bank (not observed to me) and thus, the bank could seize the 
money when available.  
Moreover, the ability and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving 
may play a key role when the firm has to decide which loan to delinquent on. The origin 
(domestic or foreign) and the nature (state owned or private) of a bank are important 
characteristics that might indicate how strict a bank will be in punishing the firm for 
misbehaving. Compared to domestic banks, foreign banks generally face distance 
constraints and informational disadvantages that can affect their ability to succeed at 
recovering defaults.	Although there is no theory paper that supports this notion, there are 
empirical papers that favor this view. Mian (2006) shows that cultural and geographical 
differences between the foreign bank’s country of origin and its subsidiary make it 
difficult for foreign banks to perform relational functions such as bilateral renegotiation 
and recovery of bad loans. These difficulties are stronger, the more geographically, or 
culturally distant a foreign bank is. If firms perceive the lack of ability at recovering 
defaults as a less threatening reaction of a bank, then firms may be more likely to 
delinquent on loans granted by foreign banks. 
On the other hand, there are three main views that explain the existence of state owned 
banks (social, agency and political). The social view sees state owned banks as 
institutions created to promote financial development for economic growth 
(Gerschenkron (1962)). They allocate funds to socially profitable projects or to firms that 
do not have access to other funds. According to this view, private and state owned banks 
differ because the former maximizes profits and the later maximizes social objectives. La 
Porta (2002), nonetheless, documents that higher government ownership of banks is 
associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita 
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income and productivity. Under the agency view, state owned banks also channel 
resources to socially profitable activities, but public managers exert less effort than 
would private managers (Banerjee (1997), Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). They 
could, among others, perform less monitoring activities and less effort in recovering 
defaults. In the political view, state owned banks enable the government to finance 
inefficient, but politically desirable projects. Politicians divert resources to supporters 
who return the favor in the form of votes, political contributions, and bribes (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). Thus, they could allow friends and supporters to misbehave in return of 
additional support. According to the three views, state owned banks are expected to be 
less active in monitoring and punishing their clients. Consequently, firms may be more 
likely to delinquent on loans granted by state owned banks.   
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
I mainly use two datasets in this analysis.  The first one is a credit registry that contains 
information about individual commercial loans reported by financial institutions to the 
Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, the regulator of Colombian’s financial 
system9. It provides a detailed look at all the loans granted by the financial system to 
firms. Characteristics such as loan maturity, collateral, interest rate, amount, rating and 
the exact date of origination are included from 1998:12 to 2012:03 on a quarterly basis.  
The second data set contains yearly information on the financial statements reported to 
the Superintendencia de Sociedades, the regulator of firms in Colombia 10.  On average, 
18,000 firms report their financial statements every year and less than 0.8 percent of 
them have public debt. Thus, the primary source of external financing for Colombian 
firms is bank debt. Both datasets are merged and the resulting dataset contains 2.5 
9 The dataset was provided due to a direct link of the author of this paper with the Central Bank 
of Colombia. 
10	By the Colombian law 590 of 1990, all firms whose total assets are greater than the equivalent 
of 501 minimum salaries, are required to report their financial statements to the Superintendencia 
de Sociedades.	
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million loan observations made to 32,965 different firms by 120 different financial 
institutions. 
In this paper, a sample of outstanding loans of firms that are facing liquidity constraints 
is used. I classify firms as facing liquidity constraints if they are able to cover some of 
their debt payments but not all of them. In other words, firms that face a situation in 
which they have to decide on which loan they stop making payments. In order to 
determine whether a firm has stopped making payments on a loan, I use the loan rating 
included in the credit register. The loan rating indicates the level of credit risk intrinsic 
on a loan (see Table 1). It is determined and updated periodically by the entity granting 
the loan at the moment of origination based on quantitative and qualitative information of 
the firm and the projects to be finance with the loan. The loan rating ranks from ‘A’ to 
‘E’, where ‘A’ is the best category and ‘E’ is the worst. Most of the commercial loans in 
Colombia are classified in category ‘A’ at the moment of origination. During the sample 
period 95.2 percent of the loans were born in category ‘A’, 3.6 percent in category ‘B’ 
and the remained 1.2 percent were born in a lower category (‘C’, ‘D’ or ‘E’). After 
origination, the main and only mandatory quantitative measurement used to update the 
rating of the loan is the number of days of delinquency11, and it is used according to 
Table 1. If a non-performing loan goes back to performance, its rating is upgraded. The 
ratings among lenders of the same firm must be align when two conditions are meet: 
first, at least two financial institutions have classified the loans of the firm in a lower 
credit rating and second, the loans with those entities represent more than 20 percent of 
the loan portfolio of the firm. When these conditions are not meet discrepancy between 
the ratings of the loans of a firm with different banks is allowed. Moreover, in the 
interim, while the ratings of the institutions are not updated in the credit bureaus (thus it 
is not yet shared) discrepancy of ratings is also allowed. 
[Table 1 around here] 
Table 2 presents the quarterly transition matrix for commercial loans estimated for the 
period comprised between 1999-I and 2011-I. The	probability	of	a	loan	having	a	credit	





with	 an	 !	 rating	 ( !!"! ),	 that	 is	 !!" =
!!"
!!"!
. Assuming that the Markov process is 
stationary !!" ! = !!", that is, the individual probabilities do not change over time. The 
transition matrix presented in Table 2 suggest that loans with a credit rating of ‘B’ are 
more likely to migrate to a rating of ‘A’, while loans with a rating of ‘C’ or ‘D’ are more 
likely to migrate to a rating of ‘D’ or ‘E’, respectively. That is, loans in ‘D’ or ‘E’ are 
more likely to end up in a permanent default.  
[Table 2 around here] 
Gómez, Morales-Acevedo, Pineda and Zamudio (2009), however, find that the 
transition probabilities are different when estimated separately for crisis times and 
normal times. During crisis times transitions to worse categories are more common than 
during normal times. Similarly, upgrading is less probably during crisis times. The 
authors conclude that the assumption that the transition probabilities are stationary	 is	
violated for credit transitions in Colombia, as credit ratings seem to react to changes in 
economic fundamentals.  
I use the loan rating to isolate the sample of interest. I classify a firm as facing liquidity 
constraints between quarter t and quarter t+1, if having had a clean record in period t (all 
loans in A), it makes a payment default on some of its loans, but not in all of them, in 
period t+1 (B, C, D or E). Firms that delinquent on all their loans are excluded, because 
they do not face a decision as to which loan to delinquent on and they are more likely to 
reach an insolvency state. In robustness, I use the exact number of days of delinquency 
(available in the credit register for a short period of time), instead of a change in the 
credit rating of the loan, to determine if a loan becomes delinquent.  
Given the censoring nature of some variables used in the analysis, i.e., Length of 
Relationship, Previous Payment Default same Bank and Previous Payment Default other 
Bank, the loan observations of the first four years are excluded. The final sample contains 
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49,968 loan observations given to 6,867 firms. The loans were granted by 71 banks, 17 
of them were foreign banks, 6 state owned banks and the rest private domestic banks. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of firms’ characteristics for the excluded and the 
selected sample. The excluded sample is split by firms that repaid all their loans and 
firms that delinquent on all their loans. The last column reports the differences in means 
between the selected sample and the excluded sample. The excluded sample comprises 
403,918 firm-quarter observations of firms that keep their loans up to date from one 
quarter to the next and 1,763 firm-quarter observations of firms that stop making 
payments on all their loans from one quarter to the next. The selected sample, on the 
other hand, is composed by 9,671 firm-quarter observations of firms that stop making 
payments on some of their loans but not in all of them. The firms in the selected sample 
seem to have poor financial performance compared to the excluded sample. The mean 
Return on Equity (ROE) is 5.0 percentage points lower, the Current Ratio (CR) is 43.3 
percentage points lower and the Debt to Equity Ratio is 41.0 percentage points higher. 
Moreover, firms are smaller in terms of assets size, have a higher number of lenders and 
loans and have a higher number of previous non-performing loans. All this differences in 
means are statistically significant.  
[Table 3 around here] 
Graph 1 represents an average firm in the selected sample. It has five outstanding loans 
with four different banks. The payments in all its loans are up to date in quarter t.  
However, in quarter t+1 the firm stops making payments on one of its loans.  
[Graph 1 around here] 
V. RESULTS 
1. Main Findings
Table 4 presents summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis. The average 
Length of Relationship is 9.6 quarters. Around 5.7 percent of the loans were granted by a 
bank with which the firm had its unique payment delinquency and 25.6 percent by a bank 
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that had not experienced any of the previous delinquencies of the firm. The average 
number of loans that a firm has with a bank is equal to 1.3. The mean Share of Wallet is 
24.8 percent, which is in line with the total number of loans and lenders of the average 
firm represented in Graph 1. Foreign banks granted 13.7 percent of the loans in the 
sample, and domestic banks granted the other 86.3 percent. Moreover, state owned banks 
granted 2.9 percent of the loans and private banks granted the rest. With respect to the 
loan characteristic, 45.8 percent of the loans have collateral, the average loan amount is 
452.2 million COP (about 250 thousand USD) and the average interest rate is 17.3 
percent. About 40 percent of the loans have a short-term maturity and the average time to 
maturity is 20.8 months.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Table 5 presents differences in means of relationship, bank and loan characteristics 
between delinquent loans and loans that kept their payments up to date. The delinquent 
loans represent 23.3 percent of the total sample. The Length of Relationship is slightly 
shorter for the delinquent loans. The proportion of loans granted by a bank to which the 
firm had its unique payment delinquency in the past (Previous Delinquencies Same 
Bank), is higher for the delinquent loans. Moreover, the proportion of loans granted by 
banks that had not experienced any of the previous delinquencies of the firm (Previous 
Delinquencies Different Bank), is lower for the delinquent loans. Thus, firms seem to 
choose to stop making payments to the banks with which they had delinquencies in the 
past. The difference in the number of loans that the firm holds with a bank is not 
economically significant. The Share of Wallet is higher for the delinquent loans, which 
indicates that firms seem to prefer to stop making payments to the banks with which they 
have a higher percentage of debt.  
The proportion of loans granted by foreign banks is lower in the group of delinquent 
loans than on the group of loans that remain with their payments up to date. And the 
proportion of loans granted by state owned banks is higher in the group of delinquent 
loans. With respect to the loan terms, the delinquent loans have higher collateral, less 
loan amount, lower interest rates, shorter maturity and longer time to maturity. All these 
differences in means are statistically significant. 
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 [Table 5 around here] 
Table 6 shows the results of a linear probability regression of the binary variable 
Delinquency on relationship, bank and loan characteristics12. As discussed before, an 
important part of the methodology is to isolate the population of interest. Only firms that 
stop making payments in some of their loans but not in all of them are included. Given 
that in the selected sample firms have more than one loan in the same quarter, firm-time 
fixed effects can be included to control for all the time-varying and invariant, observable 
and unobservable firm characteristics.  
 [Table 6 around here] 
The dependent variable equals 1 for delinquent loans and equals 0 if the payments of the 
loans remain up to date. The results in Column I suggest the probability to make a 
payment delinquency on a loan decreases with the length of the relationship between the 
firm and the bank. This result is both statistically and economically significant13. For the 
average relationship (9.6 months), the coefficient of -0.23 represents a decrease of 2.2 
percentage points in the likelihood to delinquent on a loan.  This effect as a percentage of 
the mean likelihood is equal to 9.6%. I performed additional exercises in order to check 
the robustness of this result. Table 7 present the results of several models that include 
dummy variables for the length of the relationship instead of the variable in quarters. 
Long Relationship is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the length of the 
relationship is above the 95 percentile (13 quarters). Short Relationship is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the length of the relationship is below the 25 
percentile (4 quarters). When the variable Long Relationship is included in the model 
(Columns I and II) the results suggest that firms are 3.03 percentage points less likely to 
delinquent on loans granted by banks with whom they have a long relationship. If instead 
12	As robustness, I use the exact number of days of delinquency instead of a change in the credit 
rating of the loan, to determine if a loan becomes delinquent. The results are presented in 
Appendix Table A.3 and are consistent with the results presented in Table 6.  
13	Appendix Table A.1 reports the results of a model that includes as an alternative measure for 
the length of relationship the Number of Old and New Loans with the bank.  The results are in 
line with the ones found with the more standard measure length of relationship. 	
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the variable Short Relationship is included the results suggest that firms are 1.7 
percentage points more likely to delinquent on loans granted by banks with which they 
have a short relationship. Table 8 presents the results for a sample of firms that have 
both, loans with banks with which they have very short relationships (below the 25 
percentile) and loans with banks with which they have very long relationships (above the 
95 percentile). The sample is composed by 2.723 observations. The results show that 
firms are 8.4 to 11.5 percentage points less likely to delinquent on long relationships. 
These exercises confirm the results found in Table 6 where the length of the relationship 
was included in quarters.  
[Table 7 around here] 
[Table 8 around here] 
These result are in line with the hypothesis that firms get financial benefits through the 
relationship and therefore they are less likely to default on banks with which they have 
long relationships. In order to determine what are the benefits of bank-firm relationships 
in Colombia, I estimated the effect of relationship characteristics on the loan terms 
(Interest Rate, Collateral, Collateralization, Maturity and Ln(loan amount) of all new 
loans granted between 2002 and 2011. The results, presented in Table 9, suggest that as 
the relationship lengthens firms get loans with lower interest rates, lower collateral 
requirements and higher loan amounts. However, the Maturity has a slight decrease. For 
an average relationship there is a decrease of 90 basis points on the interest rate, which 
represent a decrease by 5,2 percent on the average interest rate. The decrease on the 
likelihood to be required to pledge collateral corresponds to 80 basis points. And the 
increase on the loan amount is equivalent to 1.6 million COP. These results are robust to 
the inclusion of loan characteristics.  
[Table 9 around here] 
Moreover, I find that if the firm has had delinquencies in the past only with the bank 
that granted the loan, it is more likely to stop making payments on loans granted by that 
bank. The coefficient reported in Column 1 of Table 6, indicates that the likelihood to be 
delinquent on a loan increases by 10.1 percentage points.  In contrast, if the borrower has 
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had delinquencies only with other banks, different to the one that granted the loan, it will 
be less likely to stop making payments on loans granted by that bank. The coefficient 
reported in Column 1, indicates that the likelihood to be delinquent on a loan decreases 
by 10.8 percentage points. In order to test the robustness of this result, I re-estimate the 
model including the Number of Previous Delinquencies Same Bank	instead of the binary 
variables for previous delinquencies. The results, reported on Appendix Table A.2, 
suggest that each arrear with a bank will increase the likelihood to stop making payments 
on loans with that bank by 4.2 to 4.9 percentage points. This is consistent with the idea 
that firms strategically keep clean records with some banks, because they anticipate that 
banks punish more harshly those defaults made to their own loan portfolio. This can be 
evidenced in Table 9, which aims to analyze not only the benefits of the relationship by 
also the costs of loan delinquencies. It shows that firms that had arrears in the past get 
loans with interest rates that are 90 basis points higher (see coefficient on Previous 
Delinquent Loans). However, if some of the arrears were with the bank granting the new 
loan, the interest rate is even higher by additional 44 basis points (see coefficient on 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank). This translates on a total increase of 1.3 percentage 
points on the interest rate if the firm had arrears in the past with the bank granting the 
loan (compare to an increase of 90 basis points if the firm only has arrears with other 
banks). The likelihood to be required to pledge collateral on a new loan is also affected 
by the previous loan delinquencies. It increases by 2.4 percentage points if a firm had 
arrears in the past with other banks and by 6.3 percentage points if the arrears were with 
the bank that is granting the new loan. In turn, the loan amount decreases for new loans 
when the firm had arrears in the past with other banks by 1.1 million COP, and if some of 
the arrears where with the bank granting the loan, the loan amount decrease by 2.3 
million COP. All together, the results on Table 9 confirms not only that banks punish 
more the delinquencies make to their own portfolio but also that most of the benefits of 
the relationship in terms of better loan conditions described before are loss with the 
existence of previous loan delinquencies. 
Lastly, the number of loans with a bank seems to decrease the likelihood to stop making 
payments on a loan. According to Table 6 (Column I) an additional loan with a bank 
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decreases the likelihood of delinquency with that bank by 3.28 percentage points. Share 
of Wallet, however, does not seem to be a determinant factor on the delinquency choice. 
With respect to the bank characteristics, the results suggest that firms are more likely to 
delinquent on loans granted by foreign banks than on loans granted by domestic banks. If 
a loan is granted by a foreign bank the likelihood that a firm delinquent on it increases by 
1.37 percentage points. This corresponds to an increase in the mean likelihood of 5.9%. 
Nonetheless, in robustness I interact the variable Foreign Bank with a variable that 
indicates whether the bank enter the through an acquisition or through Greenfield 
Investment. The results, presents in Appendix A.2 (Column I), suggest that firms are 
more likely to delinquent on foreign banks only when the bank that granted to loan enter 
the market as a Greenfield Investment. This is consistent with previous empirical 
findings that show that foreign banks are less successful at recovering defaults due to 
distance constraints (Mian (2006)). In order to check the robustness of this result, I 
performed an additional exercise. Column I of Table 10 presents the results for a sample 
of firms that have loans granted by both foreign and domestic banks. The sample is 
composed by 28,922 observations. The results show that firms are 94 basis points more 
likely to delinquent on loans granted by foreign banks, however the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. Looking at the loan characteristics of loans granted by foreign 
banks also show that foreign banks do not price their loans or include additional 
collateral requirements anticipating more delinquencies. In Table 11, I analyze the 
determinants of loan contracts for a sample of loans granted to firms that received loans 
from both domestic and foreign banks during the same quarter. Loans granted by foreign 
banks have lower interest rates (-37 basis points) and are less likely to be required to 
pledge collateral (-9.7 percentage points). They, however, have shorter maturities (-5.3 
months) and lower loan amounts (these results are robust to the inclusion of loan 
characteristics).  
[Table 10 around here] 
[Table 11 around here] 
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Moreover, firms are more likely to delinquent on loans granted by state owned banks 
than on loans granted by private banks. If a loan is granted by a state owned bank the 
likelihood that the firm stop making payment on it increases by 6.2 percentage points. 
This is consistent with the view that state owned banks are less active in monitoring and 
punishing their clients. In order to check the robustness of this result, I performed an 
additional exercise. Column II of Table 10 presents the results for a sample of 8,774 
observations of firms that have loans granted by both state owned and private banks. The 
results show that firms are 4.6 percentage points more likely to delinquent on loans 
granted by state owned banks, consistent with the results of Table 6. State owned banks 
tend to grant loans with softer loan conditions. In Table 12, I analyze the determinants of 
loan contracts for a sample of 3,024 loans, granted to firms that received loans from both 
state owned banks and private banks during the same quarter. Loans granted by state 
owned banks have lower interest rates (-23 basis points) and are less likely to be required 
to pledge collateral (-3.8 percentage points). They, however, have shorter maturities (-2.1 
months) and slightly lower loan amounts.  
[Table 12 around here] 
The results in the loan characteristics suggest that firms are more likely to stop making 
payments on collateralized loans. The likelihood to be delinquent on a collateralized loan 
is 11.5 percentage points higher compared to non-collateralized loans (Table 6)14. A 
possible explanation for this is that firms anticipate that banks that included collateral on 
the loan contract are more certain that the firm will repay the loan. While banks that did 
not include collateral on the loan terms might panic and might try to push the firm into a 
bankruptcy process. Collateralized loans also give a firm more bargaining power in case 
the loan ends up in a renegotiation process. The results for collateral, however, are less 
pronounced when the firm is experiencing a long-term distress, as it is analyzed in 
robustness (see Table 17). Moreover, the results suggest that firms are more likely to 
delinquent on larger loans. For a loan with an amount equal to the mean amount of the 
sample the probability to delinquent is 2.5 percent higher. A potential explanation for this 
14	Appendix Table A.2 presents the results of a model that includes Collateralization instead of 
Collateral and the results suggest that firms are more likely to stop making payments on loans 
with a higher collateralization.	
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is that firms anticipate that banks might be more willing to start a renegotiation process if 
the loan is larger.  
In line with this, firms are more likely to delinquent on loans with a relatively long time 
to maturity15. An average loan, with a time to maturity equal to 20.8 months, will be 1.7 
percentage points more likely to be delinquent. This suggests that firms prefer to default 
on the loan that gives them more time to renegotiate. Finally, higher interest rates seem 
to decrease the likelihood of making a payment delinquency but this result is not robust 
to stronger specifications presented below. Overall, the results for the loan conditions 
suggest that firms anticipate the bank’s willingness to renegotiate a loan contract. 
In Column II of Table 6, I present the results for the model including bank fixed effects. 
The magnitude of the coefficients is slightly different but the sign and significance of the 
results remain the same for most of the variables, excluding the interest rate that loses its 
significance. In Column III, instead of including firm-time and bank fixed effects, I 
include firm-bank-time fixed effects. The size of the sample has a considerable reduction. 
The reason for this is that only firms that have more than one loan with the same bank 
and that make a payment delinquency on some of them, but not in all, are included. This 
exercise is useful to understand which loan characteristics play a more important role in 
the delinquency choice of a firm. The results are similar to the ones presented before. 
The sign and the significance of the coefficients remain the same, however, the 
magnitude of the coefficients increased. Collateral seems to be the most important 
characteristic in the delinquency choice of a portfolio of loans with the same bank. 
15	In Appendix Table A.1, I re-estimate the model excluding the sample of firms that start a new 
relationship (have had only one existing loan with any of their banks) as in these cases the length 
of relationship is determined by the duration of a single loan and a long time to maturity might 
translate into a short relationship. The results show that even excluding this sample of firms the 




I estimate the model using a conditional Logit model instead of a Linear Probability 
model16. The results reported in Table 13 as odds ratios, are in line with the ones 
obtained using a Linear Probability Model. The sign and significance of the coefficients 
remain the same as the ones reported in Table 6. 
In addition, I estimate the model using a Probit model. I exclude all the sets of fixed 
effects and include firm and macroeconomic characteristics instead. I estimate the model 
not only using the sample of firms that stop making payments in some of their loans but 
also considering the firms that stop making payments in all of their loans and the firms 
that repaid all their loans. Characteristics of these three different groups are presented on 
Table 3. Notice that only a minority of firms delinquent on all their loans from one 
quarter to the next, and the ones that do have on average 1.2 loans and only one lender.   
The results for the Probit model are presented in Table 14. Column I shows the results 
for the sample of firms that stop making payments in some of their loans, which are also 
in line with the results from the linear probability model reported in Table 6. Column II 
adds the sample of firms that stop making payments in all their loans. The sample size 
increases from 49,962 loan observations to 51,975 loan observations, which also reveals 
that only few firms faced extreme liquidity constrains during the sample period. The 
coefficients have the same sign and significance compared to Column I, however their 
magnitude has a slight increase. Finally, Column III adds the firms that repaid all their 
loans and it corresponds to the population of loans. It is composed by 1,275,994 loan 
observations and it indicates that most of the firms experience no distress during the 
sample period. The average likelihood of delinquency of the sample drops to 0.9%.  
Interestingly, most of the coefficients remain with the same sign and significance, 
however, and consistent with the composition of the sample, the magnitude of the 
16	This model has the disadvantages that predicted values may by less than zero or greater than 
one, and that the OLS covariance matrix estimate is inconsistent.	
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coefficients drops. Overall these exercises show that my results are robust to different 
methodologies and sample compositions. 
[Table 13 around here] 
[Table 14 around here] 
b. Effect of a Change in the Value of Bank-Firm Relationships
In this section I analyze if a change in the value of bank-firm relationships have an effect 
on the firms’ selection of arrears. I do so by exploring a variation on the amount of credit 
information shared between financial institutions through credit bureaus. The variation is 
generated thanks to the introduction of the Habeas Data Law in December of 2008. Prior 
to the introduction of this law, banks could observe the entire credit history of a firm. 
Both positive and negative information was observable for an unlimited length of time. 
In other words, the memory of the credit bureau was ‘infinite’. With the introduction of 
the Habeas Data law, the memory of the credit bureaus was shortened and limited to a 
length equal to twice the length of the delinquency period of a loan.  
The decrease on the information shared through credit bureaus naturally increased the 
level of asymmetric information in the credit market (now it results more difficult for 
banks to distinguish between good and bad borrowers). This in turn allows banks to 
extract more private information through the relationships with their clients. Thus, the 
value of the relationship should increase. Under this scenario firms should be even less 
likely to stop making payments on loans granted by banks with who they have long 
relationships after the introduction of the Habeas data law. In order to test if that is the 
case, I include interactions in the main specification with a dummy that represents the 
introduction of the law. 
The results, presented in Table 15, suggest that after the introduction of the Habeas Data 
law firms are even less likely to stop making payments on loans granted by banks with 
who they have a strong relationship. A longer length of relationship, a higher number of 
loans and/or a higher share of wallet with a bank will translate on a lower probability that 
a firm choose to stop making payment on loans granted by that bank. This result 
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highlights the finding that bank firm relationships play a very important role on the 
selection of the arrears of a firm. 
 [Table 15 around here] 
c. Short Term vrs Long Term Distress:
In order to determine if the delinquency decisions are affected by the length of the 
period of distress of a firm, I include interaction terms with the variable Long Term 
Distress. This is in indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm remains in a 
state of delinquency for more than three quarters and zero otherwise. Of the 6,867 firms 
included in the sample, only 728 firms were in delinquency for more than three 
consecutive quarters. That is, most of the delinquencies in the sample are short-term 
temporal delinquencies rather than long-term permanent defaults. The results, presented 
in Table 16, show that most of the interaction terms turn out to be insignificant. That is, 
the length of the period of distress of the firm does not seems to modify most of its 
preferences with respect to which loan to delinquent on. There are however some 
exceptions, if the firm is facing a long term distress it is even less likely to stop making 
payments on loans granted by banks with which they have a higher number of 
outstanding loans. This might be reflecting that the firm has additional products with the 
bank, i.e., main bank account that could be automatically sized by the bank in case of 
default. In addition, firms seem to be less likely to stop making payments on 
collateralized loans than on uncollateralized loans. This suggests that firms are more 
afraid of loosing the collateral when the distress is not for a short time of period. Finally, 
firms also seem to be even more likely to stop making payments on larger loans. This 
might be reflecting that in case of default firms might prefer to deal with a big loan 
granted by one bank rather than with several small loans granted by more than one bank. 
[Table 16 around here] 
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d. Renegotiations vrs Loan Delinquencies:
The existence of renegotiations might naturally impact the decision of a firm as on 
which loan to stop making payments. Nonetheless, there is little information available 
about renegotiations of commercial loans in Colombia and, in particular, there is not 
detailed information that indicates whether and when a loan has been renegotiated. 
According to press reports and general statistics, the most common practice among banks 
in Colombia in terms of renegotiations is to extend the maturity of the loan17. Based on 
this information, I analyze the dynamic of the Maturity in the lifetime of a loan, and 
classify a loan as being renegotiated when its Maturity increases from one quarter to the 
next one.  
From 2002 to 2010 there are in total 93.907 loan renegotiations made on 54.223 
different loans (some loans are renegotiated more than once). According to these 
numbers about 8.3% of the loans in the credit register are renegotiated at some point in 
time. The proportion of renegotiations in the sample of loans used for my main empirical 
exercise is somehow lower and represents 5.4% of the total sample (compared to a 23.3% 
of loans that stop making payments). This is not surprising, as previous literature has 
reported that the majority of renegotiations occur outside of default or financial distress.  
For example, Roberts and Sufi (2008) using a sample of credit agreements between U.S. 
publicly traded firms and financial institutions; find that renegotiations are rarely 
associated with a covenant violation or a payment default.  
I use a Multinomial Logit Model18 with a categorical dependent variable that takes the 
value of 0 if the loan is repaid, 1 if the loan is renegotiated and 2 if the loan starts an 
arrear, to analyze the likelihood of each of these outcomes. I estimate the model using the 
sample selected for the main empirical exercise and define as a ‘base outcome’ the 
repayment of the loan. The results, presented in Appendix Table A.4, suggest that a 
17	See http://ape.com.co/finanzas/item/710-crece-la-restructuracion-de-creditos-a-las-empresas.	
18	The Multinomial Logit model was first introduced by McFadden (1974) to explain the choice 
of transportation modes of urban commuters.  
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higher length of relationship is associated with a both, a lower probability to renegotiate 
a loan and a lower probability to stop making payments on a loan. On the other hand the 
existence of previous loan delinquencies with the bank that grant the loans increases both 
the likelihood of renegotiation and the likelihood of loan delinquency, however it has a 
higher contribution for the likelihood of loan delinquency. The existence of previous 
delinquencies with other banks influences negatively the likelihood to stop making 
payments on a loan and do not seem to have an impact on the likelihood of renegotiation. 
In addition, the results suggest that firms are less likely to stop making payments on 
loans granted by banks that have renegotiated their loans in the past. In turn, the results 
suggest that if there have been renegotiations before between the bank and the firm; it is 
more likely that renegotiation take place again (see the coefficient on Previous 
Renegotiations Same Bank, which show that the likelihood of renegotiation increases by 
7.4 percentage points).   
 With respect to the bank characteristics I find that loans with foreign banks are more 
likely to end up in either renegotiation or delinquency, however the likelihood to end up 
in a delinquency increases relatively more. Loans granted by state owned banks are less 
likely to be renegotiated and more likely to become delinquent on their payments. 
Finally, the loan characteristics reveal that loans with collateral or longer time to maturity 
are less likely to be renegotiated and more likely to start having arrears, while loans with 
higher loan amounts or higher interest rates are more likely to be renegotiated.  
As an additional robustness, I re-estimate the Linear Probability Model of my main 
speciation including as an additional relationship characteristic the indicator variable 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank. The results, presented in Appendix A.5, are in line 
with the main results presented in Table 6 and suggest that the existence of previous 
renegotiations between the firm and the bank decreases the probability of loan 
delinquency. 
Overall the results help to uncover the role of renegotiation in the firm’s choice of loan 
delinquencies. However, further research needs to be done to understand the role of 
renegotiation ex post payment delinquencies. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I analyze the repayment decisions of firms with multiple loans that 
experience a liquidity shock and are forced to stop making payments on at least one of 
their loans. My empirical strategy consists of two steps. First, I isolate the group of firms 
that having had all their loan payments up to date in a given quarter !, start having 
payment delinquencies in some of their loans but not in all of them on the following 
quarter, ! + 1. Second, in order to understand how these decisions are made and what 
their main drivers are, I use a linear probability model in which the dependent variable is 
an indicator variable for loan delinquency. I focus my analysis on a diverse set of 
variables that include relationship, bank and loan characteristics. In addition, I include a 
set of firm-time fixed effects in order to account for any observable and unobservable 
firm, time and firm-time heterogeneity. 
I find that firms are less likely to delinquent on loans granted by banks with which they 
have long relationships and by banks with which they have a clean repayment history. 
These results suggest that firms are concerned about losing the benefits gained through 
the relationship and that from previous experience, they anticipate that banks will punish 
more the delinquencies made to their own loan portfolio than to the one of their peers. I 
also find that firms are more likely to delinquent on loans granted by foreign and by state 
owned banks and on loans that are more likely to end up in a renegotiation process. This 
suggests that the ability and willingness of the bank to punish the firm for misbehaving 
play an important role on firm’s decision. Overall, the results suggest that firms assess 
the influence of their delinquency choices on their ability to obtain new credit in the 
future. 
In future versions of the paper I plan to analyze how the degree of financial distress of 
the firm affects its decision in regards to which loan to delinquent on. In principal, 
whereas an illiquid firm might be concerned about its ability to access financial resources 
after a payment delinquency, an insolvent firm might be more concerned about the 
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liquidation cost after a default. Nonetheless, whereas solvency defaults are quite rare, 
liquidity defaults are relatively common. Therefore, I expect my current result to be 
mainly driven by liquidity defaults.  
In addition, I will examine how the level of information asymmetries in the credit 
market affects the repayment decisions of firms. This analysis will be possible thanks to 
a variation on the memory of the credit bureaus provided by the introduction of the 
Habeas Data law in Colombia. The law was ratified in 2009, and it prohibited institutions 
in Colombia to access the entire credit history of borrowers. Since then, the negative 
credit information is observable only for a period that depends on the length of the 
delinquency period. The decrease on the amount of information shared among financial 
institutions could have an effect on firm’s decision, as now banks can accumulate more 
private information about the firm. Thus, the monopoly power attached to exclusive 
customer information is increased (Jappelli and Pagano, 1993).
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GRAPH 1 
The Graph represents an average firm on the selected sample. It is a firm that has five loans with four different 
banks.  It has two loans with Bank 1 and one loan with each of the other banks.  In quarter t, all its loans have 
a rating equal to “A” (best loan rating = the loan is up to date).  In quarter t+1, one of the loans jumps to rating 
“B” (there is a delinquency on that loan). The other four loans remain in rating “A”. 
TABLE 1 
The Table presents the loan rating classification of the 
Colombian credit register. The loan rating depends on 
the number of days of delinquency on the loan and also 
in the amount of collateral for the category E.  
Loan rating Days delinquent 
A < 30 
B 30 - 89 
C 90 - 149 
D 150 - more 






















Estimated Quarterly Transition Matrix for Colombian Commercial loans 
The Table presents the estimated quarterly transition matrix for Colombian Commercial 
 loans. It is estimated based on a Markov transition probability model, using information 
comprised between 1999-I and 2011-II. The categories are defined in Table 1. The matrix 
show the likelihood of a credit quality staying unchanged or moving to any other category 
over a period of one quarter. Each element of the matrix, pij, shows the probability of the 
credit quality of a loan being equal to i in period t, and equal to j in period t+1. 
A B C D E
A 0.966 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.000
B 0.305 0.558 0.097 0.035 0.005
C 0.070 0.085 0.561 0.258 0.026
D 0.024 0.016 0.031 0.801 0.129
E 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.036 0.938
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TABLE 3 
Differences in Means of Firm's Characteristics Between the Selected Sample and the Excluded Sample. 
The Table reports the mean of firm characteristics for both, the sample of firm observations excluded and the sample of firm observations selected. The sample of 
firm observations excluded is subdivided by whether they repay all their loans or whether they delinquent on all of them. The last column presents a t-test for the 
differences in means between the Selected Sample and the Excluded Sample. The number of total firm observations equals 415,352.  COP: Colombian Peso. In June 
2011: 1,800 COP = 1 US Dollar or 1 Million COP = 555 US Dollars. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 






 in Means 





Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Income/Equity. % 15.1 7.6 10.1 -4.97*** 
Current Ratio (CR) = Current Assets/Current Liabilities. % 218.3 253.5 175.1 -43.26*** 
Debt to Equity Ratio = Liabilities/Equity. % 219.1 241.6 260.2 41.02*** 
Assets = Total Assets. 
Million 
COP 25 717.4 12 124.7 19 162.7 -6495.6** 
Small Firm = 1 if the firm is small in terms of assets size, = 0 otherwise. % 44.8 64.8 46.2 1.26* 
Age as Borrower Time in which the firm has had a loan with the financial system. Quarters 14.8 10.9 15.2 0.44*** 
Number of Lenders Number of lenders with whom the firm has a loan. - 2.7 1.0 4.3 1.623*** 
Number of Loans Number of outstanding loans. - 3.0 1.2 5.2 2.143*** 
Delinquent Loans Number of delinquent loans. - 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2*** 
Previous Delinquent 
Loans = 1 if the firm delinquent on a loan in the past, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 12.3 20.8 31.4 19.10*** 
Firm Rating Weighted quality of the loans of the firm (1 lowest, 5 highest) 1-5 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.00 
Number of Firm Observations 403 918 1 763 9 671 415 352 
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TABLE 4 
The table provides the definition of relationship, bank and loan characteristics (a) and reports loan level summary statistics of relationship, bank and 
loan characteristics. The mean, median and standard deviation (SD), min and max are presented for every variable (b). The number of loan 
observations equals 49,986. COP: Colombian Peso. In June 2011: 1,800 COP = 1 US Dollar or 1 Million COP = 555 US Dollars.  
a. Definition of Variables.
Variable Description Unit 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship Length of the bank-firm relationship. Quarters 
Number of Old and New Loans  Number of old and new loans between a bank and a firm. - 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank = 1 if firm has have an arrear before with the bank, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank = 1 if firm has have an arrear before only with the bank, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank = 1 if firm has have an arrear before only with other banks, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Number of Previous Delinquencies Same Bank Number of previous arrears that the firm has with the bank. - 
Number of Previous Delinquencies Different Bank Number of previous arrears that the firm has with other banks. - 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank = 1 if firm has have a renegotiation before with the bank, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Number of Previous Renegotiations Same Bank Number of previous renegotiations that the firm has with the bank. - 
Number of Loans Number of outstanding loans the firm has with the bank. - 
Share of Wallet Proportion of loans that the firm has with the bank. % 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank = 1 if loan granted by foreign bank, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
State Owned Bank = 1 if loan granted by public bank, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Bank Size Natural logarithm of the assets of the bank. - 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral = 1 if loan is collateralized, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Collateralization Proportion of the loan amount that is collateralized. % 
Loan Amount Outstanding loan size. 
Million 
COP 
Ln Loan Amount Natural logarithm of loan size. - 
Interest Rate Interest rate on the loan. % 
Fixed Interest Rate = 1 if loan has a fixed interest rate, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Maturity Loan maturity Months 
Short Term = 1 if maturity of loan is less than a year, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 
Time to Maturity The time remaining until the end of the loan contract. Months 
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TABLE 4 
b. Summary Statistics for Relationship, Bank and Loan Characteristics.
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship 9.6 7.0 7.8 1.0 49.0 
Number of Old and New Loans 6.2 4.0 6.3 1.0 65.0 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank 10.5 0.0 30.7 0.0 100.0 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 5.7 0.0 23.1 0.0 100.0 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank 25.6 0.0 43.6 0.0 100.0 
Number of Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 23.0 
Number of Previous Delinquencies Different Bank 1.2 0.0 3.2 0.0 70.0 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank 22.9 0.0 42.0 0.0 100.0 
Number of Previous Renegotiations Same Bank 0.5 0.0 1.4 0.0 24.0 
Number of Loans 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 
Share of Wallet 24.8 16.4 24.8 0.0 100.0 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 13.7 0.0 34.4 0.0 100.0 
State Owned Bank 2.9 0.0 16.7 0.0 100.0 
Bank Size 22.7 23.0 1.5 0.0 24.8 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 45.8 0.0 49.8 0.0 100.0 
Collateralization 55.4 0.0 95.9 0.0 500.0 
Loan Amount 451.1 82.5 1836.2 0.0 50000.0 
Ln Loan Amount 4.2 4.4 2.2 18.4 10.8 
Interest Rate 17.3 16.8 6.7 0.4 40.0 
Fixed Interest Rate 8.3 0.0 27.5 0.0 100.0 
Maturity 36.0 25.0 42.1 0.0 360.0 
Short Term 37.7 0.0 48.5 0.0 100.0 
Time to Maturity 21.1 11.0 33.2 0.0 331.0 
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TABLE 5 
Differences in Means of Relationship, Bank and Loan Characteristics 
 between Delinquent Loans and Loans that Remain Up to Date 
The Table compares the means of Relationship, Bank and Loan Characteristics between loans that start 
having an arrear and loans that remain up to date, using a t-test. The number of observations equals 49,967. 
Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 4. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 




Length of Relationship 9.7 9.0 -0.70 *** 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 4.3 10.2 5.90 *** 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank 28.2 16.9 -11.30 *** 
Number of Loans 1.3 1.3 -0.03 *** 
Share of Wallet 22.7 32.0 9.30 *** 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 14.1 12.5 -1.60 *** 
State Owned Bank 2.6 3.6 1.00 
Bank Size 22.7 22.6 -0.06 *** 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 41.9 58.5 16.60 *** 
Loan Amount 483.0 347.0 -136.00 *** 
Interest Rate 17.4 17.2 -0.20 *** 
Short Term 0.4 0.2 -0.20 *** 
Time to Maturity 19.4 25.3 5.90 *** 
Number of observations 38 345 11 622 
100
TABLE 6 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is 
Delinquency that equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Column (I) report 
results of a model that includes relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent 
variables, firm-time fixed effects are included. In Column (II) bank fixed effect are added. In 
Column (III) firm-bank-time fixed effects are included. Definitions of the variables can be found 
in the Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding 
significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.23*** -0.16*** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.11*** 9.41*** 
(2.12) (2.10) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.77*** -8.96*** 
(1.53) (1.52) 
Number of Loans -3.28*** -3.67*** 
(0.72) (0.73) 
Share of Wallet 0.03 0.03* 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.37* 
(0.73) 
State Owned Bank 6.20*** 
(1.64) 
Bank Size -0.12 
(0.21) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 11.46*** 12.89*** 47.72*** 
(0.49) (0.54) (3.55) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.42*** 0.32** 3.29*** 
(0.14) (0.14) (1.01) 
Interest Rate -0.19*** -0.03 -0.32 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.35) 
Time to Maturity 0.08*** 0.10*** 1.12*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.17) 
Constant 28.38*** 62.12* 3.64 
(4.75) (36.48) (8.66) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.49 
Number of observations 49,967 49,967 3,728 
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TABLE 7 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Discrete Definition of Relationship. 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that equals 
one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Columns (I) and (III) report results of a model that includes 
relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables, firm-time fixed effects are included. In Columns 
(II) and (IV) bank fixed effect are added. Long Relationship is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
length of the relationship is above the 95 percentile (13 quarters). Short Relationship is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the length of the relationship is below the 25 percentile (4 quarters). Definitions of the rest of the 
variables can be found in Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are 
in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III IV 
Relationship Characteristics 
Long Relationship -3.03*** -2.02*** 
(0.75) (0.76) 
Short Relationship 1.69** 1.15 
(0.74) (0.75) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.29*** 9.56*** 10.56*** 9.73*** 
(2.12) (2.11) (2.13) (2.11) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.26*** -8.56*** -9.78*** -8.26*** 
(1.53) (1.52) (1.52) (1.51) 
Number of Loans -3.39*** -3.72*** -3.50*** -3.74*** 
(0.72) (0.73) (0.72) (0.73) 
Share of Wallet 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.03 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.41* 1.42* 
(0.73) (0.73) 
State Owned Bank 6.41*** 6.67*** 
(1.64) (1.64) 
Bank Size -0.17 -0.22 
(0.21) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 11.46*** 12.91*** 11.46*** 12.92*** 
(0.49) (0.54) (0.50) (0.54) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.41*** 0.32** 0.40*** 0.31** 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Interest Rate -0.19*** -0.03 -0.20*** -0.03 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Time to Maturity 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 28.30*** 61.08* 28.28*** 59.95* 
(4.75) (36.03) (4.81) (36.38) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17 




 Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
Sample of Firms with both Short and Long Relationships 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that 
equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. The sample is composed by 2,723 loan observations of firms 
that have both, loans with banks with which they have very short relationships (below the 25 percentile) and loans with 
banks with which they have very long relationships (above the 95 percentile).  Column (I) report results of a model that 
includes relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables, firm-time fixed effects are included. In 
Column (II) bank fixed effect are added.  Long Relationship is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the 
length of the relationship is above the 95 percentile (13 quarters). Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 
4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are
reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II 
Relationship Characteristics 
Long Relationship -11.53*** -8.40*** 
(3.00) (3.05) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank -2.32 1.46 
(7.74) (7.80) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -13.22** -6.94 
(5.91) (5.93) 
Number of Loans 0.50 0.73 
(3.38) (3.40) 
Share of Wallet 0.06 0.06 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.70 
(3.59) 
State Owned Bank -11.40 
(8.42) 
Bank Size 0.06 
(0.91) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 15.60*** 16.97*** 
(2.20) (2.31) 
Ln Loan Amount -0.78 -0.94 
(0.80) (0.80) 
Interest Rate -0.15 0.07 
(0.21) (0.22) 
Time to Maturity 0.03 0.04 
(0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 31.83 -27.98* 
(20.94) (14.56) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES 
R-squared 0.14 0.22 
Number of observations 2 723 2,723 
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TABLE 9 
Benefits of the Relationship and Cost of Loan Delinquencies. 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 470.085 new loans. Columns I-IV report specifications 
for each of the loan characteristics: Interest Rate, Collateral, Ln(loan amount) and Maturity. The models 
include relationship and firm characteristics as independent variables. Bank x Time Fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 3 and the Table 4. 
Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm 
level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the 
adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Methodology OLS 
Model I II III IV 




Length of Relationship -0.09*** -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.10*** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank 0.44*** 3.84*** -0.20*** 1.37*** 
(0.08) (0.45) (0.03) (0.17) 
Share of Wallet -0.03*** 0.11*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Characteristics 
Previous Delinquent Loans 0.90*** 2.54*** -0.12*** 0.06 
(0.06) (0.28) (0.03) (0.11) 
Number of Lenders -0.36*** 0.57*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Small Firm 3.55*** 6.43*** -1.73*** 0.66*** 
(0.05) (0.25) (0.02) (0.10) 
Return on Equity (ROE) -0.29*** 1.78*** 0.06** -0.07 
(0.06) (0.27) (0.02) (0.11) 
Current Ratio (CR) 0.16*** -0.35*** -0.16*** -0.06** 
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.03*** 0.26*** 0.02*** -0.06*** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) 
Firm Rating -1.10*** 1.19*** 0.44*** -2.15*** 
(0.05) (0.25) (0.02) (0.19) 
Constant 24.07*** 9.08*** 0.53*** 19.94*** 
(0.27) (1.28) (0.13) (0.97) 
Bank x Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.35 0.25 0.32 0.36 
Number of observations 470,085 470,085 470,085 470,085 
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TABLE 10 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
Foreign vrs Domestic Banks. Private vrs State Owned Banks 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that 
equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Column (I) report results for a sample of 28,922 loans of 
firms that have outstanding loans with both foreign and domestic banks. Column (II) report results for a sample of 
8,774 loans of firms that have outstanding loans with both state owned and private banks. The models include 
relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables. Firm x Time Fixed effects are included in all 
specifications. Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, 
robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in 
parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.15*** -0.09 
(0.05) (0.09) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.16*** 7.69* 
(2.58) (4.62) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -8.06*** -12.69*** 
(1.78) (3.04) 
Number of Loans -2.33*** -3.09** 
(0.82) (1.41) 
Share of Wallet -0.01 0.17*** 
(0.02) (0.05) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 0.94 0.52 
(0.72) (1.35) 
State Owned Bank 4.57** 6.19*** 
(1.82) (1.64) 
Bank Size -0.30 0.19 
(0.24) (0.39) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 10.04*** 7.81*** 
(0.58) (0.98) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.28 0.23 
(0.17) (0.30) 
Interest Rate -0.19*** -0.16* 
(0.05) (0.09) 
Time to Maturity 0.08*** 0.09*** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 28.35*** 14.45 
(5.46) (8.88) 
Firm x Time Fixed Effects YES YES 
R-squared 0.13 0.15 
Number of observations 28 922 8 774 
105
TABLE 11 
Determinants of Loan Contracts. Foreign vrs Domestic Banks 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 144,107 new loans granted to firms that received a loan from 
at least one foreign and one domestic bank in the same quarter. Columns I-IV report specifications for each of 
the loan characteristics: Interest Rate (%), Collateral (%), Maturity (months) and Ln(loan amount). The models 
include bank and relationship characteristics as independent variables. Firm x Time Fixed effects are included in 
all specifications. Definitions of the variables can be found in Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, 
robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in 
parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Methodology OLS 
Model I II III IV 




Foreign Bank -0.37*** -9.73*** -5.27*** -0.15*** 
(0.07) (0.39) (0.17) (0.02) 
Bank Size -0.12*** -6.40*** -2.49*** 0.03*** 
(0.03) (0.24) (0.10) (0.01) 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship 0.07*** 0.18*** -0.14*** 0.00 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank -0.53*** 5.87*** 2.38*** -0.13** 
(0.17) (1.03) (0.51) (0.06) 
Share of Wallet -0.07*** 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 18.92*** 159.13*** 67.50*** 3.48*** 
(0.70) (5.36) (2.25) (0.18) 
Firm x Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.67 
Number of observations 144,107 144,107 144,107 144,107 
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TABLE 12 
Determinants of Loan Contracts. State Owned vrs Private Banks 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 3,024 new loans granted to firms that received a loan from at 
least one state owned bank and one private bank in the same quarter. Columns I-IV report specifications for each 
of the loan characteristics: Interest Rate (%), Collateral (%), Maturity (months) and Ln(loan amount). The 
models include bank and relationship characteristics as independent variables. Firm x Time Fixed effects are 
included in all specifications. Definitions of the variables can be found in Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the 
first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in 
parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Methodology Linear Probability Model 
Model I II III IV 




State Owned Bank -0.23** -3.81*** -2.07*** -0.23*** 
(0.12) (0.85) (0.28) (0.05) 
Bank Size -0.05 -5.87*** -2.93*** -0.01 
(0.05) (0.39) (0.17) (0.01) 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship 0.09*** 0.05 -0.19*** -0.00 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.00) 
Previous Delinquencies to Bank -0.22 7.07*** 3.68*** -0.11 
(0.29) (1.96) (0.91) (0.09) 
Share of Wallet -0.08*** 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 17.10*** 146.73*** 75.93*** 4.34*** 
(1.08) (8.68) (3.84) (0.31) 
Firm x Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.51 0.32 0.37 0.69 
Number of observations 3,024 3,024 3,024 3,024 
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TABLE 13 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Conditional Logit Model. 
The Table reports regression results from a Conditional Logit model. The dependent variable is 
Delinquency that equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. The model includes 
relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables. Definitions of the variables 
can be found in the Table 3 and the Table 4. Odds ratios are listed in the first row, robust standard 
errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in 
parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** 
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.01*** -0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 0.22** 0.19* 
(0.10) (0.10) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -0.66*** -0.57*** 
(0.08) (0.09) 
Number of Loans -0.18*** -0.21*** 
(0.04) (0.04) 
Share of Wallet -0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 0.06* 
(0.04) 
State Owned Bank 0.30*** 
(0.07) 
Bank Size -0.00 
(0.01) 
Loan Characteristics 
Dummy Collateral 0.59*** 0.68*** 1.13*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.18*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Interest Rate -0.01*** -0.00 -0.02** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Time to Maturity  0.00*** 0.01*** 0.06*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
Number of observations 49,967 49,967 3,728 
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TABLE 14 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Probit Model. 
The Table reports regression results from a Probit model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that 
equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Column I shows the results for the sample of 
firms that face moderate liquidity constrains, Column II adds the sample of firms that face extreme 
liquidity constrains and Column III adds firms that face few or no liquidity constrains (it corresponds to 
the population of loans). The model includes relationship, bank, loan, firm and macroeconomic 
characteristics as independent variables. Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 3 and 
the Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding 
significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Methodology Probit 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.03*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 7.46*** 9.20*** -0.06 
(1.23) (1.29) (0.06) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.25*** -10.66*** -0.68*** 
(0.77) (0.85) (0.03) 
Number of Loans -6.09*** -9.77*** 0.08*** 
(0.50) (0.52) (0.02) 
Share of Wallet 0.11*** 0.29*** 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 0.77 0.57 0.15*** 
(0.60) (0.63) (0.03) 
State Owned Bank 4.80*** 4.33*** 0.30*** 
(1.29) (1.33) (0.06) 
Bank Size -0.10 -0.13 0.11*** 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.01) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 10.33*** 10.77*** 0.76*** 
(0.38) (0.40) (0.02) 
Ln Loan Amount -0.14 -0.98*** 0.00 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.00) 
Interest Rate -0.10*** -0.09*** 0.01*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.00) 
Time to Maturity 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Probit Model. 
Models I II III 
Firm Characteristics 
Previous Delinquent Loans 6.70*** 6.26*** 2.09*** 
(0.83) (0.89) (0.13) 
Number of Lenders -2.37*** -2.47*** -0.01** 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.01) 
Small Firm 0.99*** -0.44 0.41*** 
(0.30) (0.32) (0.03) 
Return on Equity (ROE) -2.74*** -3.15*** -0.47*** 
(0.45) (0.49) (0.03) 
Current Ratio (CR) 0.05 0.27*** -0.02*** 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.01) 
Debt to Equity Ratio -0.06 -0.07* 0.01*** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth 23.96*** 28.89*** -4.34*** 
(4.65) (5.10) (0.34) 
Arrears in some loans YES YES YES 
Arrears in all loans NO YES YES 
Arrears in no loan NO NO YES 
Average Likelihood 21.3% 23.6% 0.9% 
Number of observations 49,967 51,997 1,276,502 
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TABLE 15 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
 Interactions with Habeas Data Law 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency 
that equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Column (I) report results of a model that 
includes relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables, firm-time fixed effects are 
included. The variables are interacted with a dummy variables Habeas Data, which takes the value of one 
from the date where the Habeas Data Law was introduced (December 2008) and zero before that date. In 
Column (II) bank fixed effect are added. In Column (III) firm-bank-time fixed effects are included. 
Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust 
standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, 
and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.11* -0.06 
(0.06) (0.06) 
Length of Relationship x Habeas Data -0.19** -0.20** 
(0.09) (0.09) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 12.66*** 12.02*** 
(2.74) (2.75) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank x Habeas Data -6.66 -6.59 
(4.17) (4.09) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank 11.47*** 10.34*** 
(1.95) (1.98) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank x Habeas Data 1.59 3.45 
(2.93) (2.87) 
Number of Loans -2.65*** -2.01** 
(0.91) (0.91) 
Number of Loans x Habeas Data -1.87 -3.75*** 
(1.45) (1.39) 
Share of Wallet 0.07*** 0.07*** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Share of Wallet x Habeas Data -0.11*** -0.11*** 
(0.04) (0.03) 
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TABLE 15 (continued) 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
 Interactions with Habeas Data Law 
Models I II III 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank -0.72 
(0.88) 
Foreign Bank x Habeas Data 5.53*** 
(1.58) 
State Owned Bank 6.39*** 
(1.82) 
State Owned Bank x Habeas Data -2.28 
(4.13) 
Bank Size 0.65** 
(0.27) 
Bank Size x Habeas Data -1.82*** 
(0.43) 
Loan Characteristics 
Dummy Collateral 10.43*** 11.04*** 44.66*** 
(0.62) (0.66) (4.47) 
Dummy Collateral x Habeas Data 2.77*** 4.61*** 8.41 
(1.00) (0.98) (7.33) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.53*** 0.47*** 3.89*** 
(0.17) (0.17) (1.16) 
Ln Loan Amount x Habeas Data -0.43 -0.49 -1.65 
(0.31) (0.30) (2.32) 
Interest Rate -0.15*** -0.04 -0.28 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.41) 
Interest Rate x Habeas Data -0.09 0.06 -0.04 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.77) 
Time to Maturity 0.08*** 0.11*** 1.31*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.23) 
Time to Maturity x Habeas Data -0.00 -0.01 -0.45 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.33) 
Constant 26.10*** 63.58* 3.01 
(4.76) (36.56) (8.77) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.5 
Number of observations 49 967 49 967 3 728 
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TABLE 16 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
Interactions with Loan Term Distress 
The Table reports regression results from a Linear Probability model. The dependent variable is 
Delinquency that equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. The model includes 
relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables. Interactions with the variable Long 
Term Distress are included in order to determine differences in the delinquency decisions related to length 
of the period of distress of the firm. Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 2 and the Table 
3. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm
level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the 
adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable 
Methodology Linear Probability Model 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.23*** -0.17*** 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Length of Relationship x Long Term Distress 0.05 0.10 
(0.15) (0.15) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.80*** 9.93*** 
(2.25) (2.24) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank x Long Term Distress -7.02 -5.25 
(6.15) (6.12) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.79*** -9.04*** 
(1.66) (1.66) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank x Long Term Distress 0.12 0.48 
(4.06) (3.96) 
Number of Loans -2.69*** -3.22*** 
(0.76) (0.77) 
Number of Loans x Long Term Distress -6.11*** -4.48** 
(2.34) (2.20) 
Share of Wallet 0.02 0.03 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Share of Wallet x Long Term Distress 0.06 0.06 
(0.07) (0.07) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.52** 
(0.77) 
Foreign Bank x Long Term Distress -1.76 
(2.40) 
State Owned Bank 6.49*** 
(1.76) 
State Owned Bank x Long Term Distress -3.26 
(5.06) 
Bank Size -0.22 
(0.22) 
Bank Size x Long Term Distress 1.15 
(0.71) 
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TABLE 16 (continued) 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
Interactions with Loan Term Distress 
Models I II III 
Loan Characteristics 
Dummy Collateral 11.69*** 13.14*** 47.54*** 
(0.52) (0.57) (3.72) 
Dummy Collateral x Long Term Distress -2.80* -3.20** -0.29 
(1.60) (1.52) (10.74) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.27* 0.17 2.89*** 
(0.15) (0.15) (1.02) 
Ln Loan Amount x Long Term Distress 1.94*** 2.11*** 6.54* 
(0.61) (0.60) (3.69) 
Interest Rate -0.21*** -0.05 -0.41 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.37) 
Interest Rate x Long Term Distress 0.18 0.23 1.25 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.86) 
Time to Maturity  0.08*** 0.11*** 1.09*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.17) 
Time to Maturity x Long Term Distress -0.01 -0.02 0.64* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.36) 
Constant 28.15*** 61.99* 1.80 
(4.75) (36.52) (8.53) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.49 
Number of observations 49,967 49,967 3,728 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.1 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Various Robustness 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that equals 
one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Definitions of the independent variables can be found in the Table 4. 
Columns (I) and (II) present the results of the main specifications using as an alternative measure of Length of the 
relationship the Number of Old and New Loans. Columns (III) and (IV) present the results for a sample of firms that 
have had more than one loan with each of their relationship banks. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust 
standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the 
corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III IV 
Relationship Characteristics 
Number of old and new loans -0.60*** -0.55*** -0.62*** -0.59*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.02*** 9.28*** 13.41*** 13.49*** 
(2.11) (2.10) (3.57) (3.56) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.50*** -9.02*** -7.83*** -5.14** 
(1.51) (1.51) (2.56) (2.59) 
Share of Wallet 0.02 0.02 0.06* 0.05* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.94*** 2.40 
(0.72) (1.58) 
State Owned Bank 5.76*** 6.61* 
(1.63) (3.73) 
Bank Size 0.13 1.34*** 
(0.21) (0.48) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 10.92*** 12.46*** 13.62*** 15.63*** 
(0.50) (0.55) (0.97) (1.04) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.60*** 0.54*** 0.50* 0.46* 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.27) (0.27) 
Interest Rate -0.18*** -0.02 -0.33*** -0.08 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
Time to Maturity 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 19.16*** 57.97 -3.88 -20.42*** 
(4.88) (36.75) (11.32) (2.28) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO 
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.19 
Number of observations 49,983 49,983 15,591 15,591 
Type of Robustness 
Alternative measure of 
relationship. 
More than one loan observed 
per relationship. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.2 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. Various Robustness 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that 
equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Definitions of the independent variables can be found in the 
Table 4. Columns (I) and (II) present the results of the main specifications including Collateralization instead of 
Collateral, Column (I) in addition includes an interaction term between Foreign Bank and Greenfield Investment.  
Columns (III) and (IV) includes the Number of Previous Delinquencies Same Bank instead of the binary variables for 
previous delinquencies. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering 
at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the 
adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III V 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.12*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Number of Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 4.86*** 4.15*** 
(0.56) (0.53) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 9.84*** 9.11*** 
(2.10) (2.10) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.98*** -9.09*** 
(1.51) (1.52) 
Number of Loans -1.68** -1.74** -3.28*** -3.64*** 
(0.72) (0.73) (0.73) (0.74) 
Share of Wallet 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03* 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank -1.75** 1.23* 
(0.74) (0.74) 
Foreign Bank * Greenfield Investment 14.21*** 
(2.48) 
State Owned Bank 4.98*** 6.25*** 
(1.65) (1.69) 
Bank Size -0.41* -0.13 
(0.21) (0.21) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateralization  4.31*** 4.49*** 
(0.29) (0.32) 
Collateral 11.58*** 12.93*** 
(0.50) (0.55) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.95*** 0.83*** 0.41*** 0.33** 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Interest Rate -0.00*** -0.15*** -0.20*** -0.03 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Time to Maturity 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 34.86*** 66.93* 24.96*** 60.56 
(4.86) (39.04) (4.80) (36.97) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO YES 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO 
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.19 
Number of observations 49,983 49,983 49,983 49,983 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.3 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan, 
Making use of the Number of Days of Delinquency 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that equals 
one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Importantly, the number of days of delinquency (instead of the change 
of rating) is used to determine whether a loan is delinquent. Column (I) report results of a model that includes relationship, 
bank and loan characteristics as independent variables, firm-time fixed effects are included. In Column (II) bank fixed 
effect are added. In Column (III) firm-bank-time fixed effects are included. Definitions of the variables can be found in the 
Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are 
reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** 
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.16*** -0.09* 
(0.05) (0.05) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 7.46*** 7.78*** 
(1.94) (1.90) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -11.95*** -10.21*** 
(1.10) (1.09) 
Number of Loans -10.07*** -7.38*** 
(0.79) (0.80) 
Share of Wallet -0.03 -0.04* 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank -2.27*** 
(0.87) 
State Owned Bank -0.18 
(2.02) 
Bank Size -3.20*** 
(0.28) 
Loan Characteristics 
Dummy Collateral 5.35*** 3.85*** 9.73* 
(0.63) (0.66) (5.01) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.53*** 0.56*** 6.76*** 
(0.18) (0.19) (1.38) 
Interest Rate -0.24*** -0.30*** -0.89 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.55) 
Time to Maturity 0.04*** 0.02 0.32*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.10) 
Constant 112.57*** 8.23*** 31.01** 
(6.19) (1.79) (13.36) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects NO YES NO 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.11 
Number of observations 33,319 33,319 2,414 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.4 
Choice Between Repayment, Renegotiation and Delinquency. Multinomial Logit Model. 
The Table reports the marginal effects of a Multinomial Logit Model. The categorical dependent variable takes 
the value of 0 if the loan is repaid, 1 if the loan is renegotiated and 2 if the loan starts an arrear. The base outcome 
is set the repayment of the loan. The columns present the marginal effects of each of the other outcomes with 
respect to the base outcome. The model includes relationship, bank, loan, firm and macroeconomic characteristics 
as independent variables. Definitions of the variables can be found in the Table 3 and the Table 4. Coefficients are 
listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the 
row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** 
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Methodology Multinomial Logit 
Outcome Renegotiation Delinquency 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.13*** -0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 1.2* 6.12*** 
(0.64) (0.97) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank 0.24 -10.9*** 
(0.5) (0.86) 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank 7.39*** -1.64*** 
(0.23) (0.52) 
Number of Loans -0.19 -5.67*** 
(0.24) (0.48) 
Share of Wallet -0.01 0.1*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 0.99*** 1.14** 
(0.24) (0.57) 
State Owned Bank -1.15* 4.47*** 
(0.7) (1.09) 
Bank Size 0.56*** -0.1 
(0.08) (0.14) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral -2.89*** 9.41*** 
(0.25) (0.36) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.55*** -0.07 
(0.06) (0.09) 
Interest Rate 0.1*** -0.09*** 
(0.02) (0.03) 
Time to Maturity -0.25*** 0.1*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
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TABLE A.4 (continued) 
Choice Between Repayment, Renegotiation and Delinquency. Multinomial Logit Model. 
Renegotiation Delinquency 
Firm Characteristics 
Previous Delinquent Loans -0.39 6.28*** 
(0.49) (0.73) 
Number of Lenders 0.04 -2.51*** 
(0.04) (0.1) 
Small Firm 0.36 0.75*** 
(0.25) (0.27) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 0.56** -2.56*** 
(0.27) (0.42) 
Current Ratio (CR) -0.08 0.04 
(0.08) (0.07) 
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.00 -0.05 
(0.03) (0.04) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth -35.58*** 20.83*** 
(3.6) (4.28) 
Pseudo R2 0.11 
Marginal Percentage 5.38 23.26 
Number of observations 49,967 
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APPENDIX TABLE A.5 
Likelihood to Make a Payment Delinquency on a Loan. 
Includes Previous Renegotiations Same Bank as An Additional Relationship Characteristic 
The Table reports regression results from a linear probability model. The dependent variable is Delinquency that 
equals one when a loan is delinquent and zero otherwise. Column (I) report results of a model that includes 
relationship, bank and loan characteristics as independent variables, firm-time fixed effects are included. Among 
the relationship characteristics Previous Renegotiations Same Bank is included. Column (II) includes Number of 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank. In Column (III) bank fixed effect are added. Definitions of the variables can 
be found in the Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels 
are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Delinquency 
Models I II III 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.17*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Previous Delinquencies Same Bank 10.29*** 10.37*** 9.52*** 
(2.12) (2.12) (2.10) 
Previous Delinquencies Different Bank -10.53*** -10.37*** -8.88*** 
(1.54) (1.54) (1.52) 
Previous Renegotiations Same Bank -3.12*** 
(0.67) 
Number of Previous Renegotiations Same Bank -1.15*** 
(0.18) 
Number of Loans -3.11*** -3.13*** -3.64*** 
(0.72) (0.72) (0.73) 
Share of Wallet 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bank Characteristics 
Foreign Bank 1.72** 1.89** 
(0.73) (0.73) 
State Owned Bank 6.30*** 6.31*** 
(1.64) (1.64) 
Bank Size -0.05 -0.08 
(0.21) (0.21) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 11.19*** 11.22*** 12.87*** 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.54) 
Ln Loan Amount 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.34** 
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Interest Rate -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Time to Maturity 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 26.51*** 26.76*** 61.70* 
(4.76) (4.76) (36.47) 
Firm-Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO NO YES 
Firm-Bank-Time Fixed Effects NO NO NO 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.18 
Number of observations 49,967 49,967 49,967 
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Impact of a Decrease on Credit Bureaus' Memory
 on the Behavior of Borrowers and Lenders 
Abstract 
Around the globe, credit bureaus restrict the length of time that negative credit 
information of firms can be retained. The large variance in retention times across 
industrialized countries illustrates the lack of consensus on the optimal memory of 
negative information. By exploiting a variation in retention time of negative 
information for firms, provided by the introduction of the Habeas Data law in 
Colombia, we are able to analyze the causal link between the length of the credit 
bureaus retention time and the subsequent behavior by lenders and borrowers. The 
law was ratified in 2009 and prohibited institutions in Colombia to access the entire 
credit history of borrowers. Since then, the negative credit information is observable 
only for a period that depends on the length of the delinquency period. Our results, 
suggest that after the introduction of the Habeas Data law: i) the duration of loan 
delinquency periods are longer, ii) firms seem to strategically wait long enough, until 
their negative records disappear from the credit bureaus, before switching banks, iii) 
banks grant loans with higher interest rates and lower collateral requirements.   
JEL Codes: C41, D22, D81, D91, G21, G38 
Key words: Information sharing, business loans, payment defaults, bank switch. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The optimal design of a credit bureau is of great economic importance as it 
diminishes asymmetric information problems between lenders and borrowers. 
Through the collection of information shared by lenders1, credit bureaus can reduce
adverse selection problems by making more accurate predictions of borrowers’ 
repayment probabilities (Pagano and Japelli (1993)). Moreover, as the performance of 
borrowers is shared among lenders moral hazard problems are mitigated by 
reinforcing borrowers’ incentives to perform (Padilla and Pagano (2000), Jappelli 
(2002)). Thereby the information sharing through the credit bureau influences both 
the credit allocation and the level of investment of a country.   
During financial crises and economic downturns a large number of countries had 
experience rising rates of firms’ late payments and default on debt. Records of these 
arrears on the firms’ credit file typically have serious consequences for credit scores 
and for access to credit. Any arrear on the credit file is likely to result in a bad credit 
score. While credit scores worsen, the firms credit access is substantially reduced, and 
this in turn can hamper the firm’s ability to dampen the effect when faced with 
unexpected cost or revenue shocks. In addition, it can make the firm possibility to 
investment optimal more difficult. Therefore, to mitigate potential negative effects 
from retaining negative information for too long, most countries have laws that 
mandate the removal of negative information from credit bureau files after a certain 
retention period. The length of the retention period however varies largely across 
industrialized countries: Negative information is mandated to be removed from a 
borrower’s credit report after seven years in the United States and three years in 
1 Information is shared mainly through public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Public 
credit registers are government-managed databases of borrowers’ credit information in a financial 
system. They are available in more than 71 countries. Private credit bureaus are private firms or 
nonprofits organizations that collect credit information in a financial system.  Their main role is to 
facilitate exchange of information among financial entities. They are available in more than 55 
countries (Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007)). 
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Sweden for example (Bottero and Spagnolo (2011)). This illustrates the lack of 
consensus on the optimal memory of negative information. 
This project aims to identify the impact of the time credit bureaus remember a firms’ 
negative credit information for the financial system and its actors. By exploiting a 
quasi-experimental variation in the credit bureaus retention time, provided by the 
introduction of the Habeas Data law in Colombia, the project will explore the 
following research questions: i) does a reduction/increase in the length of the credit 
bureaus retention time increase/reduce the firms’ default risk? ii) does it affect the 
availability of bank credit for firms that have had non-performing loans? Is the 
likelihood to get a new loan from an existing relationship (inside bank) or a new 
relationship (outside bank) affected? iii) Do lenders alter their lending strategies and 
if so in what manner? These research questions are highly policy relevant and are 
nearly unexplored in the finance literature. This paper creates new insights that lead to 
an improved understanding of the role of retention times for the financial system and 
its actors that might open up the possibility to formulate more research based policies. 
The Habeas Data law was introduced in Colombia with the aim to protect the rights 
to be forgotten and forgiven of the borrowers of the financial system. Before 2008 
(Old Regime), financial institutions in Colombia were able to access a firm’s entire 
credit history through the credit bureaus. Both positive and negative credit 
information was available through different portals. After the introduction of the 
Habeas Data law (New Regime), the negative information of a loan is observable only 
for a period that depends on the length of the delinquency period. According to the 
law, borrowers that have arrears for a period of less than two years stay in the portals 
for a period equal to twice the duration of the delinquency period. However, if a 
borrower has arrears for more than two years the maximum retention time is four 
years. Finally, if the borrower never repays a loan, the negative information remains 
in the portals for 10 years.  
The amount of information shared varies from country to country. In some 
countries, such as Germany and South Arabia the credit register contains only limited 
information on outstanding loans of large borrowers. In other countries, such as 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Malaysia and Taiwan the credit registers contain 
extensive information for all borrowers, including in some cases loan terms, ratings 
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and late payments, among others (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007)). Using 
information on private credit bureaus and public credit registers around the world, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) find that information sharing indicators are positively 
correlated with bank lending and negatively correlated with default rates. They also 
find that private and public information sharing systems have no differential 
correlation on credit market performance. Moreover, exploring the public credit 
registers of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Majnoni, Miller, Mylenko and Powell 
(2004) find that public credit registers may improve credit access for borrowers for 
the same level of bank risk or reduce bank risk for the same level of credit access. 
Similarly, Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2008) find that information sharing is 
associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit, and Love and Mylenko 
(2003) find that the existence of private credit registries is associated with lower 
financing constraints and higher share of bank borrowing in firm’s financing 
structure.  
Information sharing, however, might slow the pace of recovery of a country after 
economic downturns. Credit scores typically worsen during downturns and as a result, 
the credit access is substantially reduced. Hertzberg, Liberti and Paravisini (2011) 
provide evidence that information sharing exacerbates lender coordination and 
increases the incidence of firm financial distress. The mechanism is that lenders to a 
firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender 
reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. Moreover, 
Vercammen (1995) provides an alternative mechanism by which long credit histories 
are not optimal. He shows that even though reputational effects are desirable from an 
efficiency perspective, they are generally not sustainable over time for a given cohort 
of borrowers. The reason is that when lenders are prevented from looking too far into 
a borrower’s past, borrowers continually have an incentive to perform because there is 
always some scope for altering lender’s believes. In other words, it prevents 
borrowers from exert less effort once a strong good reputation is built. 
Despite the prevalence and importance of the length of retention times for creditors, 
borrowers, and policy makers there is little research on this topic. Bos and Nakamura 
(2011) using a sample of Swedish households loans analyze the impact of a reduction 
in the retention times from more than three years to exactly three years. They find that 
a reduced retention time decreases the need for and access to credit for consumers but 
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increases the likelihood to default. Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) using the Bolivian 
credit registry between 1999 and 2003, find that a relatively short retention time of 
two-months encourages bad borrowers to strategically switch to new banks after 
making their due payments for those two months. Thus, outside banks still suffer from 
adverse selection. The reason why the optimal memory is so hard to analyze is the 
difficulty in observing the counterfactual: “What would have happened with the firm 
if negative information was removed earlier/later from its credit file?” As Elul and 
Gottardi (2007) theoretically point out, forgetting a default typically makes incentives 
worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the expected length of the time period during which 
lenders can penalize a borrower for a past default. However, following a default, it 
may be good to forget, because by improving a firms’ reputation, forgetting increases 
the incentive to exert effort to preserve this reputation. 
In this paper we study the effect of a unique retention rule that defines the retention 
time as a function of the length of delinquency period. For our analysis we use a 
unique credit register of commercial loans from Colombia. It is collected by the 
Superintendecia Financiera de Colombia for research and regularity purposes. It has 
the advantage that it allows us to access some private information about borrower risk 
that is unobserved by the lender, in particular the entire credit history of a firm (all 
positive and negative information is included).  
Our analysis is divided in three parts. In the first part, using duration models we 
analyze whether firms are more prone to stop making payments on their loans after 
the Habeas Data law. We find that the likelihood that a new loan becomes delinquent 
decreases after the introduction of the law. However, we also find that the likelihood 
that a delinquent loan is repaid decreases after the introduction of the law. In other 
words, even though the number of new loans that become delinquent seems to 
decrease, the length of the delinquency period increases (despite observable better 
financial conditions of the non-performing firms). This is consistent with the 
disciplinary role of information sharing among lenders (Jappelli and Pagano (1993), 
Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000)). If creditors are known to share information of loan 
payment defaults, borrowers realize that defaulting in one lender will damage their 
rating with all other potential sources of credit and due to that, they will try harder to 
avoid default. As shown by Padilla and Pagano (2000), however, the intensity of this 
disciplinary effect depends on the type and accuracy of the information shared among 
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lenders. Thus, if there is a decrease on the amount of negative information shared, the 
disciplinary role will be less pronounced. Also, by decreasing the informational 
monopoly that banks have about their borrowers, information sharing also decrease 
the fear of borrowers of being exploited via higher interest rates in the future, and thus 
increase the borrowers’ effort, as shown by Padilla and Pagano (1997). 
In the second part of our analysis, we examine if firms strategically switch banks 
after a delinquency period or if they are more likely to be financed again by their 
existing bank relationships. In particular, we are interested in analyze whether the 
ability of a firm with previous negative records to obtain a new loan from an 
outside/inside bank is affected by the introduction of the Habeas Data Law. Our 
results suggest that firms with previous negative records are less likely to get new 
loans from both inside and outside banks in the New Regime. However, the median 
time to get a new loan from an outside bank increases significantly more than the 
median time to get a new loan from an inside bank (from four to nine quarters and 
from one to two quarters, respectively). This also shows that after a delinquency 
period, inside banks seem to be the first providers of bank loans in both regimes.  
In addition, we find that during the New Regime both inside and outside banks grant 
loans with looser loan terms but higher collateral requirements to firms with previous 
negative records. However, the reduction in the interest rate and the increase in the 
maturity seem to be more pronounced for outside banks. This might be explained in 
part by the fact that, as mentioned before, the mean time to grant a new loan increased 
relatively more for outside banks than for inside banks. Therefore, by the time inside
banks grant a new loan the delinquency period is relatively fresh or otherwise, still 
present in their own records. While by the time outside banks grant a new loan, the 
delinquency period is already distant and more likely no longer observable for them. 
Thus, firms seem to wait long enough, until their bad records are removed, before 
switching banks and enjoying its initial benefits (Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), 
Farinha and Santos (2002)). 
In the third part of our analysis, we analyze whether banks modified their lending 
strategies after the introduction of the Habeas Data Law. Notice that this exercise is 
different from the one mentioned in the previous paragraph, as now we use the sample 
of all loans at origination instead of a reduced sample of firms with previous negative 
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records. We find that banks grant loans with higher interest rates (+0.4bp to 1.7pp), 
consistent with previous empirical evidence that find that an increase (reduction) of 
information sharing is associating with lower (higher) cost of credit. (Brown, Jappelli 
and Pagano (2008)). In addition we find that banks are less likely to include collateral 
in the loan contracts (-2.4pp to -5.6pp). This suggests that banks use collateral as a 
mechanism to mitigate moral hazard problems. Given that in the New Regime there 
are less observably riskier borrowers, the likelihood to pledge collateral decreases. 
Finally, we find that firms with clean repayment history (Good Firms) get loans with 
lower interest rates (13bp) and are more likely to pledge collateral in the New Regime. 
This result goes in line with the theories that explain collateral as an attempt to 
compensate for ex-ante asymmetric information (Bester, 1985, 1987; Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). In other 
words, collateral is use by Good Firms as a mechanism to signal their quality when 
the level of asymmetric information in the credit market increases. As in Berger, 
Frame, Ioannidou (2011), we find empirical evidence of both ex ante and ex post 
theories of collateral, however the ex-post theories are empirically predominant. 
The paper unfolds as follows. Section II presents the Colombian Background, 
Section III describes the law change. Section IV describes the dataset and provides 
summary statistics. Section V presents the methodology. Section VI presents the 
empirical analysis. Section VII concludes. 
II. COLOMBIAN BACKGROUND
In the early nineties Colombia undertook a process of financial liberalization2 and 
almost simultaneously, there was a significant increase in capital inflows. During that 
period, the Colombian domestic investment grew much more than in any other Latin 
American country. There was an increase in the demand for non-tradable goods, 
particularly on real estate. This leaded to an increase in domestic credit and in asset 
prices, as well as a real appreciation of the Colombian peso. By then, most of the 
2 The financial liberalization process aimed at enhancing competition, allowing the operation of foreign 
banks in the country, increasing the reliance on market instruments, and reducing government and 
monetary authorities’ intervention in the financial system. Interest rates for savings deposits, for 
mortgage loans and for a large part of other loans were liberalized, and the Central Bank’s capacity to 
intervene interest rates was limited (Arbeláez and Echavarría, 2002).
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loans of the banking system were concentrated on maturities of one year or less. The 
long term financing was limited to mortgage lenders, which adopted mortgage 
schemes with riskier amortization requirements. Which combined with a lack of 
proper evaluation of mortgage loans increased the credit risk of these institutions. In 
addition, the capital requirements of mortgage lenders were lower than those of other 
intermediaries (Uribe (2008)). 
Between 1997 and 1999 there was a reversal of capital flows that affected the 
financial system through the reduction in liquidity and a subsequent increase in the 
funding costs. The reversal of capital flows was accompanied with deterioration on 
the terms of trade. This led to a sharp decline in aggregate spending. The product fell 
more than 4% in 1999 and real estate prices were down about 27% in real terms 
(Uribe (2008)). 
The increase in real interest rates together with a fall in real estate prices increased 
the financial burden on households. As a result, there was an increase in non-
performing loans3 that affected the solvency ratios of financial intermediaries. Several 
mortgage institutions remained weak for a long period of time and few others suffered 
bankruptcy. The general increase in the perception of credit risk led financial 
intermediaries to shift their portfolio composition towards government securities 
(Uribe (2008)). The crisis evidenced many of the limitations of the financial sector’s 
risk management. As a result, Colombia made significant improvements in assessing 
credit risks and market liquidity in the spirit of Basel II. 
Currently, Colombia is Latin America´s fourth largest economy and since the early 
2000´s has been converging fast towards higher living standards. Thanks to the 
adoption of sound macroeconomic policy reforms Colombia has have underpinned 
growth and reduced macroeconomic volatility. Among the main macroeconomic 
reforms adopted stand up, the adoption of a full-fledged inflation-targeting regime in 
19994 (with an inflation target range of 2.0-4.0%), a flexible exchange rate, a 
structural fiscal rule and solid financial regulation. Since 2002 the country 
experienced economic growth as well as low inflation and low interest rates (see 
3 Non- performing loans over total loans reached 12% in 1999 (Arbeláez and Echavarría, 2002). 
4 Between 1992 and 1999 monetary policy was conducted on the basis of an intermediate monetary 
target and a crawling band for the exchange rate (Gómez, Uribe and Vargas (2002)).  
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Graph 1), as most of the countries in Latin America. This climate translated in 
confidence that stimulated investment, especially foreign direct investment (OECD, 
2015). 
[Graph 1 around here] 
The Colombian economy was not dramatically affected by the global financial 
crisis. There was no GDP contraction but an economic slowdown that was quickly 
reverted. The GDP grew 6.9% in 2007 and 3.5% in 2008. There was a slow down in 
2009, when the economy grew at 1.7%, however, there was a rapid recovery in 2010 
when the GDP grew 4.0% and was followed by a growth of 6.6% in 2011 (see Graph 
2). The slowdown experienced by the Colombian economy was less pronounced than 
the one observed in the rest of Latin America; and there is general consensus that the 
crisis encounters the region better prepared than in the past.  The response capacity of 
the countries was quite different from what was observed in the debt crisis of the 
eighties (Kacef and Jiménez (2009)).  
[Graph 2 around here] 
Due to the privatization of public assets, which brought additional revenue, the 
Colombian government’s income was not affected during the crisis (UNFPA, 2011). 
In addition, the negative effects of the global financial crisis were mitigated by a 
variety of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy measures5. As a result, the 
banking system withstood the financial turbulence with capital and liquidity ratios 
well above regulatory requirements (World Bank, 2013). 
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE LAW CHANGE
Before 2008, institutions in Colombia were able to access a borrower’s entire credit 
history through the credit bureaus. Both positive and negative credit information was 
available through different portals (i.e., Datacredito, CIFIN). Positive information 
5 These measures relied partly on funding from multinationals, such as the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
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comprises information on both outstanding and previous loans, including: loan 
amount, maturity, value of collateral, bank granting the loan and the evolution over 
time of the loan, among others. Negative information corresponds to the information 
on payment defaults. In order to access the information for the first time, banks 
require authorization by the loan applicant. If a loan is originated and as soon as there 
is an outstanding credit relationship between the bank and the firm, the bank retains 
the right to access the information for monitoring purposes. 
The severe reduction in the supply of credit that followed the economic crisis of the 
90’s raised the need to create a law that limit the access to negative credit 
information. Several legislative projects were launch since the late nineties, however 
all of them failed to reach the approval by the Senate, the House of Representatives or 
the Constitutional Court. It was only until October 16th of 2008 that the Constitutional
Court approved the legislative project, and finally become a law after the approval of 
the President in December 31st of 2008. The Habeas Data law (No. 1266) aims to 
develop the fundamental right of all people to acknowledge, update and rectify 
information gathered about them in databases. It also aims to develop all other 
rights, freedoms and constitutional guarantees related to the collection, the 
processing and the circulation of personal data as referred in the Article 15 of the 
Colombian Constitution. The law makes particular emphasis on the information 
of financial, credit, business, and services nature; and also on the information 
coming from other countries. 
The law applies to all the personal information registered in databases 
administered by public or private institutions. It applies without prejudice to 
special rules that provide the confidentiality or reserve of certain information 
recorded in public datasets, for statistical purposes, research or sanction of 
crimes, or to ensure public order. 
In the context of credit markets, the Habeas Data regulates the management 
and circulation of all the information collected about borrowers (i.e., consumers, 
firms) by different institutions, including the credit bureaus. And, in particular, it 
protects the right of borrowers to be forgiven and forgotten by restricting the 
access to the negative credit information. After the introduction of the Habeas 
Data law, the negative information of a loan is observable only for a period that 
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depends on the length of the delinquency period. If the loan is delinquent for less 
than two years, then it remains in the portals for a period equal to twice the duration 
of the delinquency period, i.e. if the loan is delinquent for 2 months, the information 
will be in the portals for 4 months. On the other hand, if the loan is delinquent for 
more than two years, it remains in the portals for a fix period of 4 years, i.e. if the loan 
is delinquent for 3 years, the information will be in the portals for 4 years. The 
relationship between the retention time and the delinquency period of the Habeas 
Data law is represented in Graph 3. Finally, borrowers that never repay their loans 
stay in the portals for 10 years. The positive information on performing loans, 
however, remains available for the whole credit history.  
[Graph 3 around here] 
The law included a transition period of six months. During that period, borrowers 
were incentivized to repay their loans in order to clean their credit history. The 
borrowers that repay their loans before the end of the transition period were in the 
portals for one year. The borrowers that after repaying their loans had been on the 
portals for a year or more by the end of the transition period were removed 
immediately. The rule of the transition period is presented in detail in Table 1. Graph 
4 presents the time line of the legislative project since the Constitutional Court 
approved it, and thus the public was certain the law was going to be ratified in the 
near future, until the actual implementation of the law. 
[Table 1 around here] 
[Graph 4 around here] 
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Financial Institutions in Colombia are required by law to report detailed information 
on their loans to the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (SFC), the regulator 
of Colombian’s financial system. The information is confidential and is used for 
policy and research purposes. Unlike the credit bureaus, the credit register contain the 
complete credit history of all the loans, which provides an essential ingredient to 
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disentangle the behavioral changes of borrowers and lenders after the introduction of 
the Habeas Data law.  
For our analysis we use the credit register of commercial loans 6 . The dataset
provides a detailed look at all the loans granted by the financial system to firms on a 
quarterly basis. Characteristics such as loan amount, collateral, maturity, rate, credit 
score and exact date of origination are included from 1998:12 to 2012:06. The 
Information on the credit register is merged with the Financial Statements of the 
Firms and also Financial Statements of the banks.  Information about firm’s financial 
statements is provided on a yearly basis by the Superintendencia de Sociedades, the 
government organ that regulates non-financial firms. Information on bank’s financial 
statement is gathered from the website of the SFC. The final sample contains 1.3 
million loan observations granted to 28,866 firms by 71 banks.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics of firms’ characteristics for the total sample. 
The mean Return on Equity (ROE) is 5.8 percent, the mean Current Ratio (CR) is 
equal to 256.9 percent, which means that the current assess cover more than twice the 
current liabilities. The mean Capital Structure ratio, defined as liabilities over equity, 
is equal to 205.5 percent and about 40 percent of the firms are small in terms of assess 
size. Table 3 presents difference in means of Firm Characteristics between firms in 
the Old Regime and firms in the New Regime. Firms seem to be in better financial 
conditions during the New Regime. They have higher returns (ROE), higher liquidity 
ratio (CR), lower leverage ratios and bigger in terms of access size.  
[Table 2 around here] 
 [Table 3 around here] 
Table 4 presents summary statistics of loan characteristics. The mean interest rate is 
equal to 16,6 percent, 40 percent of the loans have collateral, the mean loan amount is 
678.2 million COP, which is equivalent to 376 thousand dollars, and the maturity is 
equal to 33 months (almost three years). Table 5 presents difference in means of loan 
characteristics between the Old Regime and the New Regime. The mean loan terms 
seem to be looser in the New Regime compared to the Old Regime. The interest rate is 
6 The dataset was provided to us due to a direct link of one of the authors with the Central 
Bank of Colombia. 
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3.3% percentage points lower, the loan amount is 103.8 million COP higher and the 
maturity is 9 months longer. However, the likelihood to be required to pledge 
collateral is higher by 10 percentage points.  
[Table 4 around here] 
[Table 5 around here] 
V. METHODOLOGY 
Several of the research questions addressed in this study are examined using a 
duration analysis. These models, in contrast to other methods, treat the time to the 
occurrence of an event as the outcome variable and deal well with censoring 
observations. The specific definition of the outcome variables (duration) will follow 
in each of the subsections of the empirical analysis (Section V).  
In what follows we present the generalities of the duration models following Kiefer 
(1988). Let 𝑇 represent the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of a 
certain random event. Duration can be represented by its density function f(t) or its 
cumulative distribution function F(t) , where F(t) = P(T ≤ t ), for a given t . The 
survival function, which is an alternative way of representing duration, is given by 
S(t) = 1 − F(t) = P(T > t ). In other words, the survival function represents the 
probability that the duration of an event is larger than a given t. A particular useful 
function for duration analysis is the hazard function 𝜆(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑡) 𝑆(𝑡)⁄ . 𝜆(𝑡) is the 
rate at which spells will be completed a duration 𝑡, given that they last until 𝑡. The 
hazard function provides a convenient definition of duration dependence. When λ(t) 
is increasing in t , there is a positive duration dependence, which means that the 
probability that a spell will end increases as the spell increases in length. Similarly, 
when λ(t) is decreasing in t, there is a negative duration dependence, which means 
that the probability of ending the spell decreases as the spell lengthens.  
We begin by deploying the unconditional Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimator of the 
survivor function S(t) which takes censored data into account. The estimator is given 
by Ŝ(k) = ∏ (1 − λ̂(i))1i=0 , where Ŝ(k) is the estimated probability that the spells 
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survives beyond time k. With a correction for right censoring, λ̂(i) is the number of 
losses in time i, divided by the number of survivals.  
When estimating hazard functions, it is convenient to assume a proportional hazard 
specification, such that 
λ(t, X(t), β) = λ0(t)Φ(β′Xt) 
where λ0(t)  denotes the baseline hazard function, common to all observations,
which captures the direct effect of time on the transition intensity. For estimation 
purposes, no functional form is specified for the baseline hazard. Xt  is a set of
observable time-varying explanatory variables and β  is a vector of unknown 
parameters to be estimated. An exponential form is chosen for Φ(. ), which has the 
advantage of guaranteeing non-negativity without imposing any restrictions on the 
values of the vector of parameters β. The model is estimated using the Cox (1972) 
partial likelihood model, Weibull specification and exponential specification. 
VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
1. Performance of loans after the Habeas Data law
We begin by analyzing whether firms are more prone to stop making payments on 
their loans after the Habeas Data law. We first analyze the time it takes for a new loan 
to default on its payments. We then analyze the time it takes for a delinquent loan to 
be repaid. Given that the behavior of borrowers and lenders could have being altered 
during the transition period, we exclude it from the analysis and leaving it for future 
research. Graph 5 illustrates how the spells are distributed across time. For 
comparison purposes between the Old Regime and the New Regime, we include in our 
analysis the spells that start and end in the Old Regime and the spells that start and 
end in the New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in the Graph). Moreover, we exclude 
the spells that started prior to 2002, because some of them would suffer from left 
censoring; and also, because some of the variables used in the analysis such as Length 
of Relationship and Previous Delinquent Loans are censored at the beginning of the 
sample. 
[Graph 5 around here] 
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Loan delinquency 
Duration 𝑇 is defined as the number of consecutive quarters before a loan starts 
having payment default. The origin of the survival time is taken as the quarter of 
origination of the loan. Survival can be observed only partially, because the 
observation period terminates at some point in time (in 2012), after which payment 
defaults cannot be observed. Some loans exit the observation period without 
experiencing any delay in their payments; they may or may not experience payment 
defaults in the future. 
Graph 6 shows the unconditional survival function 𝑆(𝑡), estimated separately for 
loans granted during the Old Regime and loans granted during the New Regime (spells 
“1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 5) using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. The shadows around 
the survival functions represent 95% confidence intervals. A log-rank test for equality 
of survivor functions suggest that loans in the New Regime are less likely to survive, 
or in other words, they are more likely to stop making payments, as borne out by a p-
value of 0.0.  
[Graph 6 around here] 
We then turn to estimate a semi-parametric Cox (1972) regression model, taking 
into account the impact of firm, relationship, bank and loan characteristics on the 
conditional probability of a payment default. The sign on the coefficients β can be 
interpreted as the partial impact of a time varying covariant on the probability of 
defaulting on the payments of a loan, holding duration constant. The results for fourth 
different models are presented in Table 6. The first model includes only an indicator 
variable for the New Regime, it takes the value of one if the loan was granted after the 
introduction of the Habeas Data Law and zero otherwise (Column I). The second 
model adds firm and relationship characteristics (Column II). The third model adds 
loan and macroeconomic characteristics (Column III). The fourth model includes 
bank fixed effects (Column IV). 
 [Table 6 around here] 
The results for the first model (Column I) suggest that loans in the New Regime are 
more likely to default on their payments, consistent with the results of the 
unconditional estimation made with the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. 
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Nonetheless, when we include firm, relationship, loan and macroeconomic 
characteristics (Columns II, III and IV) the sign of the coefficient changes to 
negative.. The results also show that a loan is more likely to default when the firm has 
lower ROA, higher current ratio, higher leverage, when it is small, when it has a 
shorter relationship with the bank and when it has been delinquent on previous loans. 
Moreover, a loan is more likely to default if it is small, collateralized, has a high 
interest rate and a shorter time to maturity. 
We then proceed to analyze the characteristics of the firms and the loans at the exact 
time of default. Table 7 presents the difference in means of the variables at the 
Default Point between the Old Regime and the New Regime. The defaulting firms of 
the New Regime seem to be in better financial conditions than the defaulting firms of 
the Old Regime. They have significantly higher ROA and higher current ratio. They 
also have a lower leverage ratio, however the difference is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, after the introduction of the Habeas Data law, the loan terms of the loans in 
default have lower interest rates (-3.3 percentage points) and higher collateral 
requirements. The fact that firms have better financial indicators at the Default Point 
in the New Regime, might suggest that the reduction in the retention time, introduced 
by the Habeas Data Law, disincentives firms to make their loan payments. 
[Table 7 around here] 
Repayment of Delinquent Loans 
We perform a similar analysis for the repayment of delinquent loans. Duration 𝑇 is 
defined as the number of consecutive quarters before a delinquent loan is repaid. The 
origin of the survival time is taken as the quarter in which the loan becomes 
delinquent. Also, in this case, survival can be observed only partially, because the 
observation period terminates in 2012 and after that loan repayments cannot be 
observed. Graph 7 shows the unconditional survival function 𝑆(𝑡) , estimated 
separately for delinquent loans during the Old Regime and delinquent loans during the 
New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 5). The shadows around the survival 
functions represent 95% confidence intervals. A log-rank test rejects the null 
hypothesis of equality of survivor functions (as borne out by a p-value of 0.0). This 
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suggests that delinquent loans in the New Regime are less likely to be repaid, or in 
other words, the duration of the spells of payment default is longer. 
[Graph 7 around here] 
We then turn to estimate the semi-parametric Cox (1972) regression model, taking 
into account the impact of firm, relationship, bank and loan characteristics on the 
conditional probability to repay a delinquent loan. The results for fourth different 
models are presented in Table 8. The first model includes only the indicator variable 
for the New Regime (Column I). The second model adds firm and relationship 
characteristics as well as industry fixed effects (Column II). The third model adds 
loan and macroeconomic characteristics (Column III) and the fourth model includes 
bank fixed effects (Column IV). The results suggest that delinquent loans in the New 
Regime are less likely to be repay than delinquent loans in the Old Regime, consistent 
with the results of the unconditional estimation made with the non-parametric Kaplan-
Meier estimator. These results are also robust to the inclusion of Bank FE. In addition, 
in unreported results we estimate the models using the exponential and the Weibull 
specifications of the baseline hazard function. The coefficient estimates are in line 
with those presented in Table 8, indicating that they are not sensitive to the 
specification of the baseline hazard function. The results also show that a delinquent 
loan is more likely to be repaid when the firm has higher ROA, lower current ratio 
and lower leverage. Moreover, a delinquent loan is more likely to be repaid if it is 
collateralized, small and has a low interest rate. 
[Table 8 around here] 
We then proceed to analyze the characteristics of the firms and the loans at the exact 
time of repayment. Table 9 presents the difference in means of the variables at the 
Repayment Point between the Old Regime and the New Regime. The firms that repay 
their loans in the New Regime seem to be in better financial conditions than the firms 
that repay their loans in the the Old Regime. They have significantly higher ROA and 
higher current ratio. They also have a lower leverage ratio, although the difference is 
not statistically significant. Moreover, after the introduction of the Habeas Data law, 
the set of delinquent loans that are repaid have lower loan amounts, lower interest 
rates, longer time to maturity and are more likely to have collateral. In general, even 
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though firms seem to be in better financial conditions in the New Regime, they take 
more time to repay their delinquent loans. 
[Table 9 around here] 
2. New loans from Outside/Inside Banks after loan repayment
In the second part of our study, we analyze the time it takes for a firm, with previous 
records of non-performing loans, to get a new, and how it is affected by the 
introduction of the Habeas Data Law. We divide the analysis in two parts: new loans 
from banks with which the firm did not have a lending relationship in the past 
(outside banks) and new loans from banks with which the firm had a lending 
relationship before (inside banks). We do so in order to determine what is the first 
source of bank debt of a firm after a delinquency period. In other words, we examine 
if firms strategically switch banks after a delinquency period or if they are more likely 
to be financed again by their existing bank relationships. In particular, we are 
interested in analyze whether the ability of a firm to obtain a new loan from an 
outside/inside bank is affected by the introduction of the Habeas Data Law. Unlike 
outside banks, inside banks are able to gather private information about the firm 
during the course of the relationship. The increase in information asymmetries 
provided by the introduction of the Habeas Data Law, might have enabled inside 
banks to gather a greater amount of private information. Thus, borrowers might 
change their strategies accordingly.  
We start by isolating a sample of firms that face only one payment default during the 
sample period and then estimate the time it takes for them to get a new loan after 
repayment. We use the firms that experience only one payment default in order to 
avoid overlapping between the time to get a new loan and the start of a new arrear. In 
our sample 4,287 firms have only one payment default during the sample period and 
3,453 firms had more than one. We analyze if the time to get a new loan from an 
outside/inside bank differs between the Old Regime and the New Regime.  
Duration 𝑇 is defined as the number of consecutive quarters before a firm gets a new 
loan from an outside/inside bank. The origin of the survival time is taken as the 
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quarter in which the firm pays its delinquent loan. Survival can be observed only 
partially, because the observation period terminates at some point in time (in 2012), 
after which new loans cannot be observed. Some firms exit the observation period 
without getting a new loan from an inside/outside bank and they may or may not get a 
new loan in the future. Given that we aim to analyze how the likelihood to get a new 
loan from an inside/outside bank was modified by the introduction of the Habeas Data 
law irrespective of the transition period, we also exclude this period from this part of 
the analysis. 
Graph 8 presents two panels with unconditional survival functions. Panel A shows 
the probability that the time to get a new loan from an outside bank is later than some 
specified time 𝑡. Panel B shows the probability that the time to get a new loan from an 
inside bank is later than some specified time 𝑡. The survival functions are estimated 
separately for the firms that repay their loans during the Old Regime and the firms that 
repay their loans during the New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 5). Log-
rank tests for equality of survivor functions suggest that, after a delinquency period, 
firms in the New Regime are less likely to get new loans from both inside and outside 
banks, than firms in the Old Regime. The median time to get a new loan from an 
outside bank is four quarters in the Old Regime and nine quarters in the New Regime. 
Moreover, the mean time to get a new loans from an inside bank is one quarter in the 
Old Regime and two quarters in the New Regime. This suggests that inside banks are 
the first providers of bank loans for firms with previous records of non-performing 
loans in both regimes.   
[Graph 8 around here] 
We then turn to estimate semi-parametric Cox (1972) regression models, taking into 
account the impact of firm characteristics on the conditional probability that a firm 
with previous non-performing loan records gets a new loan. The regressions are 
performed separately for the likelihood that a firm gets a new loan from an outside 
bank and the likelihood that a firm gets a new loan from an inside bank. The results 
for two different models are presented in Table 10. The first model includes only an 
indicator variable for the New Regime (Column I). The second model adds firm 
characteristics including the variable Length of Loan Delinquency that measures the 
length of the delinquency period of the firm, it also includes macroeconomic 
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characteristics and industry fixed effects (Column II). In Column (III) the second 
model is estimated using a Weibull specification for the baseline hazard. The 
coefficients measure the partial impact of each variable on the likelihood a firm gets a 
new loan from an Outside/Inside bank, conditional on duration. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficients reported for the New Regime dummy suggest that 
after a delinquency period, firms are least likely to get new loans from both inside and 
outside banks in the New Regime than in the Old Regime. These results are robust to 
the three specifications and are consistent with the results of the unconditional 
estimation made with the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator. We also find that 
the likelihood to get a new loan decreases with the Length of Loan Delinquency, 
however we do not find a differential effect between the Old Regime and the New 
Regime (unreported results). We also estimate the models using an exponential 
specification for the baseline hazard. The magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients are similar to the ones reported in Table 10. This suggests that our results 
are not sensitive to the specification of the baseline hazard. The parameter 𝜌 of the 
Weibull specification ( 𝜆0(𝑡) = 𝜌𝜆𝑡𝜌−1 ) is statistically greater than one, which
suggests that as the time after the delinquency period of the firm lengthens, the 
likelihood to get a new loan increases. 
[Table 10 around here] 
Table 11 compares the loan conditions of the first new loans granted by 
inside/outside banks to firms after a non-performing period, before and after the 
introduction of the Habeas Data Law. Both inside and outside banks seem to increase 
the collateral requirements, reduce the interest rate and increase the maturity after the 
introduction of the law. However, the reduction in the interest rate and the increase in 
the maturity seem to be more pronounced for the outside banks. This might be 
explained by the fact that, as mentioned before, the mean time to grant a new loan to a 
firm with non-performing records increased relatively more for outside banks than for 
inside banks after the introduction of the law. Therefore, by the time inside banks 
grant a new loan the delinquency period is relatively fresh or otherwise, still present 
in their own records. While by the time outside banks grant a new loan, the 
delinquency period is already distant and more likely no longer observable for them.  
[Table 11 around here] 
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We estimate the following model for each of the loan conditions using the sample of 
1,101 (2,403) new loans granted to firms with non-performing records by outside 
(inside) banks,    
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛾 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
where 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑡 index firm, bank and time (in quarters) respectively. 𝜃𝑗 corresponds
to bank fixed effects. They capture any systematic differences across banks. The 
results are reported in Tables 12 (outside banks) and 13 (inside banks). 
Consistent with the comparison in means of loan characteristics presented in Table 
11, we find that after the introduction of the Habeas Data Law both inside and outside 
banks grant loans with looser loan terms but higher collateral requirements to firms 
with previous records of non-performing loans. In particular, we find that loans 
granted by outside banks after the introduction of the law have: interest rates that are 
lower by 4.3 percentage points (pp), are 6pp more likely to be required to pledge 
collateral and have maturities that are 4.3 months longer (Table 12). Moreover, loans 
granted by inside banks during the New Regime have: interest rates that are 3.5pp 
lower, are 3pp more likely to be required to pledge collateral and have maturities that 
are 2 months longer.  
[Table 12 around here] 
[Table 13 around here] 
3. Banks’ Lending Strategies
We now turn to analyze whether banks modified their lending strategies after the 
introduction of the Habeas Data Law. We start by analyzing if the loan terms of loans 
at origination changed after the introduction of the Habeas data law. We also test 
whether good firms (as defined below) get the same treatment after the New Regime. 
In order to do so, we use the following model for each of the loan conditions: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛾 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑥 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
where 𝑖, 𝑗  and 𝑡  index firm, bank and time (in quarters) respectively. 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜃𝑗
corresponds to firm and bank fixed effects. They capture any systematic differences 
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across firms and across banks. 𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡  is an indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the firm never default before time t and zero otherwise. Our main 
coefficients of interest are 𝛾 and 𝛿, which measure respectively the general effect of 
the New Regime over the new loans and the specific effect for firms with a clean 
repayment history. For our estimation we use the total sample of loans at origination, 
which is comprised by 450,984 loans granted to 26,400 firms.  
The results, reported in Table 14, suggest that banks grant loans with higher spreads 
on interest rates (+4.0pb to 1.2pp), lower collateral requirements (likelihood to pledge 
collateral decreased by 2.4pp to 5.6pp), lower loan amounts (+1.2 to 1.3 million COP) 
and longer maturities (+0.4 to 1.7 months) in the New Regime. This is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence that find that an increase (reduction) of information 
sharing is associating with lower (higher) cost of credit (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano 
(2008)). Moreover the results for collateral suggest that banks use it to mitigate moral 
hazard problems. Given that in the new regime there are less observable observably 
riskier borrowers, the likelihood to pledge collateral decreases (Boot, Thakor, and 
Udell, 1991; Boot and Thakor, 1994; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Holmstrom and 
Tirole, 1997). In addition, we find that a Good Firm gets loans with lower interest 
rates (-05bp to 13bp) and is more likely to pledge collateral in the New Regime. This 
result goes in line with the theories that explain collateral as an attempt to compensate 
for ex-ante asymmetric information (Bester, 1985, 1987; Besanko and Thakor, 1987; 
Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot, Thakor, and Udell, 1991). In other words, collateral is 
use by Good Firms as a mechanism to signal their quality when the level of 
asymmetric information in the credit market increases. As in Berger, Frame, 
Ioannidou (2011), we find empirical evidence of both ex ante and ex post theories of 
collateral, however the ex-post theories are empirically predominant. 
[Table 14 around here] 
Finally, we analyze a sample of 167,247 new loans granted to 10,933 firms that 
received a loan from at least one inside and one outside bank in the same quarter. By 
doing this we are able to identify what are the differences in the loan conditions 
between inside and outside banks after the introduction of the Habeas Data Law. The 
following model is estimated for each of the loan conditions, 
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𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡
= 𝛽 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑥𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
where 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑡 index firm, bank and time (in quarters) respectively. 𝜃𝑖𝑡 corresponds
to firm x time fixed effects and account for any observable and unobservable firm 
specific heterogeneity across time. 𝜃𝑗 corresponds to bank fixed effects and capture
any systematic differences across banks. 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an indicator variable that takes
the value of one if the loan is granted by an outside bank and zero otherwise. Our 
main coefficient of interest is 𝜑, which measure the effect of the New Regime on the 
new loans granted by outside banks. The results are reported in Table 15. We find that 
switching loans have lower spreads on interest rates (-31pb to -59pb), consistent with 
the findings in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) using the Bolivian credit register. They 
are less likely to be required to pledge collateralized (-5.0pp to -4.1pp), they have 
lower loan amounts (-1.2 million COP) and shorter maturities (-6 months to -5.3 
months). After the introduction of the Habeas Data Law, the spread on the interest 
rate of loans granted by outside banks seems to have an increase (+19bp to 35bp), 
however it continues to be lower compare to the interest rate of loans granted by 
inside banks (von Thadden (2004); Degryse and Van Cayseele). Moreover, the 
collateral requirements of outside banks seem to be even lower after the introduction 
of the law (-2.9bp to -2.6bp). In addition, the loan amount of loans granted by outside 
banks seems to have an increase after the introduction of the law (1.1 million COP), 
however, it continues to be lower than the loan amounts offered by inside banks. 
Finally, outside banks seem to grant loans with even shorter maturities after he 
introduction of the law (2.6 months). These results suggest that although there are less 
observably risky borrowers, there is a higher uncertainty about the quality of new 
borrowers for outside banks.  
[Table 15 around here] 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we study the effect of a variation in the retention time of the firms’ 
negative credit information. By exploiting a quasi-experimental variation in retention 
times caused by a law change in Colombia we are able to analyze the subsequent 
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bank-firm behavior. For our analysis we use a unique credit register of all the 
commercial loans granted in Colombia from 1998 to 2012. It allows us to access some 
private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender, in particular 
the entire credit history of a firm (positive and negative information is included).  
Consistent with the disciplinary role of information sharing among lenders (Jappelli 
and Pagano (1993), Padilla and Pagano (1997, 2000)), we find that a decrease in 
information sharing is associated with a longer duration of loan delinquency periods. 
We also find that firms, with previous records of non-performing loan, are less likely 
to get new loans from both inside and outside banks in the New Regime. Nonetheless, 
inside banks seem to be the first providers of bank loans for firms with previous 
records of non-performing loans in both regimes. Firms seem to strategically wait 
long enough, until their negative records disappear from the credit bureaus, before 
switching banks.   
Consistent with this, we find that during the New Regime both inside and outside 
banks grant loans with looser loan terms but higher collateral requirements, to our 
sample of firms with previous records of non-performing loans. However, the 
reduction in the interest rate and the increase in the maturity seem to be more 
pronounced for the outside banks. Thus, by the time inside banks grant a new loan the 
delinquency period is relatively fresh or otherwise, still present in their own records. 
While by the time outside banks grant a new loan, the delinquency period is already 
distant and more likely no longer observable for them.  
Finally, using a sample of loans at origination, we find that banks grant loans with 
higher interest rates in the New Regime, consistent with previous empirical evidence 
that find that an increase (reduction) of information sharing is associating with lower 
(higher) cost of credit (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2008)). In addition we find that 
banks are less likely to include collateral in the loan contracts, which suggests that 
banks use collateral as a mechanism to mitigate moral hazard problems. Compared to 
the Old Regime, in the New Regime there are less observably riskier borrowers, 
therefore the likelihood to include collateral in the loan contract decreases. 
Nonetheless, Good Firms seem to use collateral as mechanism to signal their quality 
in the New Regime. We therefore find empirical evidence of both ex ante and ex post 
theories of collateral. 
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The Graph shows the evolution of the Interest Rate (monetary policy rate) for Colombia. 
GRAPH 2 
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, 2008: The legislative project was declared constitutional. 
December 31
st
, 2008: The legislative project was approved by the President. 
June 30th, 2009: Application of the Habeas Data Law. 
GRAPH 3 
Retention Time Rule Habeas Data Law 
The Graph shows the retention time as a function of the delinquency period according to the 
rule of the Habeas Data Law. 
GRAPH 4 
Time Line of the Legislative Project 
The Graph presents the time line of the legislative project. The Constitutional Court 
approves the project for the first time in October 16th of 2008. The law is finally ratified on 
December 31st of 2008, when the President approves the legislative project. Between January 
and June of 2009 the transition regime take place and since July of 2009 the Habeas Data law 
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GRAPH 5 
Time Line: Spells Location 
The Graph illustrates how the spells are distributed over time between the Old Regime (1), the 
Transition Period (2) and the New Regime (3). Spells “1-1” start and end during the Old
Regime, spells “1-2” start in the Old Regime and end during the Transition Period, spells “1-
3” start in the Old Regime and end in the New Regime, spells “2-2” start and end during the 
Transition Period, spells “2-3” start in the Transition Period and end in the New Regime and 
spells “3-3” start and end during the transition period. Spells that started prior to 2002 are 
excluded from the analysis. 
GRAPH 6 
Probability that a Loan do not Default Before Time t 
The Graph presents non-parametrically Kaplan-Meier survivor functions estimates with 
adjustment for right censoring. The 95% confidence intervals are also included. The survival 
function is estimated separately for loans granted during the Old Regime and loans granted 
during the New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 3). The figure is based on estimates 
of the survivor function Ŝ(k) = ∏ (1 − λ̂(i)1i=0 ), where λ̂(i) is the sample estimator for the 
probability that a loan default, conditional on the loan being up to date until period 𝑖. The 
number of loan observations is 1.048.077, the number of loans is 648.387 and the number of 
failures is 13.663.  
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GRAPH 7 
Probability that a Delinquent Loan is not Repaid Before Time t 
The Graph presents non-parametrically Kaplan-Meier survivor functions estimates with 
adjustment for right censoring. The 95% confidence intervals are also included. The survival 
function is estimated separately for delinquent loans during the Old Regime and delinquent 
loans during the New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 3). The figure is based on 
estimates of the survivor function Ŝ(k) = ∏ (1 − λ̂(i)1i=0 ), where λ̂(i) is the sample estimator 
for the probability that a delinquent loan is repaid, conditional on the loan being delinquent 
until period 𝑖. The number of loan observations is 40,910, the number of delinquent loans is 
15,680 and the number of repayments is 11,709. 
GRAPH 8 
Probability that, After Repay its Delinquent Loan, a Firm Do Not Get a New Loan 
from an Outside/Inside Bank Before Time t 
Panels A and B present non-parametrically Kaplan-Meier survivor functions estimates with 
adjustment for right censoring. The survival functions are estimated separately for firms that 
repay their delinquent loan during the Old Regime and firms that repay their delinquent loan 
during the New Regime (spells “1-1” and “3-3” in Graph 3). The figure is based on estimates 
of the survivor function Ŝ(k) = ∏ (1 − λ̂(i)1i=0 ) . In Panel A, λ̂(i) represents the sample 
estimator for the probability that a firm get a new loan from an outside bank (after repaying 
its delinquent loan), before period 𝑖. The number of firm observations is 9,834, the number of 
firms is 2,984 and the number of firms that get a new loan from an outside bank is 1,101. In 
Panel B, λ̂(i) represents the sample estimator for the probability that a firm get a new loan 
from an inside bank (after repaying its delinquent loan), before period 𝑖. The number of firm 
observations is 6,176, the number of firms is 3,386 and the number of switches is 2,403. 
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Panel A (failure): New Loan From an Outside Bank 
Panel B (failure): New Loan From an Inside Bank 
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TABLE 1 
Transition Rule of the Habeas Data Law 
The table presents the rules of the transition period for borrowers that repay their delinquent loans before the introduction of the Habeas 
Data law and during the transition period. The date of exclusion of the negative information from the portals depends on the date of 
repayment of the loan and on the time in which the negative information has been already in the portals. 
Repayment Date Negative information on the portals after repayment date Transition rule 
Before December 31, 2008 >= 1 year Immediate exclusion of the negative information. 
Before December 31, 2008 < 1 year The negative information is excluded one year after the repayment date.  
Between December 31, 2008 
and June 30, 2009 - 
The negative information is excluded one year after the 
repayment date.   
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics for Firm characteristics 
The Table reports summary statistics of firm characteristics. The mean, median and standard deviation (SD) are presented for every variable. The 
number of firms in the sample equals 28,866. COP: Colombian Peso. In June 2011: 1,800 COP = 1 US Dollar or 1 Million COP = 555 US 
Dollars.  
Firm Characteristic Definition Mean Median SD 
ROE Return on equity (%) =  Net Income/Equity. 5.8 4.5 10.5 
CR Current ratio (%): current assets/current liabilities. 256.9 152.6 542.2 
Capital Structure Capital structure ratio (%) = Liabilities/Equity. 205.5 111.2 329.4 
Assets Total Assets (Million COP). 25,201.2 3,422.7 227,642.4 
Small Firm 1 if the firm is small in terms of assets size, = 0 otherwise. 0.4 0.0 0.5 
155
TABLE 3 
Mean differences of firm characteristics between the old and the new regime. 
The Table compares the means of Firm Characteristics between firms in the Old Regime and firms in 
the New Regime, using a t-test. The transition period is excluded. The number of firms equals 
28,476. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Old Regime New Regime Mean Differences 
ROE 5.6 6.0 0.4 *** 
CR 250.0 263.9 13.9 *** 
Capital Structure 209.2 198.4 -10.8 *** 
Assets 22,996.2 28,788.4 5,792.2 *** 
Small Firm 0.5 0.4 -0.1 *** 
Number of firms 21,195 21,458 
TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics of Relationship and Loan Characteristics 
The Table reports summary statistics of loan characteristics. The mean, median and standard deviation (SD) are presented for every variable. The 
number of loan observations in the sample equals 1,341,385. COP: Colombian Peso. In June 2011: 1,800 COP = 1 US Dollar or 1 Million COP = 555 
US Dollars.  
Variable Description Unit Mean Median SD 
Relationship Characteristics 
Length of Relationship Length of the bank-firm relationship. Quarters 10.3 8.0 8.7 
Previous Delinquent Loans = 1 if the firm delinquent on a loan in the past, = 0 otherwise. 0/1 0.3 0.0 0.5 
Loan Characteristics 
Interest Rate Interest rate on the loan. % 16.6 15.7 7 
Collateral = 1 if loan is collateralized, = 0 otherwise. 0/1  % 38.0 0.0 49 
Loan Amount Loan size. Million COP 678.2 97.5 2484.9 
Ln Loan Amount Natural logaritm of Loan size.  - 4.5 4.6 2.1 
Maturity Length of maturity Months 33.4 24.0 41.1 
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TABLE 5 
Mean Differences of Loan Characteristics Between the Old and the New Regime. 
The Table compares the means of Loan Characteristics between the Old Regime and the New 
Regime, using a t-test. The transition period is excluded. The number of firms equals 
1,211,279. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Loan Characteristic Old Regime New Regime 
Mean 
Differences 
Interest Rate 17.6 14.4 -3.3 *** 
Collateral 0.3 0.4 0.1 *** 
Loan Amount 638.0 741.9 103.8 *** 
Ln Loan Amount 4.5 4.6 0.1 *** 
Maturity 29.6 38.5 9.0 *** 
Number of observations 741,409.0 469,870.0 
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TABLE 6 
Time to Default. Partial likelihood estimates of proportional hazard model 
The Table presents estimates based on maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard 
model using the Cox (1972) partial likelihood function. The coefficients measure the partial impact 
of each variable on the likelihood a loan defaults, conditional on duration. Definitions of the 
variables can be found in the Table 2 and Table 4. Column (I) report results of a model that includes 
only an indicator variable for the New Regime, it takes the value of one if the loan was granted after 
the introduction of the Habeas Data Law and zero otherwise. In Column (II) firm and relationship 
characteristics are included. In Column (III) loan and macroeconomic characteristics are added. 
Finally, Column (IV) includes bank fixed effects. The estimates in all the models are adjusted for 
right censoring. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding 
significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
Models I II III IV 
New Regime 0.10*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Firm and Relationship Characteristics 
ROA -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Current Ratio 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liabilities/Equity 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Small Firm 0.60*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Length of relationship -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Previous Delinquent Loans 7.15*** 7.16*** 7.14*** 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 0.12*** 0.17*** 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -0.05*** -0.05*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Interest Rate 0.02*** 0.02*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Time to Maturity -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth -0.01*** -0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES 
Log Likelihood -154,377 -137,186 -136,983 -136,597 
Number of Loans 648,387 648,387 648,387 648,387 
Number of Failures 13,663 13,663 13,663 13,663 
Number of Observations 1,051,720 1,051,720 1,051,720 1,051,720 
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TABLE 7 
Mean differences of firm and loan characteristics at the Default Point, 
 between the Old Regime and the New Regime 
The Table compares the means of Firm and Loan Characteristics at the Default Point, between 
loans in the Old Regime and loans in the New Regime. The last Column presents a t-test for the 
differences in means. The number of loan observations is 13,487. 
 Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Old Regime New Regime Mean Differences 
Spell Length 3.3 2.9 -0.4 *** 
Firm Characteristics 
ROA 0.2 1.7 1.5 *** 
Current Ratio 183.0 226.8 44.0 *** 
Liabilities/Equity 275.3 268.7 -6.6 
Small Firm 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Length of relationship 8.7 12.0 3.3 *** 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 0.5 0.6 0.1 *** 
Ln(Loan Amount) 4.2 4.2 0.0 
Interest Rate 18.3 15.0 -3.3 *** 
Time to Maturity 19.9 20.4 0.5 
Number of Observations 7,755 5,732 13,487 
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TABLE 8 
Time to Repay a Delinquent Loan. Partial likelihood estimates of proportional 
hazard model 
The Table presents estimates based on maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard 
model using the Cox (1972) partial likelihood function. The coefficients measure the partial impact 
of each variable on the likelihood a delinquent loan is repaid, conditional on duration. Definitions of 
the variables can be found in the Table 2 and Table 4. Column (I) report results of a model that 
includes only an indicator variable for the New Regime, it takes the value of one if the loan was 
granted after the introduction of the Habeas Data Law and zero otherwise. In Column (II) firm and 
relationship characteristics are included as well as industry fixed effects. In Column (III) loan and 
macroeconomic characteristics are added. Finally, Column (IV) includes bank fixed effects. The 
estimates in all the models are adjusted for right censoring. Coefficients are listed in the first row, 
robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below 
in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** 
Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Models I II III IV 
New Regime -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.25*** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Firm and Relationship Characteristics 
ROA 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Current Ratio -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liabilities/Equity -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Small Firm 0.01 -0.04** -0.03* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Length of relationship -0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 0.08*** 0.05*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -0.04*** -0.04*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Interest Rate -0.01*** -0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Time to Maturity 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth -0.02*** -0.02*** 
(0.00) (0.00) 
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES 
Log Likelihood -106,693 -106,506 -106,469 -106,379 
Number of Delinquent Loans 15895 15895 15895 15895 
Number of Repayments 11551 11551 11551 11551 
Number of Observations 40,380 40,380 40,380 40,380 
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TABLE 9 
Mean differences of firm and loan characteristics at the Repayment Point, 
 between the Old Regime and the New Regime 
The Table compares the means of Firm and Loan Characteristics at the Default Point, between 
loans in the Old Regime and loans in the New Regime. The last Column presents a t-test for the 
differences in means. The number of loan observations equals the number of loans repaid during 
the sample period, which is 11,709. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
Old Regime New Regime Mean Differences 
Spell Length 2.4 2.4 0.0 
Firm Characteristics 
ROA 1.3 3.1 1.8 *** 
Current Ratio 179.3 216.7 39.1 *** 
Liabilities/Equity 247.1 240.0 -7.1 
Small Firm 0.4 0.4 0.0 
Length of relationship 9.9 12.7 2.8 *** 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 0.5 0.6 0.1 *** 
Ln(Loan Amount) 4.1 3.9 -0.2 *** 
Interest Rate 18.2 15 -3.2 *** 
Time to Maturity 16.4 18 1.7 ** 
Number of Observations 6,097 5,454 11,551 
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TABLE 10 
Time to Get a New Loan After the Repayment of a Delinquent Loan. 
Partial Likelihood Estimates of Proportional Hazard Model 
The Table presents estimates based on maximum likelihood estimation of the proportional hazard model using 
the Cox (1972) partial likelihood function. The coefficients measure the partial impact of each variable on the 
likelihood a firm gets a new loan from an Outside/Inside Bank, conditional on duration. Length of Loan
Delinquency is the length of the period in which the firm was in default. Definitions of the rest of variables can 
be found in the Table 2. Columns (I) report results of a model that includes only an indicator variable for the 
New Regime, it takes the value of one if the loan was granted after the introduction of the Habeas Data Law 
and zero otherwise. In Columns (II) firm and macroeconomic characteristics, as well as industry fixed effects, 
are included. Columns (III) present estimates based on a Weibull Model. The estimates in all the models are 
adjusted for right censoring. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance 
levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Failure New Loan From Outside New Loan From Inside Bank 
Models I II 
III 
(Weibull) I II 
III 
(Weibull) 
New Regime -0.70*** -0.78*** -0.65*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.32*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Firm Characteristics 
ROA 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Current Ratio -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Liabilities/Equity 0.00** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Small Firm -0.41*** -0.34*** -0.26*** -0.31*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06) 
Length of Loan Delinquency -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.21*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.03*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Industry Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Log Likelihood -7,701 -7,654 - -18,015 -16,531 - 
Number of Firms 2783 2783 2783 3355 3355 3355 
Number of Outside/Inside new loans 1034 1034 1034 2375 2375 2375 
Number of Observations 9120 9120 9120 6,139 6,139 6,139 
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TABLE 11 
Mean Differences of the Characteristics of New Loans from Outside/Inside Banks (granted to firms with non 
performing records) Between the Old Regime and the New Regime 
The Table presents the characteristics of New Loans from Outside/Inside banks, granted to firms after repaying their unique delinquent 
loan. The table compares the loans granted during the Old Regime versus the loans granted during the New Regime and presents a t-test 
for the differences in means. The number of loan observations equals the number of new loans from Outside banks: 1,101 and the number 
of loans from Inside banks: 2,403. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
New Loan From Outside New Loan From Inside Bank 
Old Regime New Regime Mean Differences Old Regime New Regime Mean Differences 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral 30 40 10.0 *** 20 30 10.0 *** 
Ln(Loan Amount) 4.3 4.5 0.2 4.5 4.3 -0.1 * 
Interest Rate 19.1 13.9 -5.2 *** 19.5 15.6 -3.9 *** 
Maturity 17.3 25.8 8.5 *** 11.5 14.9 3.4 *** 
Number of Observations 596 496 1,092 1,118 1,257 2,375 
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TABLE 12 
Loan Conditions of New Loans by Outside Banks, Granted to Firms with Records of Non Performing Loans 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 1,034 new loans granted by outside banks to firms that had records of non-performing loans in the 
past. Columns I-VIII report specifications for each of the loan characteristics: Interest Rate, Collateral, Ln(loan amount) and Maturity. The models 
include the variable New Regime and firm and loan characteristics as controls. Bank Fixed Effects are included in all specifications. Definitions of the 
variables can be found in Table 2 and Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm 
level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.        
Dependent Variable Interest Rate Collateral Ln(Loan Amount) Maturity 
Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
New Regime -4.20*** -3.58*** 14.42*** 6.47** 0.31** -0.34*** 8.28*** 4.39*** 
(0.54) (0.46) (3.40) (2.80) (0.13) (0.12) (1.59) (1.46) 
Constant 20.99*** 27.54*** -35.69*** -20.09** 3.82*** 6.63*** -11.05** -15.34*** 
(1.87) (1.29) (7.72) (7.85) (0.44) (0.27) (5.40) (5.31) 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Macroeconomic 
Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.18 0.34 0.13 0.30 0.19 0.38 0.10 0.29 
Number of observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 
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TABLE 13 
Loan Conditions of New Loans by Inside Banks, Granted to Firms with Records of Non Performing Loans 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 2,215 new loans granted by inside banks to firms that had records of non performing loans in the 
past. Columns I-VIII report specifications for each of the loan characteristics: Interest Rate, Collateral, Ln(loan amount) and Maturity. The models 
include the variable New Regime and firm and loan characteristics as controls. Bank Fixed Effects are included in all specifications. Definitions of the 
variables can be found in Table 2 and Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the firm 
level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 1%, 
** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.    
Dependent Variable Interest Rate Collateral Ln(Loan Amount) Maturity 
Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
New Regime -2.96*** -2.72*** 6.12*** 1.25 0.05 -0.37*** 4.24*** 2.81*** 
(0.33) (0.31) (1.81) (1.73) (0.09) (0.09) (0.62) (0.50) 
Constant 19.73*** 26.93*** -5.39 -4.04 3.95*** 6.23*** 1.68 -1.63 
(0.68) (0.77) (4.03) (6.73) (0.22) (0.28) (1.15) (3.16) 
Firm Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Loan Characteristics YES YES YES YES 
Macroeconomic 
Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.16 0.37 0.07 0.22 0.25 0.45 0.06 0.24 
Number of observations 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 2,215 
165
TABLE 14 
Loan Conditions of New Loans by Inside and Outside Banks 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 451,462 new loans granted to 26,401 firms. Columns I-IV report specifications for each of the loan characteristics: Interest 
Rate, Collateral, Ln(loan amount) and Maturity. The models include an indicator variable for the New Regime, an indicator variable for Good Firm, which takes the value of one if 
the firm never default before time t and zero otherwise. An interaction term New Regime and Good Firm is also included. Firm, relationship, loan and macroeconomic 
characteristics are included as controls. Definitions of the variables can be found in Table 2 and Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that are 
corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. Note: *** Significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.   In Column (I) firm and bank fixed effects are included. In Column (II) loan characteristics are added as controls. And Column (III) 
includes firm*bank fixed effects.  
Dependent Variable Spread Interest Rate Collateral Ln(Loan Amount) Maturity 
Models I II III I II III I II III I II III 
New Regime 0.41*** 0.64*** 1.72*** -2.44*** -5.63*** -3.82*** 0.16*** -0.14*** -0.24*** 1.68*** 1.39*** 0.42** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.36) (0.36) -0.45 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) 
Good Firm x New Regime -0.13* -0.06 0.05 1.92*** 2.15*** 1.72*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.30* 0.16 -0.21 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.39) (0.38) (0.45) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) 
Good Firm 0.13* 0.26*** -0.17** -1.40*** -1.62*** -2.04*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.84*** -0.91*** -0.47*** 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.33) (0.33) (0.40) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) 
Firm and Relationship 
Characteristics 
ROA -1.68*** -2.01*** -1.92*** 0.88 0.53 -0.31 -0.20*** -0.37*** -0.44*** -1.49*** -1.39*** -1.33** 
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (1.11) (1.09) (1.26) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.53) (0.51) (0.55) 
Current Ratio 0.05*** 0.01* 0.01* -0.12*** -0.03 0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 0.04*** 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Liabilities/Equity -0.02** 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.11** -0.10* 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.07*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Small Firm 0.86*** 0.33*** 0.16** -2.20*** -0.81** -0.14 -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.20*** -0.75*** -0.07 0.33* 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.41) (0.40) (0.49) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
Number of Relationships -0.08*** -0.01 0.05*** -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.16** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.09*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Length of Relationship -0.05*** 0.01*** -0.07*** 0.28*** 0.19*** -0.00 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.05*** 0.07*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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TABLE 14 (continued) 
Loan Conditions of New Loans by Inside and Outside Banks 
Dependent Variable Spread Interest Rate Collateral Ln(Loan Amount) Maturity 
Models I II III I II III I II III I II III 
Macroeconomic Characteristics 
GDP Growth -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.08*** 
-
0.27*** -0.42*** -0.31*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Loan Characteristics 
Collateral -1.71*** -2.03*** 0.33*** 0.43*** 7.74*** 6.79*** 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.13) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -1.64*** -1.55*** 2.43*** 3.76*** 1.58*** 1.35*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.12) (0.03) (0.04) 









(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time to Maturity -0.01*** -0.02*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 17.87*** 23.40*** 19.27*** 15.38** 20.32*** 21.61*** 3.16*** 5.07*** 5.10*** 9.21** 4.78 4.76*** 
(1.54) (0.93) (0.13) (7.16) (4.83) (0.85) (0.46) (0.33) (0.03) (3.97) (3.04) (0.36) 
Firm Fixed Effects  YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES NO 
Firm x Bank Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES 
R-squared 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.7 
Number of observations 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 451,462 
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TABLE 15 
Loan Conditions of New Loans by Inside and Outside Banks 
The Table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 167,267 new loans granted to 10,933 firms that received a loan from at least one inside and one outside bank 
in the same quarter. Columns I-IV report specifications for each of the loan characteristics: Interest Rate, Collateral, Ln(loan amount) and Maturity. The models 
include the variable Switch, with is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the loan was granted by an outside bank and zero otherwise and an 
interaction term with the New Regime. Some of the specifications also include loan characteristics as controls. Firm x Time Fixed Effects and Bank Fixed 
Effects are included in all specifications. Definitions of the variables can be found in Table 4. Coefficients are listed in the first row, robust standard errors that 
are corrected for clustering at the firm level are reported in the row below in parentheses, and the corresponding significance levels are in the adjacent column. 
Note: *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
Dependent Variable Spread Interest Rate Collateral Ln(Loan Amount) Maturity 
Models I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Switch -0.31*** -0.59*** -5.05*** -4.14*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -5.97*** -5.31*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.29) (0.28) (0.01) (0.01) (0.22) (0.22) 
Switch x New Regime 0.19** 0.35*** -2.89*** -2.62*** 0.13*** 0.16*** -2.70*** -2.64*** 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.54) (0.53) (0.02) (0.02) (0.43) (0.42) 
Loan Characteristics 
Interest Rate -0.87*** -0.09*** 0.44*** 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
Collateral -1.70*** 0.20*** 7.89*** 
(0.04) (0.01) (0.31) 
Ln(Loan Amount) -1.38*** 1.63*** 0.78*** 
(0.02) (0.12) (0.10) 
Maturity 0.01*** 0.13*** 0.00*** 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Constant 14.65*** 19.89*** 20.86 32.05*** 3.71*** 5.50*** 12.05 -1.86 
(1.96) (1.08) (15.38) (11.73) (0.64) (0.46) (9.76) (8.96) 
Firm x Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Bank Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.41 0.51 0.42 0.44 0.54 0.6 0.36 0.37 
Number of observations 167,267 167,267 167,267 167,267 167,267 167,267 167,267 167,267 
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